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ABSTRACT 
The limited literature on the foreign policy of small states is 
riddled with diverse views on the most effective policy orientation 
for these countries. Some scholars have specified multilateralism as 
the most effective strategy while others have suggested regionalism 
and some others have stressed bilateralism. While this is the case, 
small states being heavily dependent on the external environment and 
the least equipped to influence events or processes at the 
international level, find it essential to ensure that their foreign 
policy orientation is the most effective. As such, there is a need 
for additional research on the subject, as that undertaken in this 
thesis. 
Guided by the framework for evaluation suggested by G.A. Raymond, 
this thesis attempted to evaluate the foreign policies of Vanuatu 
and the Maldives to determine whether there is any justification to 
argue in favour of multilateralism, regionalism or bilateralism as 
the most effective foreign policy strategy for small island states, 
a sub-group wi thin the category of small states. Vanuatu and the 
Maldives were used as case studies since their policies were of the 
same class or universe rendering them suitable for comparison. Three 
foreign policy goals that have been identified for evaluation 
included, preserving and enhancing security and sovereignty; 
economic development; and environment protection. These goals were 
tied to several objectives. The thesis, using the comparative 
method, attempted to determine the relative effectiveness of the 
strategies, multilateralism, regionalism and bilateralism, in 
contributing towards realising the foreign policy objectives and 
thereby the goals. 
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The evaluation revealed that multilateralism was more effective 
overall in contributing towards the security and sovereignty related 
objectives and the environment related objectives of Vanuatu and the 
Maldives. Both bilateralism and multilateralism were equally 
effective for Vanuatu and the Maldives in contributing towards their 
economic development related objectives. The evaluation also revealed 
a slight bias in favour of multilateralism as more effective overall 
compared to regionalism and bilateralism, in contributing towards the 
three foreign policy goals of the two countries. This was because all 
of the objectives were given equal weight in the analysis. If the 
objectives were prioritised then the results would have been 
different. In fact, different strategies proved effective in 
contributing towards different objectives and goals. Often more than 
one strategy had to be used in furthering a single objective or goal. 
As such, based on the evaluation of this thesis, there is no 
justification to argue in favour of anyone strategy as more 
effective for the foreign policy of small states. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 - General Introduction 
The past three to four decades witnessed a large number of small 
island states gain independence and become sovereign members of the 
international community. 1 Yet, as Keohane noted in 1969 and 
Henderson in 1991 the study of the foreign policy of small states 
has not received its due attention in international relations 
scholarship.2 This was unfortunate since· small island states are 
among the most dependent on the international environment for their 
socio-economic development and security. 3 The economies of small 
island states, for example, have largely survived on revenue 
generated from tourism, foreign aid, and preferential access to 
external markets. Likewise, in the area of security much of the 
strength of small states is derivative from the external 
environment. 4 
1 Small Island States is defined in pp. 21-25. 
2 J. Henderson, 'New Zealand and the Foreign Policy of Small 
States', in R. Kennaway and J. Henderson (eds.), Beyond New Zealand 
II: Foreign Policy into the 1990s, Longman Paul, Auckland, 1991, 
pp. 3-13; and R. O. Keohane, 'Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States 
in International Politics', International Organisation, 23, 1969 
pp. 291-310. 
3 The characteristics of small states are discussed in, Commonwealth 
Consultative Group on the Special Needs of Small States, 
Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society, Commonwealth 
Secretariat, London, 1985, pp.14-22; Commonwealth Advisory Group, A 
Future For Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability, Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 1997, pp. 9-13, 17-22, 24-26 and 65-74; B. Benedict 
(ed.), Problems of Smaller Territories, Athlone Press, 1967, p. 35; 
A.J. Dolman, 'Paradise Lost? The Past Performance and Future 
Prospects of Small Island Developing Countries', in E. Dommen & P. 
Hein (eds.), States r Microstates and Islands, Croom Helm, Kent, 
1985, pp. 40- 6 9 . 
4 M.I. Handel, Weak States in the International System, Frank Cass, 
London, 1990, p.257. 
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Small island states with their great need to interact, influence and 
benefit from the international community lack economic or military 
power to wield in the conduct of their foreign policy. They do not 
have the resources to adequately address tasks such as information 
gathering which are essential for prudent foreign policy making. 
Their overseas diplomatic representation, membership in 
international organisations, and participation in international 
meetings and conferences are restricted by, financial and human 
resource constraints. Consequently, small island states have to be 
parsimonious and selective in their foreign policy emphasis and 
strategies to realise the greatest payoffs from minimal expenditure. 
This calls for intense scholarly attention to the foreign policy of 
small island states. 
Various international politico-economic changes during the past 
decade have heightened the need and urgency for closer scholarly 
scrutiny of the foreign policy of small island states. Among these 
changes were the end of the Cold War which drastically altered the 
very fabric of international relations; a steady decline in foreign 
aid; the institution of a new global trading regime initiating the 
erosion of preferential market access for small states; emergence of 
new threats such as global warming and sea level rise; and the 
escalation of existing threats from various types of criminal 
elements. Small island states being the most vulnerable and 
therefore the first to be affected by changes in the global system 
have to find efficient ways and means to adjust to this changing 
global environment. It is imperative that these states with very 
limi ted resources ensure that their foreign policy orientation is 
the most effective. 
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There is no agreement among scholars as to the most effective 
foreign policy orientation for small island states. Some scholars 
have identified multilateralism as the most effective foreign policy 
orientation, others have suggested regionalism and yet others have 
specified bilateralism. s The Commonwealth Consultative Group on the 
Special Needs of Small States, for example, while suggesting the 
need for diplomatic initiatives simultaneously at the bilateral and 
multilateral levels, argued that for "small states, as for most 
states, bilateral relations are of the highest importance". 6 The 
Group also went on to note that major powers and neighbouring states 
must naturally have priority in this respect. 
In contrast to the above suggestion, Paul Sutton and Anthony Payne 
have recommended regionalism as the most important foreign policy 
tool for small states. 7 They argued that small states could overcome 
their intrinsic vulnerabilities including openness, islandness, 
dependence, and weakness, by closer co-operation among themselves, 
both in existing regional organisations and through the creation of 
new ones. Sutton and Payne also specified that within the growing 
anarchy of the international system in the 1990s the best defence 
for small states lies in enhancing the resilience of their political 
systems and by promoting schemes of collective military and economic 
security among regional states. Herr has noted that the belief that 
regional co-operation is imperative for the survival of the South 
Pacific island states has become so widely accepted as to virtually 
enjoy the status of a political axiom. 8 A similar view was shared by 
5 Multilateralism, regionalism and bilateralism are defined in pp. 
10-21. 
6 Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability, op. cit., p. 68. 
7 P. Sutton, & A. Payne, 'Lilliput Under Threat: the Security 
Problems of Small Island and Enclave Developing States', Political 
Studies, vol. 49, 1993, pp. 579-593. 
8 R.A. Herr, Institutional Sources of Stress in Pacific Regionalism, 
working paper series, Pacific Islands Studies Centre for Asia and 
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Maurice East who argued that in the post-Cold War world, regionalism 
is becoming more salient and relevant and that small states needed 
to re-examine the allocation of their resources between global and 
regional endeavours. 9 
Some other scholars are in favour of multilateralism over both 
regionalism and bilateralism. In discussing the security of small 
states Rothstein for example, argued that "small powers ought to 
prefer mixed, multilateral alliances". 10 His justification was that 
such alliances provided the "most benefits in terms of security and 
poli tical influence" for small states. Similarly, in an article on 
the relevance and functions of diplomacy for small Caribbean states 
Ron Sanders suggested that the prospect for the survival of small 
states in economic and security terms was dependent on their active 
participation in the United Nations. 11 
These disparate perceptions demonstrate a definite need for further 
studies on the foreign policy orientation of small states, which 
this dissertation aims to cater to. It is the contention of this 
thesis that there is not enough evidence to substantiate claims in 
favour of multilateralism, regionalism or bilateralism as a more 
useful foreign policy strategy for small states. To verify the 
validity of this view an attempt is made below to evaluate the 
foreign policy strategies of Vanuatu and the Maldives to determine 
the Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, 1980, 
p. 1. 
9 M.A. East, 'Foreign Policy-Making in the Post-Cold War Era: 
Examples from New Zealand', in R. Pettman (ed.), Rethinking Global 
Affairs: New World Order/New International Relations/New Zealand, 
Department of Political Science, Victoria Uni versi ty, Wellington, 
1996, pp. 25-32. 
10 R.L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, Columbia University 
Press, New York and London, 1968, p. 177. 
11 R. Sanders, 'The Relevance and Function of Diplomacy in 
International Politics for Small Caribbean States', The Round 
Table, no. 312, 1989, pp. 413-424. 
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whether there is any merit to claims that either multilateralism, 
regionalism or bilateralism is a more useful or effective foreign 
policy strategy for small states. It is hoped that this dissertation 
will contribute to a better insight into the foreign policy of small 
states and particularly small island states, an area largely 
neglected in international relations scholarship. 
Before proceeding any further the important concepts used in this 
thesis will be briefly explained below. 
l.la - Multilateralism 
Multilateralism has been used in different contexts and ways in 
international relations scholarship. 12 The conventional diplomatic 
usage of the term multilateralism refers to contacts among three or 
more states, but not necessarily within the framework of an 
. . t' 13 lntergovernmental conference or organlsa lon. Cox has described 
this type of multilateralism restricted to states as "political 
multilateralism".14 Another slightly different definition of 
multilateralism is provided by Papadopoulos, who defined the term as 
"the conduct of international relations and their adjustment between 
and among several international actors, mainly within the framework 
of inter-governmental organisations". 15 Mul tilateralism has also been 
commonly used to refer to certain types of economic arrangements. 
12 The evolution of multilateralism and the various intellectual 
approaches to multilateralism are very comprehensively discussed 
in, R.W. Cox, 'Multilateralism and World Order', in Review of 
International Studies, vol. 18, 1992, pp. 161-180. 
13 J. Kaufmann, Conference Diplomacy An Introductory Analysis, 2nd 
edition, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1988, p. 2. 
14 Cox 'Multilateralism', op. cit., p. 162. 
15 A.N. Papadopoulos, Multilateral Diplomacy within the 
Commonwealth: A Decade of Expansion, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht, 1982, p. 4. 
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Miriam Camps and William Diebold, Jr., have used multilateralism to 
refer to what they called "the trade side of the Bretton Woods 
world" . 16 
The economic definition of multilateralism is said to have emerged 
from the negotiations between the united states and Britain for the 
constitution of the post-World War II economic order. Cox has noted 
that in the context of the above negotiations in which the united 
states used its economic leverage to pressure Britain to abandon the 
preferential trade and payments system encompassing the Commonwealth 
and Empire, economic multilateralism meant "the structure of world 
economy most conducive to capital expansion on a world scale"; and 
political multilateralism meant the "institutionalised arrangements 
made at that time and in those conditions for inter-state 
cooperation on common problems".17 
since the 1950s the global society has changed drastically. Various 
types and forms of transnational business alliances have been formed 
and new actors such as non-governmental organisations, which derive 
their support from different corners of the world, have gained 
substantial influence on certain issues of global significance. Thus 
it is true that multilateralism today has to take into consideration 
these changes. IS This makes the scope of multilateralism extremely 
broad. 
However given the scope of this thesis the term multilateralism had 
to be purposefully limited to arrangements involving states. As 
16 M. Camps, and W. Diebold, Jr., The New Multilateralism: Can the 
World Trading System be Saved, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 
New York, 1983, p. 24. 
17 Cox 'Multilateralism', op. cit., p. 162. 
U Ibid., p. 162-163. 
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such, this thesis borrows for use Keohane's definition of 
multilateralism, "the practice of co-ordinating national policies in 
groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by 
means of institutions". 19 However, the thesis excludes from this 
definition those arrangements and institutions that fall within the 
framework of regionalism which will be defined in the section on 
regionalism below. 
As defined by Keohane institutions meant "persistent and connected 
sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioural 
roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations". 20 Multilateral 
institutions then are multilateral arrangements that can take the 
form of international regimes or bureaucratic organisations. 21 
Based on the above definition the most significant multilateral 
institutions discussed in this thesis include organisations such as 
the united Nations, the Commonwealth, the Non Aligned Movement 
(NAM) , the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and arrangements 
like the Lome Convention. This does not in anyway mean that these 
institutions are similar. There are differences between each and 
everyone of these institutions. The discussion below will 
demonstrate their main difference. 
The United Nations for instance, includes within its folds almost 
all the states within the international community and has its 
membership open to the rest. The purposes of this organisation 
enshrined in its Charter includes the maintenance of international 
19 R.O. Keohane, 'Multilateralism: an agenda for research', Canadian 
Institute of International Affairs, vol. XLV, no. 4, Autumn, 1990, 
pp. 731-764. 
20 Ibid., p. 732. 
21 Ibid. 
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peace and security, co-operation in solving economic and social 
problems and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedom for all. 22 The organisation carries out a multitude of 
activities in areas such as international peace and security, socio-
economic development and environment protection. This organisation 
could be considered the closest to a global organisation in the 
present day world. 
The Commonwealth is referred to by some as a quasi-global 
organisation. The membership of the organisation is open only to 
former British dependencies or dependencies of other Commonwealth 
members. 23 The Maldives, which was a former protectorate of Britain, 
sought membership of the organisation in 1985, some twenty years 
after independence. 
Among the aims of the Commonwealth are supporting the United Nations 
in fostering peace and security in the world; promoting equality 
among individuals; combating racial prejudice; furthering the 
principles of self-determination; fighting poverty, ignorance, 
disease, and raising the standard of living of all societies. 24 
Although some of these aims are similar to those of the united 
Nations the scope of Commonwealth's activities are much more limited 
in most areas. 
The NAM was an organisation that was founded by Nasser of Egypt, 
Tito of Yugoslavia and Nehru of India, during the Cold War era. The 
22 A. Boyd, The United Nations Organisation Handbook, The Pilot 
Press Ltd., London, 1946, p. 37. 
23 Papadopoulos, Multilateral Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 6. 
24 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, The Declaration of the 
Commonwealth Principles, issued by the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government meeting in Singapore, 1971, Commonwealth Secretariat, 
London, n.d., pp. 1-3. 
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organisation technically included in its membership those countries 
that did not align with any warring side in the context of the Cold 
War. 25 Some of the preoccupations of the organisation include, 
protesting against colonialism, moderation of the East-West tension, 
and since the 1970s the restructuring of the global system in the 
direction of greater equity in North-South relations. 26 
The AOSIS was an organisation formed in 1990 by small island states 
for the purpose of collective diplomacy on the issue of global 
warming and climate change. 27 The organisation has its membership 
open to small island states. The organisation presently has some 47 
states as members. The activities of this organisation will be 
discussed in detail in chapter IV. 
Unlike the organisations discussed above the Lome Convention is an 
economic arrangement between the European Union and the African, 
Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) states. This arrangement will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter III. 
Despite their differences the institutions discussed above have two 
things in cornmon - they are all multilateral in nature and involve 
diplomacy at the multilateral level; and the two states focused in 
this thesis are either members of or a party to these institutions. 
The only exception is the Lome Convention of which only Vanuatu is a 
party. 
25 For the criteria for membership as defined by the founding 
fathers of the organisation see, A.W. Singham & S. Hune, Non-
Alignment in an Age of Alignments, Lawrence Hill & Co., 
Connecticut, 1986, p. 39. The question of whether the members of 
the organisation were truly non-aligned is discussed in, S. 
Yasmeen, Is the Non-Aligned Movement Really Non-Aligned, working 
paper no. 141, Strategic Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra, 1987. 
26 Ibid., p. xiii. 
27 Collective diplomacy is discussed in Chapter IV. 
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1.lb - Regionalism 
The definition of multilateralism is so broad that the phenomena 
referred to in this thesis as regionalism falls within its framework 
unless purposefully distinguished. Such distinction between 
multilateralism and regionalism is not new in international 
relations and is very important for the purposes of this thesis. 28 
There is no agreement among scholars on the definition of 
regionalism due to the difficulty in determining the criteria for 
delineating regions. 29 Karl Deutsch for example defined a region as a 
few countries united by some geographical, cultural or historical 
associations, or by economic and financial ties, or by political 
liberal mindedness and similarity of social institutions, or by some 
combination of all these factors. 3D Under such definitions almost all 
non-uni versal associations of states from the Commonwealth to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Arab League can be 
considered regional organisations as Ball and Killough have noted. 31 
28 Literature in which a distinction has been made between 
regionalism and multilateralism include for example, P. Krugman, 
'Regionalism Versus Multilateralism: analytical notes' in R. 
Garnaut & P. Drysdale (eds.) Asia Pacific Regionalism: Readings in 
International Economic Relations, Harper and Collins Publishers, 
Pymble, 1994, pp. 167- 178; J. Bhagwati, 'Regionalism and 
Multilateralism: an overview', Garnaut & Drysdale (eds.), Asia 
Pacific, op. cit., pp. 145-161; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (MFAT), New Zealand and Trade Policy: Implementation and 
Directions: A Multitrack Approach, MFAT, Wellington, 1993, p. 60. 
Advantages of using the category of regionalism in the study of 
international relations is discussed in, L.J. Cantori & S.L. 
Spiegel (eds.), International Politics of Regions, Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., New Jersey, 1970, pp. 4-5. 
29 For a discussion on the criteria of defining a region see, B.M. 
Russett, International Regions and the International System: a 
study in political ecology, Yale University Rand McNally & Company, 
Chicago, 1967, p. 2-7. 
30 K.W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, 2nd 
edition, Prentice Hall Inc., New Jersey, 1978, p. 226. 
31 M.M. Ball and H.B. Killough, International Relations, Stevens & 
Sons Limited, London, 1956, p. 447. For a discussion on the 
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Such usage stretches the meaning of regionalism too broad rendering 
it meaningless. 
The question then is whether to use geographic proximity, 
contiguity, homogeneity, interdependence, loyalties, or any other 
criteria to define regions. Cantori and Spiegel have identified 15 
regions which they call "subordinate systems", based on the 
following criteria - "a subordinate system consists of one state, or 
two or more proximate and interacting states which have some common 
ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and historical bonds, and whose 
sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and 
attitudes of states external to the system". 32 This is a useful 
definition of region as far as this thesis is concerned. 
The regions identified by cantori and Spiegel include the region of 
"Southwest Pacific" which consists of Australia, New Zealand and the 
island states of the South Pacific; and the region of "South Asia" 
which includes Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri 
Lanka, the Maldives, Burma and Afghanistan. cantori and Spiegel have 
noted that Afghanistan and Burma could possibly be a member of 
another region. As far as this thesis is concerned the delineation 
of Southwest Pacific is acceptable but will be referred to here as 
the South Pacific, and the region of South Asia includes all the 
countries identified by Cantori and Spiegel with the exception of 
Burma and Afghanistan which are not generally considered South 
Asian. 
classification of regional organisations see, L.H. Miller, 
'Regional Organisations and Subordinate Systems', in Cantori & 
Spiegel (eds.), International Politics of Regions, op. cit., pp. 
357-379. 
32 Cantori and Spiegel (eds.), International Politics of Regions, 
op. cit., pp. 6-7. 
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Although this thesis accepts Cantori and Spiegel's criteria of a 
region as consisting of one state or two or more proximate and 
interacting states, the thesis will argue that the concept of 
regionalism involves the practice of co-ordinating national policies 
in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc regional 
arrangements or by means of regional institutions. Here regional 
institutions mean those institutions which have their aims and 
objectives primarily focused on serving the interests of one 
particular region, and involving at least a majority of the 
countries of that region. Some of the most significant regional 
organisations focussed in this thesis include the South Pacific 
Commission (SPC), the South Pacific Forum (SPF), the Forum Fisheries 
Agency (FFA) , and the South Pacific Regional Environment Program 
(SPREP) , in the South Pacific region; and the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) , in South Asia. These 
organisations are briefly discussed below. 
The SPC was set-up in 1947 by Australia, Britain, France, the united 
States, Netherlands and New Zealand. The mission of the organisation 
was to contribute to the socio-economic development of the South 
Pacific islands through applied research in related areas, the 
provision of technical advice, assistance and training. 33 Initially 
the inhabitants of the South Pacific island states did not have a 
say in the SPC. However increasing pressure by regional countries 
gradually opened the door for full and equal membership of all the 
regional states in the Commission. 34 In 1998 SPC was renamed the 
Pacific Community. 
33 Netherlands withdrew from SPC in 1962 when it ceased to control 
Dutch New Guinea, now Irian Jaya. The United Kingdom withdrew from 
the Commission in 1996. The origins, structure, membership and the 
implication of SPC to the region is discussed in, M. Haas, The 
Pacific Way: Regional Cooperation in the South Pacific, Praeger 
Publishers, New York, 1989, pp. 31-39; the aims and activities of 
SPC are discussed in, SPC, The South Pacific Commission: History 
Aims and Activities, 13th edition, SPC, Noumea, 1998. 
34 SPC, The South Pacific Commission, op. cit., pp. 17-20. 
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The other most important organisation in the region is the SPF set 
up in 1971 by Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, Tonga and Western Samoa, 
the five regional small states that have by then attained 
independence or self-governing status. The main reason for setting 
up this new organisation was the desire of regional small states for 
co-operation on political issues and the inability to do so through 
the SPC, which restricted deliberations to purely socio-economic 
areas.
35 Australia and New Zealand, being regional countries, were 
admitted shortly after the founding meeting in 1971, hosted by the 
government of New Zealand. The membership of the Forum has now 
enlarged to include the following additional members - Niue, PNG, 
Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, the Federated States of 
Micronesia (FSM), Marshall Islands, and Vanuatu. The Forum meets 
annually at the Heads of State level. The focus of the organisation 
has been socio-economic and political issues that will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapters II, III and IV. 
The FFA was set up in 1979. The membership of the organisation 
includes the members of the SPF. The FFA provides members with a 
range of services including involvement in the monitoring and 
surveillance of the regional EEZs, providing technical assistance, 
and the collection and dissemination of scientific data and 
information in the area of fisheries. As discussed in chapter III 
the organisation also provides a vehicle through which the regional 
countries could collectively deal with distant water fishing 
countries. 
The SPREP was established in 1980 as a joint initiative by the SPC 
and the SPF. The organisation plays a co-ordinating role on 
environment related issues in the South Pacific. The organisation 
also carries out a broad range of activities in managing and 
improving the natural environment of the region through the 
protection of biological diversity, increasing awareness in the 
35 S. Henningham, The Pacific Island States: 
Sovereignty in the post-Cold War World, Macmillan 
London, 1995, p. 15. 
Securi ty and 
Press Limited, 
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region on environment protection, and the provision of education and 
training for the management of the regional environment and 
resources as discussed in more detail in chapter IV. 
In addition to the above regional institutions the thesis also 
discusses a sub-regional organisation in which Vanuatu is a member. 
This organisation is the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) formed in 
1985 by Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu. 36 The Group 
was initially intended for co-operation in campaigning against 
French colonialism in New Caledonia and nuclear testing in the South 
Pacific. 37 The Agreed Principles for Co-operation entered into in 
1988 included co-operation in areas such as trade and culture. 38 
Kanaks of New Caledonia were admitted to MSG in 1990. Fiji became an 
observer of MSG in 1993 and a full member in 1996. 
In the case of South Asia only one main regional organisation, the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) , is 
considered in this thesis. This organisation which was set-up in 
1985 include Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The SAARC Charter notes that the 
association was formed on the conviction of member states 
that regional co-operation would be "mutually beneficial, 
desirable and necessary for promoting the welfare and 
improving the quality of life of the peoples of the region". 39 
Among the fundamental principles of the organisation are the 
respect for sovereign equality, territorial integrity, 
political independence and non-interference in the internal 
36 Factors that led to the development of a Melanesian identity that 
contributed to the formation of MSG are discussed in 1.4a of this 
chapter. 
37 Haas, The Pacific WaYr op. cit., p. 126. 
38 The Agreed Principles for Cooperation are in 
Kabutaulaka, 'The Political Economy of 
Integration', Pacific Economic Bulletin, vol. 
1995, p. 51. 
R. Grynberg & T. T. 
Melanesian Trade 
10, no. 2, December 
39 'Charter of SAARC', in R. P. Anand, South Asia: in Search of a 
Regional Identity, Banyan Publications, New Delhi, 1991, Appendix 
C, para. 4. 
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affairs of other states. 40 The decisions of the organisation 
are made on the basis of unanimity. The objectives of SAARC 
include regional economic development; strengthening 
collective self-reliance; contributing to mutual trust; 
promoting collaboration and assistance in social, cultural, 
technical and scientific fields; and joint action in 
international forums on matters of common concern. 41 
1.lc - Bilateralism 
The term bilateralism like multilateralism has been used commonly in 
the area of economics referring to a certain type of arrangement 
between two states in the area of international payments and trade. 42 
Brabant for example notes that bilateralism is but one form of 
general exchange controls which is usually introduced when countries 
are facing severe payment problems, for which more subtle forms of 
trade intervention and restrictions (eg. tariffs, quotas, and the 
like) are no longer deemed adequate. 43 
The meaning of bilateralism used in this thesis is broader than just 
economic arrangements. However, in this thesis too bilateralism is 
used to refer to the pursuance of foreign policy through connections 
or ties between two states on a country to country basis. These 
connections could be established to serve the mutual or individual 
interests of both parties concerned and could include relations 
40 Ibid., article II. 
41 Ibid., article I. 
42 For a discussion on the use of bilateralism in trade see, J.M.P. 
Van Brabant, Bilateralism and structural Bilateralism in Intra-CMEA 
Trade, Rotterdam University Press, Rotterdam, 1973; and P.G. Elkan, 
Bilateral Arrangements in International Payments and Trade, N.Z. 
Institute of Economic Research, Wellington, 1962. 
43 Brabant, Bilateralism, op. cit., pp. 66-67. 
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based on alliances and agreements or those without such formal 
arrangements. 
1.ld - Small Island States 
The two states, Vanuatu and the Maldives, focussed in this thesis 
are not only small but also islands. As such, these states are 
classified here as small island states - one of the many categories 
used in classifying states. other frequently used terms in 
classifying states such as the Maldives and Vanuatu include 
microstates, mini-states and small states. 
It is virtually impossible to provide a definition of small island 
states that is free of controversy.44 The fundamental reason for this 
dilemma lies in the relative nature of the concept of size or 
smallness. What one perceives as small could be considered large by 
another. Therefore, whenever smallness is used in categorising 
states it is important to specify the meaning of the term small. It 
is the aim of this section to define the concept of small island 
states used in this thesis. 
Over the past few decades a number of scholars have attempted to 
define small states using a variety of criteria such as territorial 
size, population size, military capability, economic performance, 
44 The problems and controversies associated with defining smallness 
with respect to states are discussed in a number of articles and 
books, some of which include, E. Dommen 'What is a Microstate', and 
P. Hein, 'The study of Microstates', in E. Dommen & P. Hein (eds.), 
States r Microstates and Islands, Croom Helm Ltd, Kent, 1985, pp. 1-
15 & 16-29 respectively; P. Sutton, 'Political Aspects', in C. 
Clarke, & T. Payne (eds.) , Poli tics r Securi ty and Development in 
Small States, Allen and Unwin, London, 1987, pp. 6-7; G.A. Fauriol, 
Foreign Policy Behaviour of Caribbean States: Guyana r Haiti, 
Jamaica, University Press of America, Boston, 1984, pp. 47-54. 
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and combinations of some of these factors. For example, Fauriol 
defined small states as those that are limited in their economic 
capability, population and territorial size. 45 In a similar vein 
Maurice East characterised small states as those with "one or more 
of the following: (1) small land area, (2) small total population, 
(3) small total GNP (or other measure of total productive capacity), 
and (4) a low level of military capabilities". 46 
Some scholars have attempted precise definitions of small states by 
arbitrarily delimiting or setting upper limits on certain 
quantifiable aspects of states such as population, land area, and 
GNP. Jalan for example, defined small states as those with 
populations of 4.7 million or less, arable land areas of 22,850 
square kilometres or less, and GNPs of US$ 2.9 billion or less. 47 
Likewise, Charles Taylor characterised small states as those states 
with a land area of less than 142,822 square kilometres, a 
population of no more than 2,928,000 people and a GNP not exceeding 
US$ 1,582 million. 48 These definitions show that any cut off point 
used in defining small states can only be arbitrary. 
As far as this thesis is concerned, GNP or GDP are not very useful 
measures in the classification of small states. These indicators are 
calculated solely based on economic activity and do not reflect the 
vulnerability of the economies of small states to forces outside 
45 Fauriol, op. cit., p.48. 
46 M.A. East, 'Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour: A Test of Two 
Models', World Politics, vol. 25, no. 4, pp.557-576. 
47 B . Jalan, 'Classification of economies by size', in B. Jalan 
(ed.), Problems and Policies in Small Economies, Croom Helm, 
London, 1982, pp. 39-47. 
48 C. Taylor, 'Statistical Typology of Microstates and Territories: 
towards a definition of a micro-state', in J. Rapaport, E. Muteba, 
and J. Therattil (eds.), Small States and Territories: Status and 
Problems, A UNITAR Study, Arno Press, New York, 1971, pp. 183-202. 
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their own control. 49 As such, the employment of GNP or GDP in 
classifying states would project a distorted image of the economic 
development of small states and trivialise the vulnerability factor. 
From the point of view of this thesis land area is also not an 
appropriate criterion for the classification of small states. It is 
true that small states have small land areas, but most such states 
are endowed with very large Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Using 
land area as the criterion in the classification of small states 
would trivialise the political significance and economic importance 
of the EEZs of these states. 
Military capability is also not a very useful criterion to employ in 
the classification of small states due to two main reasons. Firstly, 
it is very difficult to obtain accurate data on the military 
capability of states, as such information is often confidential. 
Secondly, the effectiveness of a set level of military capability 
will vary depending on the degree of threat. Factors such as the 
strength of the enemy, the level of force an enemy is ready to use, 
and the level of military assistance a country can expect from 
friendly military powers, determine the degree of threat. 
In line with the growing international practice, this thesis will 
use population as the criterion in classifying small states. As 
mentioned before, the use of population size in the classification 
of smallness is not problem-free since any cut-off point between 
small and large states can only be arbitrary. However, this thesis 
considers population to be a more appropriate and useful criterion 
than any other. Some of the reasons for using population as the 
49 Economic vulnerability of small island states is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter II. 
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criterion in determining smallness include: a) necessary data on 
population is readily available, population growth rate is 
predictable, and population levels do not fluctuate as much as some 
other indicators like GNP or GDP; b) the Commonwealth Advisory Group 
has noted that countries with a population of 5 million or less are 
presently just short of a numerical majority in the international 
system, raising the need to distinguish within this broad category 
the interests of the smallest members50 ; and c) countries with small 
populations generally have a number of common characteristics such 
as a very limited pool of human resources, a narrow natural resource 
and economic base, small domestic market and heavy reliance on the 
external markets. 
As discussed previously, numerous population cut-off points have 
been employed by various scholars in defining small states. However, 
the population upper limit for classifying small states which has 
gained the widest currency in international relations is 1 million. 
This was also the criterion used by the Commonwealth Consultative 
Committee in 1985 to classify small states. 51 Given the population 
growth since 1985 the Commonwealth Advisory Group in 1997 used a 
revised upper population limit of 1.5 million people, in its report, 
A Future for Small States: overcoming Vulnerability. 52 This thesis, 
while acknowledging that any cut-off point will be arbitrary, 
adopted the 1. 5 million population upper limit established by the 
Commonwealth Advisory Group, as the criterion which determines 
smallness with respect to states. 
50 Commonwealth Advisory Group, A Future For Small States, op. cit., 
p. 8. Presently there are 89 countries with populations of 5 
million or less. 
51 Commonwealth Consultative Committee, Vulnerability, op. cit., p. 
8. 
52 Commonwealth Advisory Group, A Future For Small States, op. cit., 
pp. 8-9. 
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As discussed previously the two case studies used in this thesis are 
categorised not only as small states but also as small island 
states. These are not purely distinct categories. Rather small 
island states are a subgroup within the category of small states. As 
such small island states share all the features of small states but 
have an added dimension arising from their physical characteristics 
intrinsic to island nations. These characteristics, labelled by some 
scholars as "islandness", include those such as insularity, economic 
and environmental vulnerability, and the possession of large EEZs. 53 
The characteristics of small island states will be discussed in more 
detail in the course of this thesis. 
1.2 - Theory and Methodology 
As mentioned before this thesis aims to assess whether there is any 
justification to claims in favour of either multilateralism, 
regionalism or bilateralism as the most useful or effective foreign 
policy strategy for small states. This assessment will be carried 
out based on the comparative method of foreign policy analysis and 
employing the analytical framework presented by Gregory A. Raymond 
for "facilitating the important but neglected task of foreign policy 
evaluation" .54 
53 A useful discussion on islandness is in, Sutton & Payne, 
'Lilliput under Threat' op. cit., pp. 583-586; M.D.D. Newitt, 
'Introduction', in H.M. Hintjens & M.D.D. Newitt (eds.), The 
Political Economy of Small Tropical Islands: The Importance of 
Being Small, University of Exeter Press, Exeter, 1992, pp. 1-17. 
54 G.A. Raymond, 'Evaluation: A Neglected Task for the Comparative 
Study of Foreign Policy', in C.H. Herman, C.W. Kegley and J.N. 
Rosenau (eds.), New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, 
Allen and Unwin, Winchester, 1987, pp. 96-110. 
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The discussion in this section will be carried out as follows: (1) 
discuss the reasons why the comparative method was employed and why 
some of the techniques for foreign policy analysis such as content 
analysis and events data research were not used in this thesis as 
the basis for research; (2) outline some of the main theoretical 
approaches to foreign policy analysis and indicate why they were not 
used more extensively in the thesis; (3) discuss the framework 
employed for analysis in this thesis. 
Researchers in the area of social sciences have four main methods to 
choose from in their work. These methods include the experimental, 
statistical, case study, and the comparative methods. Lijphart 
argues that the first three of these methods and certain forms of 
the case study method aim at scientific explanation which consists 
of two basic elements: (1) establishment of general empirical 
relationships between two or more variables, while (2) all other 
variables are controlled. 55 For this purpose the experimental method 
is the simplest since it could use identical two groups and expose 
one to a stimulus while the other is controlled. 56 The results can 
then be compared and any difference can be attributed to the 
stimulus. Unfortunately in the area of political science "natural 
testing" or experimentation can only be used very rarely due to 
ethical considerations and practical reasons. 57 For these same 
55 A. Lijphart, 'Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method' , 
The American Political Science Association, vol. LXV, no. 2, June 
1971, pp. 682-693. 
56 Ibid., p. 683; For discussions on the usefulness of 
experimentation in social sciences see, P.L. Wuebben, et. al., The 
Experiment as a Social Occasion, Glendessary Press, Inc., 
California, 1974, pp. 3-11; E. J. Meehan, Explanation in Social 
Science: A System Paradigm, The Dorsey Press, Illinois, 1968, pp. 
111-115. 
57 Lijphart, 'Comparative Politics', op. cit., pp. 683-684; Meehan, 
Explanation in S09ial Science, op. cit., p. 108. 
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reasons the experimental method could not be utilised in this 
thesis. 
Lijphart has described the statistical method as "the conceptual 
(mathematical) manipulation of empirically observed data - which 
cannot be manipulated situationally as in experimental design - in 
order to discover controlled relationships among variables". 58 The 
issue of control is handled in the statistical method through 
partial correlation. The effective execution of partial correlation 
requires statistics on a large number of cases. 
Some of the techniques based on the statistical method employed in 
political science research include content analysis and analysis 
based on events data. Content analysis is commonly used for the 
collection of statistics from a variety of texts such diplomatic 
messages, official publications, political speeches or historical 
documents to name a few, to make valid inferences. 59 The statistics 
collected could include certain words, statements, and the amount of 
space allocated to certain issues in official publications, to 
mention a few. Analysts could use these statistics to determine 
relationships between various variables. 
Events data research involves numeric coding of events for use in 
political science or foreign policy analysis. The meaning of 
events as used in the Comparative Research on the Events of 
58 Lijphart, 'Comparative Politics', op. cit., p. 684; A very useful 
discussion of the statistical method is in, P.F. Lazarsfeld, 
'Interpretation of Statistical Relations as a Research Operation' , 
in P.F. Lazarsfeld, and M. Rosenberg (eds.), The Language of Social 
Research: A Reader in the Methodology of Social Research, The Free 
Press, New York, 1955, pp. 115-125. 
59 R. P . Weber, Basic Content Analysis, 200 edition, Sage 
Publications, London, 1990, p. 9. This book contains a detailed 
guide of the procedure of content analysis. 
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Nations (CREON) Proj ect, for example, is "a minimally aggregated 
action resulting from a decision by the political authorities of a 
state who have the power to commit the resources of the national 
government".60 In terms of actor, action and target, the CREON 
definition stipulates that each event must have: (a) one actor, 
which is an individual political executive of a nation state or a 
designated representative; (b) an action, which is purposeful verbal 
or non-verbal behaviour initiated by the actor; (c) one or more 
direct targets or immediate recipients of the action; and (d) one or 
more indirect objects, which is the entity or entities the actor 
attempts to influence by his action. Large amounts of such events 
are coded in events data research for use in cross-national 
analysis. 
The content analysis and events data research techniques noted above 
have proved useful for research in the area of foreign policy 
analysis. However, this thesis did not attempt to employ them due to 
the following reasons. In content analysis or events data research 
like in other statistical techniques, extensive and reliable primary 
sources of information are necessary for generating data. In both 
the countries studied in this research, such information was scarce. 
Government files were inaccessible for research in both countries. 
The coverage of issues related to foreign relations is limited in 
Government news publications such as the Information News Bulletin 
in the Maldives. The Vanuatu Weekly: New Hebdomaire, which contains 
60 The CREON Project is an ambitious project organised by the Ohio 
State University, to collect events data to enable quantitative 
cross-national analysis in foreign policy. The project is discussed 
in considerable detail in, C.F. Herman, et. al., CREON: A Foreign 
Events Data Set, Sage Publication, London, 1973. A useful 
discussion of events data research method is also in P.M. Burgess, 
and R.W. Lawton, 'Introduction', in P.M. Burgess, and R.W. Lawton, 
Indicators of International Behaviour: An Assessment of Events Data 
Research, Sage Publication, Beverley Hills, 1972, pp. 1-17. 
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government news, started pUblication only in 1985 and does not cover 
some of the very interesting developments in the foreign policy 
history of the country in the early 1980s. Moreover, reporting in 
these pUblications is not what can be considered obj ecti ve. The 
coverage of foreign policy issues in other local newspapers is 
limited and lacks substance. For instance while an overseas visit of 
a government representative is reported the purpose of the visit is 
not covered in any detail. A substantial number of statements made 
by the Maldives at the united Nations were available from the 
Permanent Mission of the Maldives to the united Nations, but such 
material was not available in the case of Vanuatu. Whatever 
statements were available in the case of Vanuatu were those 
published in newspapers and books. Thus it was not practical to 
employ the statistical method for research in this thesis. The 
thesis therefore opted to use the comparative method. 
Lipjhart argues that the crucial difference between the comparative 
and the statistical method is that the number of cases dealt by the 
former is too small to permit systematic control by means of partial 
correlation. 61 In fact some statistical techniques such as content 
analysis can generate very useful data for use in comparative 
studies. since the comparative method is weaker in terms of 
analytical rigour than the statistical method, it should be resorted 
to only when the number of cases available for analysis is too small 
so that further cross-tabulation to establish systemic control is 
not feasible.~ In the case of this thesis only two countries are 
61 Lipjhart, 'Comparative Politics', op. cit., p. 684. 
62 Ibid. ; A useful discussion of the pros and the cons of the 
comparative and the statistical methods is in, A. Lipjhart, 'The 
Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research', Comparative 
Political Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, July 1975, pp. 158-177. 
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used for analysis given the time and resources available, and so the 
comparative method was the logical choice. 
The major weaknesses of the comparative method are the great number 
of variables and the limited number of cases to handle these 
variables. 63 Despite these weaknesses Lijphart argues that often, 
given the scarcity of time, energy and financial resources, the 
intensive comparative analysis of a few cases may be more promising 
than a superficial statistical analysis of many cases. 64 
Moreover Lijphart has suggested four ways in which these weaknesses 
of the comparative method could be minimised. 65 However it should be 
acknowledged here that even if the weaknesses are minimised the 
comparative method is still not on a par with the statistical method 
in producing generalisations which is the main aim of scientific 
methods. Given the limited number of cases used in the comparative 
method it can only produce partial generalisations, which are useful 
first steps that can later be followed up with replications in 
different settings. 66 
The first way to minimise the weaknesses of the comparative method 
suggested by Lijphart is to increase the number of cases as much as 
possible so as to increase the chances of instituting control. This 
thesis attempted such an expansion at the early stages of research 
by including Kiribati and Samoa in the cases studied, but practical 
and financial constraints in obtaining adequate information on all 
of these states forced the number of cases to be reduced to just 
two. 
63 Lipjhart, 'Comparative Politics', op. cit., p. 685. 
64 Ibid., p. 687. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Lipjhart, 'The Comparable-Cases', op. cit., p. 172. 
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The second way to minimise the weaknesses of the comparative method 
is to reduce the "property space" of the analysis. The technique to 
do this is to join two or more variables that express essentially 
similar underlying characteristics into single variables and thereby 
reduce the number of cells in the matrix representing the 
relationship and relatively increase the number of cases. This was 
done to some extent in this thesis for example by classifying a 
variety of institutions into multilateral and regional institutions. 
The third technique suggested by Lipjhart is to focus the 
comparative analysis on "comparable" cases. In this sense comparable 
cases mean those that are similar in a large number of important 
characteristics or variables which one wants to treat as constants. 
The Maldives and Vanuatu which were chosen for this study clearly 
fitted into the above category of comparable cases. As discussed in 
detail in section 1.4 and chapters II, III and IV, the Maldives and 
Vanuatu shared a number of similarities. Both these countries were 
small island states, had small populations, relatively small land 
areas, very large EEZs, a similar level of economic development, 
espoused non-alignment, denounced colonialism, and had a very strong 
interest in protecting the global environment. Consequently they 
both shared several similar foreign policy goals and objectives such 
as environment protection. Both of these countries also employed 
with almost equal emphasis the three strategies of multilateralism, 
regionalism and bilateralism in the pursuit of their foreign policy 
goals and objectives. 
The fourth and final technique for minimising the weaknesses of the 
comparative method is to focus the analysis on key variables. This 
approach reduces the danger of being overwhelmed by a large number 
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of variables. This technique is utilised in this thesis. Since the 
cases discussed in this thesis are relatively unknown states every 
attempt will however be made to present a holistic picture of the 
issues under study. 
The case study method has its strength in providing a holistic 
picture of the cases under consideration. Harry Eckstein described 
the case study method as being similar to that of clinical studies 
in medicine and psychology. 67 Like clinical studies the case study 
method is open ended and flexible and its findings are generally 
characterised as narrative and descriptive, providing case histories 
and detailed portraiture. By focusing on a single case, the case 
study method is able to intensively examine that case even if the 
resources at the disposal of the investigator are relatively 
limited. 
Several types of case studies have been identified by scholars 
including atheoretical or "configurative-idiographic case studies"; 
interpretive or "disciplined-configurative case studies"; 
"hypothesis-generating case studies" or "heuristic case studies"; 
deviant or "crucial case studies"; "theory-confirming case studies"; 
and "theory-infirming case studies". 68 Eckstein refers to the latter 
two case studies as "plausibility probes". 69 These are ideal types 
and certain case studies might fit into more than one of these 
categories or one part of them could fall into one category and the 
other part into another. Of these categories the heuristic, 
67 H. Eckstein, 'Case Study and Theory in Political Science', in 
F.L. Greenstein, and N.W. Polsby (eds.), Strategies of Inquiry, 
Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7, Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, Massachusetts, 1975, pp. 79-138. 
68 Lijphart, 'Comparative Politics', op. cit., pp. 691-693; Eckstein, 
'Case Study', op. cit., pp. 96-138. 
69 Eckstein, 'Case Study', op. cit., p. 108. 
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plausibility probes and deviant case studies are considered the most 
useful for theory development. 
Heuristic case studies start out with a vague notion of possible 
hypotheses and attempt to formulate definite hypotheses to be tested 
subsequently among a larger number of cases. 70 Plausibility probes 
attempt to analyse single cases within the framework of established 
generalisations to test a proposition, which may turn out to be 
confirmed, or infirmed. The deviant case study analyses cases known 
to deviate from established generalisations and thereby uncover the 
additional variables that were not considered previously or refine 
the definitions of some or all of the variables. 
Despite the usefulness of some case studies for theory development 
they were not adequate for use as the research method of this 
thesis. This thesis aims at producing at least partial 
generalisations in answering the question whether it is justified to 
argue in favour of either multilateralism, regionalism or 
bilateralism as the most effective foreign policy strategy for small 
states. Producing such generalisations necessitates a comparative 
element in research and single case studies cannot handle it. Thus 
this thesis employed the comparative method for research and 
analysis as mentioned previously. However, since relatively little 
is known to the international public about Vanuatu and the Maldives 
this thesis attempts to integrate as much as possible the main 
strength of the case study method, which is presenting a detailed 
description of the cases under consideration, into the comparison. 
To facilitate this task the narrative style of writing is employed, 
as is the case in most case studies. 
70 Lipjhart, 'Comparative Politics', op. cit., p. 692. 
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To begin the process of comparative analysis a suitable theoretical 
framework is necessary. Scholars have suggested various approaches 
for the analysis of foreign policy. While all of these approaches 
have their strengths in various respects the researcher has to be 
selective in deciding which one is the most suitable for his 
research. The selection of anyone approach does not in anyway mean 
that the others are not useful. 
Among the many approaches to foreign policy analysis is 'National 
Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy' proposed by 
Holsti. 71 In a book published in 1972 Holsti argued that national 
roles are foreign policy outputs associated only with states that 
are involved in system-wide and regional affairs. 72 He went on to 
note that microstates such as the Maldives although proclaiming or 
displaying some interest in other states, do not see themselves as 
playing any distinct role in the world. 73 
Holsti defined national role conceptions as the foreign policy 
makers' "definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, 
rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions 
their state should perform in a variety of geographic and regional 
settings".74 Based on a content analysis of some 71 states Holsti 
identified at least 16 types of national roles that are components 
of the foreign policy of states, including those such as regional 
leader, regional protector, liberation supporter, defender of faith, 
71 K.J. Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign 
Policy', in S.G. Walker (ed.) Role Theo:r:y and Foreign Policy 
Analysis, Duke University Press, Durham, 1987, pp. 5-43. 
72 ___ International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 2nd edition, 
Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1972, p. 122. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
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developer, and bridge, to mention a few. Such role conceptions are 
believed to be fashioned by a variety of domestic factors including 
location, resources of a state, capabilities, socio-economic needs, 
national values, ideology, traditional roles, public opinion, and 
political needs. 
The National Role Conceptions theory argues that the foreign policy 
decisions and actions of a state are products of its role 
conceptions. These role conceptions are influenced or restrained by 
role prescriptions from the external environment emanating from 
factors such as the international systemic structure, system-wide 
values, general legal principles, treaty commitments, informal 
understandings, and world opinion. However, generally the sources of 
external role prescriptions and the available sanctions to enforce 
them are ill-defined, flexible or weak compared to the sources that 
fashion role conceptions. Thus, often at times when there is 
incompatibility between role prescriptions and role conceptions the 
former normally gives way to the latter. 
This thesis does not intend to question the utility of the above 
theory as a theoretical contribution to the study of foreign policy 
in general. However the theory was not suitable for the purposes of 
this study due to several reasons. First of all national roles are 
associated only with states that see themselves as playing a 
distinct role in the world, which places in doubt its applicability 
to a number of states especially the very small ones. This thesis 
which aims to make at least partial generalisations about the 
foreign policy of small states cannot utilise a theory which might 
not apply to a number of them. 
36 
Secondly, the theory's claim that national role conceptions are more 
influential than the role prescriptions emanating from the external 
environment is not necessarily true in the case of small island 
states. While small states might find some room to manoeuvre in the 
international environment in certain instances, their foreign 
policies are largely influenced by external factors. The tendency in 
the behaviour of small states to avoid alienating the more powerful 
players within the system, as identified by East, for example 
demonstrates the strong influence of the external environment on the 
foreign policy of small states. 75 
Thirdly, the theory's focus on national role conceptions obscures 
the important role played by individuals in the foreign policy of 
small states. For instance an individual such as a Permanent 
Representative of a small state to the united Nations could assume a 
very active role for the state within the international community, 
but once he/she is removed from the scene the state will revert to 
its passive state. This demonstrates that there is more to foreign 
policy decisions and actions than national role conceptions and that 
willingness to take advantage of opportunities that arise needs to 
be assigned importance in considering the foreign policy of small 
states. 
Lentner provides a very useful "Scheme of Analysis" of foreign 
policy.76 Lentner's scheme is based on the argument that a country's 
internal characteristics and the external environment interact to 
shape foreign policy. Both domestic and external influences are 
always believed to be active, for no actor exists apart from its 
75 East, 'Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour', op. cit. 
76 Lentner's approach is discussed in, H.H. Lentner, Foreign Policy 
Analysis: A Comparative and Conceptual Approach, Charles E. Merrill 
Publishing Company, Ohio, 1974. 
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environment, yet every actor copes with the environment in ways that 
are shaped by its internal characteristics. 77 Lentner does not 
provide a theory as to how the influences interact or which set of 
influences is more dominant and under what circumstances. This 
scheme of analysis requires the consideration of a large variety of 
variables, both internal and external, in the analysis. 
As far as small states are concerned the interaction between 
internal and external factors in shaping foreign policy is well 
established as argued in Lentner's scheme. 78 The assertion that both 
domestic and external influences are always active and that every 
actor copes with the environment in ways that are shaped by its 
internal characteristics is also acceptable. As demonstrated later 
on in this thesis the foreign policy of one of the small states 
under study here will assume radical postures from time to time but 
when external opposition becomes too strong it will adjust its 
policies in coping with the environment. Unfortunately Lentner does 
not provide a suitable framework or organising device for analysis. 
Another environmental approach that offers a very well structured 
framework for analysing foreign policy is the "Environmental Model" 
provided by Papadakis and Starr. 79 The central thesis of the model is 
that environmental factors influence foreign policy by being 
perceived and reacted to by foreign policy decision makers. 80 Under 
the model the state is considered an entity in an environment which 
is divided into different levels such as individual, role, 
77 Ibid., p. II. 
78 See for example, East, 'Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour', op. 
cit. 
79 M. Papadakis, and H., Starr, 'Opportunity, Willingness, and 
Small States: The Relationship Between Environment and Foreign 
Policy', in Herman, Kegley and Rosenau (eds.), New Directions, op. 
cit., pp. 409-433. 
80 Ibid., p. 414. 
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governmental, societal, international relations and international 
system. The context within which states act is defined by the 
environment, but how states actually act is dependent upon factors 
such as: the sets of opportunities that the characteristics of the 
sub-environments provide the states; how the states perceive their 
environment; their willingness to take a particular course of action 
and so on. 81 As such, states can overcome some environmental 
constraints by exploiting other opportunities within their 
environment. In other words there is no deterministic relationship 
between the environment, the foreign policy process and the outcome 
of the process since opportunity and willingness operate as 
mediating variables between the environment and foreign policy. 
The environmental model presented by Papadakis and starr is a very 
useful contribution to the analysis of foreign policy especially 
that of small states. It provides a framework through which one 
could explain why a number of small states have managed to maintain 
an independent foreign policy in the international system dominated 
by much larger powers. The model is also very well organised to 
enable systematic analysis of the foreign policy decision making 
process or foreign policy process, the actual decisions or foreign 
policy as output, the implementation of decisions or foreign policy 
outcomes, and the result or foreign policy effects. However it does 
not clearly set out a guideline to assess the degree to which the 
effects succeed in realising the foreign policy obj ecti ves of the 
country. This assessment is crucial to answer the question being 
considered in this thesis, which is whether it is justified to argue 
in favour of multilateralism, regionalism or bilateralism as a more 
effective foreign policy strategy for small states. 
81 Ibid., p. 416. 
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Raymond provides a more suitable framework for the purposes of this 
thesis. 82 Raymond's framework rests on the assumptions that: "(1) 
foreign policy behaviour entails a series of purposeful acts aimed 
at achieving desired goals; (2) it is possible to devise performance 
indicators that measure the extent to which a given goal has been 
achieved; and (3) the comparative method can be used to acquire 
reproducible evidence on whether the acts under investigation did, 
indeed, produce observable changes in the performance indicators". 83 
Evaluation under Raymond's framework requires foreign policy to be 
broken down into its three elementary components namely, the broad 
or overall goals or long-term objectives; specific or short-term 
obj ecti ves referred to in this thesis as obj ecti ves; and actions. 
These components of foreign policy are briefly discussed below. 
Goals are the end result that policy makers have in mind when they 
devise policies. However, goals are not necessarily prudent or 
logical. Goal identification is a methodological challenge, which 
has to be addressed before evaluation can begin. 
Goal identification entails a variety of difficulties, controversies 
and uncertainties. Raymond has noted the following difficulties 
associated with goal identification - 1) goals are often buried 
under an avalanche of rhetoric that national leaders use to justify 
their policies; 2) the use of buzzwords and euphemisms like "new 
world order" obscures the correct meaning of the enunciated goals; 
3) goals are purposefully kept vague so as to appeal to a broader 
82 Raymond, 'Evaluation', op. cit. 
83 Raymond, 'Evaluation', op. cit., p. 98. 
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political constituency; and 4) it is also difficult to identify 
goals because they are not static. 84 
Irrespective of these difficulties goals need to be identified if 
one is to evaluate policy. Charles F. Hermann in his article 
'Foreign Policy Behaviour: That Which is to be Explained', suggested 
three strategies that could be used in the identification of goals. 
These strategies included: 1) taking at face value the professed 
goals and purposes offered by government spokesmen; 2) infer goals 
from observed behaviour; and 3) infer goals from the demands imposed 
on the government by its environment. 8s These strategies are not free 
of the controversies and uncertainties associated with goal 
identification discussed previously. Nevertheless, in the absence of 
non-controversial alternatives the above strategies provide useful 
frameworks for the identification of foreign policy goals. 
Based on the strategies suggested by Hermann, the following three 
foreign policy goals common to both Vanuatu and the Maldives were 
identified for use in this thesis preserving and enhancing 
security and sovereignty; environment protection; and economic 
development. These are not the only foreign policy goals of Vanuatu 
and the Maldives but they are among the most prominent when 
Hermann's strategies are used. One or more of these goals have been 
enunciated in almost every statement made at international forums by 
leaders, diplomats and other spokespersons of both Vanuatu and the 
Maldives. As such these goals have been among the most distinct when 
the professed goals and purposes offered by government spokespersons 
84 Ibid., pp. 99-100. 
85 Charles F. Hermann, 'Foreign Policy Behavior: That Which is to be 
Explained', in M.A. East, S.A. Salmore and C.F. Hermann (eds.), Why 
Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign 
Policy Studies, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1978, pp. 25-48. 
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are taken at face value. Numerous examples of such statements and 
speeches will be highlighted in the course of this thesis. 
The same conclusion was observed when an attempt was made to infer 
goals from the observed behaviour of Vanuatu and the Maldives. The 
term 'behaviour' here refers to behaviour in the area of foreign 
policy and not domestic policy. This distinction is necessary 
because the domestic record of countries might not necessarily 
reflect their foreign policy behaviour. For example, a country with 
a bad record in the protection of the domestic environment might 
still be actively involved at the international level in promoting 
issues of environmental protection. The behaviour of Vanuatu and the 
Maldives from which the above mentioned goals were inferred is not 
elaborated here since Chapters II, III and IV discus them in detail. 
The same three goals were clearly identifiable from the demands 
imposed on the governments of Vanuatu and the Maldives by their 
environment. In inferring goals from the environment, this thesis 
referred to a range of scholarly literature and statements by 
government spokespersons on the vulnerability of small states and 
small island states. 86 This material demonstrated that small island 
86 The literature referred included those such as: F. Doumenge, 'The 
viability of small intertropical islands', in E. Dommen and P. Hein 
(eds.), States, op. cit., pp. 70-118; UNCTAD Secretariat, 
'Examination of the particular needs and problems of island 
developing countries', in Dommen & Hein (eds.), States, op. cit., 
pp. 119-151; Clarke & Payne (eds.), Politics, Security and 
Development, op. cit.; Fauriol, Foreign Policy Behaviour, op. cit.; 
East, 'Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour', op. cit.; B. Jalan 
(ed.), Problems and Policies in Small Economies, Croom Helm, 
London, 1982; P. Streeten, 'The Special Problems of Small 
Countries', World Development, vol. 21, no. 2, 1993, pp. 197-202; 
S. Harden (ed.), Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World, 
Frances Pinter (Publishers) , London, 1985; Sutton & Payne, 
'Lilliput under threat', op. cit.; Benedict (ed.), Problems, op. 
cit.; Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability, op. cit.; 
Commonwealth Advisory Group, A Future for Small States, op. cit.; 
and numerous other documents and statements which will be cited in 
the course of this thesis. 
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states like Vanuatu and the Maldives face a range of serious 
politico-economic and ecological threats that inevitably place 
preserving and enhancing security and sovereignty, environmental 
protection, and economic development, among the foreign policy goals 
of these countries. 
The next methodological challenge that needed to be tackled was to 
link each goal to one or more measurable objectives. The latter are 
the outcomes desired of policies in contributing towards foreign 
policy goals. Each goal could in fact be linked to one or more 
objectives. These objectives are the performance indicators that can 
be used to determine the extent to which actions contributed towards 
achieving the goals. In the area of environment protection for 
example, if an objective was to reduce ozone-depleting substances by 
90 percent in ten years, this figure could be used as a performance 
indicator. The success or failure of policy could then be determined 
based on the extent to which the actions employed succeeded in 
achieving the performance indicator. However, it should be noted 
that not all objectives are numerical like the one mentioned above. 
Similarly the measurements used to determine the extent to which 
actions contributed towards realising certain objectives cannot be 
expressed numerically. 
The process of goal identification discussed above revealed that 
Vanuatu and the Maldives had several foreign policy objectives 
linked to each goal. This thesis selected some of the most prominent 
of these objectives for evaluation. In this process, every effort 
was made to select obj ecti ves important for both Vanuatu and the 
Maldives. In certain cases objectives which were important to only 
one of these states had to be included because of their overwhelming 
prominence in the foreign policy of that country. For instance, 
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supporting decolonisation was so prominent in the foreign policy of 
Vanuatu that it had to be included in the evaluation although the 
Maldives did not share Vanuatu's commitment and passion with respect 
to the objective. The objectives so selected are in Table 1 below. 
It should also be noted here that there is some inconsistency 
between the domestic policy and actions and certain foreign policy 
objectives identified in this thesis. This inconsistency is 
especially acute with respect to Vanuatu's foreign policy objective 
of combating transnational crime, as will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter II. If these objectives are not valid it will be 
clearly evident from the evaluation. Even if one or two objectives 
are incorrect it will not make too much of a difference on the 
findings of this thesis. 
Before evaluation can begin each identified objective has to be tied 
to one or more actions or strategies, which in this case include 
multilateralism, regionalism and bilateralism, the sum of which 
constitutes a program. The aim of the evaluator is to determine the 
effecti veness of the programs based on implementation, bridging, 
response and extraneous variables. These variables are briefly 
explained below. 
Implementation variables determine the degree of congruence between 
intended and observed actions. 87 According to Raymond, there are two 
types of implementation variables. The first type relates to the 
tractability of the problem being addressed, and include those such 
as the degree of change required and technical complexity of the 
problem. The second type includes variables related to the political 
context of the program such as the amount of resources allocated, 
87 Hermann, 'Foreign Policy Behavior', op. cit., p. 3. 
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the depth of administrative commitment, and the amount of 
integration between implementing agencies. 
Bridging variables encompass the "causal process" which policy 
action is intended to set in motion in order to reach a desired 
outcome. 88 Take for example the statement of 1987 by the Maldives' 
President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, to the united Nations General 
Assembly, in which he attempted to draw the attention of member 
countries to the vulnerability of small island states in the face of 
the deteriorating global environment, and pleaded for international 
co-operation in tackling the problem. 89 This statement was intended 
to set in motion a process of international co-operation leading to 
the halting or reversal of global environmental degradation and the 
threat it poses to small island states. This process could include 
technical meetings on environmental problems, research into the 
causes of environmental degradation, new conventions to protect the 
environment or strengthen old ones, provision of aid to small states 
and the like. In other words, Gayoom's statement was intended to set 
in motion a process that would bridge the gap between his action of 
making the statement and the desired outcome, which was halting if 
not reversing global environmental degradation. 
88 Ibid. 
89 M.A. Gayoom, statement to the 42nd Session of the united Nations 
General Assembly, 1987, New York, a copy of the document was made 
available to the author by the Permanent Mission of the Maldives to 
the United Nations, New York. 
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Table 1 
Goals and Objectives of Vanuatu and the Maldives 
Goals Objectives - Vanuatu Objectives - Maldives 
Preserving and -Assertion of sovereignty -Assertion of sovereignty. 
enhancing -Supporting decolonisation. -Realising a SANWFZ and an 
security -Realising a nuclear free IOZOP. 
and sovereignb Pacific. -Combating transnational 
-Combating transnational crime. 
crime. 
Environment -Enhancing international -Enhancing international 
protection awareness of the threat of awareness of the threat of 
environmental degradation environmental degradation 
to small island states to small island states 
and placing climate change and placing climate change 
on the international agenda. on the international agenda. 
- Influencing climate change - Influencing climate change 
negotiations. negotiations. 
- Obtaining assistance for - Obtaining assistance for 
environment protection. environment protection. 
Economic -Minimising the effect of - Minimising the effect of 
development vulnerabilities and vulnerabilities and 
constraints to economic constraints to economic 
development and promoting development and promoting 
trade. trade. 
- Maximising foreign aid. - Maximising foreign aid. 
- Protection of resources. - Protection of resources. 
The other two clusters of variables in Raymond's framework include 
response variables and extraneous variables. Response variables 
include the various intended results and possible side effects of 
actions. 90 Extraneous variables include contextual factors such as 
the characteristics of the target, the behaviour of other actors and 
the like, which affect foreign policy action. 
In successful programs the implementation variables will affect the 
bridging variables leading to the realisation of the intended 
obj ecti ve. The evaluator therefore needs to establish whether the 
implementation variables of the program under study affected the 
90 Raymond, 'Evaluation', op. cit., p. 106. 
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bridging variables and whether the latter produced the desired 
outcome. Falsification of the hypothesis would imply the failure of 
the theory behind the program. If the evaluator observes evidence 
tha t the bridging variables did indeed produce some results, then 
the program's effectiveness in terms of the extent to which the 
objective was realised needs to be assessed. 
There is more than one way to assess the effectiveness of programs. 
Experimental designs and quasi-experimental designs have been 
employed in the evaluation of organisational effecti veness. 91 
Unfortunately foreign policy is rarely amenable to experimentation. 
Questionnaires have also been used in measuring effectiveness in 
organisations such as hospitals. 92 Such questionnaires need to be 
completed by those who are knowledgeable about the issue in 
question. Unfortunately people who know the intricate details of the 
foreign policy process, output, outcome, and effects, of small 
island states such as the Maldives and Vanuatu are so few that the 
questionnaire method is not practical. As Raymond has noted the 
comparative method offers evaluators an alternative, although not as 
effective as the experimental method, to estimate the relative 
effectiveness of a policy.~ 
Raymond argues that in order to use the comparative method the 
programs under investigation need to possess substantially similar 
aims. In other words the goals of the programs need to be comparable 
or of the same class. However these programs should have 
differentiated strategies for attaining their goals. In the case of 
91 Various methods of evaluating program effectiveness is discussed 
in, C.H. Weiss, Evaluation Research : Methods of Assessing Program 
Effectiveness, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey, 1972. 
~ J.L. Price, 'The study of Organisational Effectiveness', 
Sociological Quarterly, vol.13, no. 1, Winter 1972, pp. 3-15. 
93 Raymond, 'Evaluation', op. cit., p. 101. 
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this thesis there are three sets of programs with the same goal, 
with respect to each objective in each issue area, for each country. 
For example in the area of preserving and enhancing security and 
sovereignty the Maldives has three objectives namely, the assertion 
of sovereignty; realising a SANWFZ and an IOZOP; and combating 
transnational crime. Each of these objectives belongs to three 
programs with preserving and enhancing security and sovereignty as 
the goal and either multilateralism, regionalism or bilateralism as 
the strategy for attaining the goal. A comparative analysis of the 
three programs with respect to each objective will reveal the 
relative effectiveness of the strategies employed in realising the 
objectives and thereby contributing towards the goal. 
This thesis aims to use the comparative method to first assess each 
program at the intra-country level to determine whether 
multilateralism, regionalism or bilateralism is relatively more 
effective in contributing towards realising the foreign policy goals 
of the two countries in the different issue areas. The results of 
this exercise can be used to determine whether anyone of the 
strategies is more effective overall in the foreign policy of each 
of the countries. The thesis will then undertake an inter-country 
comparison of these results to determine whether it is possible to 
generalise in favour of anyone strategy as more effective overall 
in realising the foreign policy goals of both the countries under 
study. 
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1.3 - The structure of the Thesis and Chapters 
This thesis is divided into five chapters: Introduction; Preserving 
and Enhancing Security and Sovereignty; Economic Development; 
Environment Protection; and Conclusions. The structures of these 
chapters are briefly outlined below. 
1.3a - Chapter I Introduction 
The introductory chapter of this thesis is divided into four main 
sections. The first section is a general introduction, which 
outlines the reasons why there is a need for a study that evaluates 
the foreign policy orientation of small states. The section 
discusses some of the differing views among scholars over the most 
effective foreign policy orientation for small islands states. The 
section then goes on to point out that this thesis aims to 
contribute to the study of small island states by attempting to 
determine whether it is justified to argue in favour of either 
multilateralism, regionalism or bilateralism as the most effective 
foreign policy strategy for these states. The section also provides 
definitions of the essential concepts used in the thesis. 
Section 1.2 of the introductory chapter focuses on the methodology 
used in the thesis. Section 1.3 outlines the structure of the 
thesis. Section 1.4 consists of the background to the two case 
stUdies, Vanuatu and the Maldives, used in this thesis. 
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1.3b - Chapter II: Preserving and Enhancing the Security and 
Sovereignty 
This chapter is divided into six sections. section 2.1 is an 
introduction of the chapter. section 2.2 discusses the four foreign 
policy objectives of Vanuatu - assertion of sovereignty; supporting 
decolonisation; realising a nuclear free South Pacific; and 
combating transnational crime. This is followed by section 2.3 that 
evaluates the foreign policy actions of Vanuatu at the multilateral, 
regional and bilateral levels in the effort to realise the country's 
foreign policy objectives. 
Section 2.4, of the thesis will discuss the three foreign policy 
obj ecti ves of the Maldives selected for use in this chapter·-
assertion of sovereignty; supporting the establishment of a SANWFZ 
and an IOZOP; and combating transnational crime. This will be 
followed by a section that evaluates the foreign policy actions of 
the Maldives at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels in 
contributing towards the foreign policy obj ecti ves stated above. 
section 2.6 will conclude the chapter with an intra-country 
comparison of the effectiveness of multilateralism, regionalism and 
bilateralism. 
1.3c - Chapter III: Economic Development 
The chapter on economic development is divided into four main 
sections. The first section is the introduction. The second section 
or section 3.2 discusses the three foreign policy objectives 
selected for evaluation in this thesis - minimising vulnerability 
and the promotion of trade; maximising foreign aid; and the 
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protection of resources. section 3.3 will assess the foreign policy 
actions of Vanuatu and the Maldives at the multilateral, regional 
and bilateral levels in realising the foreign policy objectives of 
these two countries. In this section, the actions of Vanuatu and the 
Maldives at the multilateral level are discussed together since they 
largely overlap. Finally, the chapter will conclude with an intra-
country comparison of the effectiveness of multilateralism, 
regionalism and bilateralism. 
1.3d - Chapter IV: Environment Protection 
The chapter on environment protection is also divided into four 
sections. The first section or section 4.1 is the introduction. 
section 4.2 is based on three of the most significant foreign policy 
objectives shared by Vanuatu and the Maldives in the past decade -
drawing international attention to the plight of small island states 
in the face of the deteriorating global environment and placing the 
issue of climate change on the international agenda; influencing 
negotiations on the convention on climate change; and finding ways 
and means of alleviating problems related to environmental 
degradation at the regional and local levels. Since these objectives 
are so closely connected, the section does not attempt to discuss 
them individually. Rather the section undertakes a brief discussion 
of the environmental threats facing the two countries and indicates 
why the objectives noted above gained significance in their foreign 
policies. 
section 4.3 attempts to assess the foreign policy actions of Vanuatu 
and the Maldives. As in the last chapter, this section will discuss 
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jointly the foreign policy actions of the two countries at the 
multilateral level since they overlap. However, their foreign policy 
actions at the regional and bilateral levels are discussed in 
separate sub-sections, 4.3b - 4.3e. section 4.4 will attempt to 
conclude the chapter with an intra country comparison of the 
effectiveness of multilateralism, regionalism and bilateralism with 
respect to Vanuatu and the Maldives. 
1.3e - Chapter V: Conclusions 
In drawing the conclusions of the thesis the chapter will carryout 
an inter-country comparison of the effectiveness of multilateralism, 
regionalism and bilateralism with respect to Vanuatu and the 
Maldives. Based on the evaluation in the thesis the chapter will 
attempt to determine whether it is justified to argue in favour of 
multilateralism, regionalism or bilateralism as the most effective 
foreign policy strategy for small island states like the Maldives 
and Vanuatu. 
1.4 - Background to Vanuatu and the Maldives 
The case studies used in this thesis, as mentioned before, are 
Vanuatu and the Maldives. These two small island states are 
relatively unknown. As such, it is necessary to provide some 
background information on these countries before embarking on the 
evaluation of their foreign policies. It is the aim of this section 
to provide background information on the case studies. 
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1.4a - Vanuatu 
Geography, Population. an.d Ethn.icity 
The archipelagic island nation of the Republic of Vanuatu, known as 
New Hebrides until 1980, lies in the Pacific Ocean some 2413 
kilometres east of Australia. 94 The country consists of 83 or so 
small islands most of which are rugged, mountainous, and of volcanic 
origin. The rest of the islands are raised reef islands including a 
few coral islands. The length of the country is 1367 kilometres from 
the north to the south. Vanuatu's land surface is approximately 
12,190 square kilometres, while average small island states have 
land areas below 10,000 square kilometres. 95 The EEZ of Vanuatu is 
around 848,000 square kilometres. 96 
Vanuatu falls neatly into the category of small island states used 
in this thesis. According to the 1989 census the population of 
Vanuatu was 142,944 people. 97 Vanuatu's statistics Office estimates 
the country's population to be around 182,000 in June 1998. 98 since 
1981, the average population growth rate of Vanuatu has been 2.7 per 
cent. 99 
94 Calculated from statistics 
Report for UNCED: Vanuatu, 
Programme (SPREP), Apia, 1992, 
95 UNCTAD Panel of Experts, 
Nations, New York, 1974, p. 3. 
in, E. Bani & B. Clarke, Country 
South Pacific Regional Environment 
p. 1. 
Developing Island Countries, United 
96 Statistics Office, Vanuatu Facts and Figures, 1998 edition, 
Statistics Office, Port Vila, n.d., n.p. 
97 Statistics Office, Statistical Indicators, 3rd quarter, July-
September 1998, Statistics Office, Port Vila, 1998, p. 2. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Profile, Pacific 
Islands: Fiji, Solomon Islands, Western Samoa, Vanuatu, Tonga, 
1996-97, EIU , London, 1996, p. 80. 
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About 70 out of Vanuatu's 83 islands are inhabited, with 
approximately 70 per cent of inhabitants living on the four largest 
islands - Efate, Espiritu Santo, Malekula and Tafea. The overall 
population density of the country is 15 people per square kilometre. 
Approximately 36,000 people are concentrated in Vanuatu's capital, 
Port Vila, located on Efate. 100 The town of Luganville located on the 
island of Espiritu Santo has a population of around 11,100 people, 
making it the second largest urban centre in Vanuatu. 101 
Approximately 98 percent of Vanuatu's population consist of 
indigenous inhabitants called ni-Vanuatu who are ethnically 
Melanesian. 102 The remaining 2 percent of the population is made up 
of around 3500 European and mixed race people of European Melanesian 
or European Polynesian descent, together with some Vietnamese, 
Chinese, and other Pacific islanders. 103 Vanuatu is also host to 
around 2500-3000 European expatriates most of whom reside in Port 
Vila. 
The ethnically homogenous ni-Vanuatu community was culturally 
diverse when French and British traders and missionaries started 
arriving in Vanuatu in the early nineteenth century. Some 110 
languages are spoken in Vanuatu even at the present day.104 Contact 
with Europeans led to the emergence within the ni-Vanuatu community 
of a pidgin tongue known as Bislama, which is the lingua franca in 
Vanuatu today. English and French are used in government, business 
and education. 105 
100 Statistics Office, Statistical, op. cit., p. 2. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid.; EIU, Country Profile, 1996, op. cit., p. 80. 
104 European Commission, The South Pacific and the European Union, 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
Luxembourg, 1996, p. 23. 
105 EIU, Country Profile, 1996, op. cit., p. 80. 
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Arrival of Europeans and Colonisation 
The experiences of the ni-Vanuatu with the early European traders 
and settlers were not very pleasant. Between 1863 and 1904 for 
example, European traders abducted around 50,000 ni-Vanuatu by force 
and deception to work in sugarcane fields of Australia, New 
Caledonia and Fiji. 106 Such abduction came to be known as 
"blackbirding". 
Moreover, in the mid-nineteenth century European settlers and land 
speculators began a process of land alienation from the ni-
Vanuatu. 107 Large tracts of land were purchased from ni-Vanuatu whO 
had little or no idea of the concept of private land ownership. By 
1905 a company called Societe Franc;aise des Nouvelles-Hebrides for 
example, claimed over fifty-five per cent of the land area of 
Vanuatu. lOB Van Trease has noted that decades later ni-Vanuatu argued 
that much of the land alienated in the nineteenth century was not 
sold by the rightful owners and that the sales must have been made 
only for temporary use as permanent alienation to strangers was 
virtually impossible under the country's traditional land tenure 
system. 109 
106 D. Robie, Blood on their Banner: Nationalist Struggles in the 
South Pacific, Australia: Pluto Press, Leichhardt, 1989, p. 67. 
107 For a more comprehensive discussion of land alienation in 
Vanuatu see, Howard Van Trease, 'Colonial Origins of Vanuatu 
Politics', in H. Van Trease (ed.), Melanesian Politics: Stael Blong 
Vanuatu, Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies of the 
University of Canterbury, Christchurch, 1995, pp. 3-58. 
108 Ibid., p. 8. 
109 Ibid. 
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The absence of a land registration system and a formal dispute 
settlement mechanism meant that by the late nineteenth century there 
was escalating tension and rivalry not only between the ni-Vanuatu 
and Europeans but also between the British and the French settlers 
and traders themselves. Britain and France had vested interests in 
safeguarding their own nationals. Both these powers were also 
anxious to ensure that the other did not become dominant in 
Vanuatu.l1O Consequently in 1887 Britain and France decided to make 
Vanuatu a 'sphere of joint influence', and set-up a Joint Naval 
Corrunission to police the waters of the country.111 
The naval patrols by the Joint Naval commission did not resolve the 
land disputes and tension continued unabated. As such in 1906, with 
the threat of war looming in Europe, both Britain and France decided 
to resolve outstanding problems regarding Vanuatu by signing an 
Anglo-French Convention establishing a condominium over the 
country.112 This Convention was superseded in 1914 by an Anglo-French 
Protocol. 
Condominium. Rnle 
Under the condominium administration certain core government 
activities such as customs and public works were carried out jointly 
by the British and the French while a larger set of services 
110 Van Trease, 'Colonial Origins', op. cit., p. 9. 
111 Useful discussions of the colonisation and colonial experience 
of Vanuatu are in, Robie, Blood on their Banner, op. cit., pp. 67-
80; Howard Van Trease, 'Colonial Origins', op. cit.; B. Sope, 
'Background to "Man of Vanuatu": The Colonial History of the New 
Hebrides', in W. Lini, Beyond Pandemonium: From the New Hebrides to 
Vanuatu, Asia Pacific Books, Suva, 1980, pp. 17-18. 
112 Sope, 'Background', op. cit., p. 17. 
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including education and health were administered separately by 
French and British staff. ll3 Joint rule led to competition and 
friction between the British and the French in their bid to 
strengthen their positions by gaining the friendship and support of 
ni -Vanuatu. This competition polarised the local community along 
anglophone/ francophone lines and had far reaching consequences for 
the political development of the country. Premdas and Howard 
succinctly explained the condominium rule and its impact on the ni-
Vanuatu community as follows: 
The Anglo-French government established under the Protocol 
created an externally imposed cleavage which came to pervade 
most aspects of ni-Vanuatu life. In daily interaction, the 
French and British administrators and their respective 
citizens, businesses, and churches were engaged in intense 
competition for the loyalty of ni-Vanuatu. While at one 
level this provided opportunities for some ni-Vanuatu, 
overall the impact was disastrous. After decades of such 
rivalry, some ni-Vanuatu spoke French, attended French 
schools, went to French-run Catholic churches and availed 
themselves of French administered services. other ni-Vanuatu 
spoke English, attended English schools, went to English 
(Australian)-run (mainly Presbyterian) churches and accepted 
English-run government services. The terms of the 1914 
Protocol legalised and institutionalised this polarisation. 
The pervasiveness of the public bureaucracy in the life of 
the colonial state and the built-in divisions deepened the 
religio-linguistic segmentation in the society.1l4 
The bifurcation of the ni -Vanuatu society was reflected in the 
poli tical parties, which emerged in the country in the 1970s. For 
example the New Hebrides National Party (NHNP) formed in 1971 and 
renamed the Vanua' aku Pati (VP) in 1977 was predominantly 
anglophone. 115 The European settlers and the francophone minority 
113 R. Premdas & M.C. Howard, 'Vanuatu's Foreign Policy: 
Contradictions and Constraints', Australian Outlook, December 1985, 
vol. 39, no. 3, pp.177-186. 
114 Ibid., p. 178. 
115Earl y party politics of New Hebrides are comprehensively 
discussed in, K.M. Kele-Kele, 'The Emergence of Political Parties', 
in C. Plant (ed.), New Hebrides: The Road to Independence, 
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that accounted for 35 per cent of the country's population responded 
to the advent of NHNP by forming their own parties. Some of the 
significant francophone parties that emerged in the 1970s included 
the Mouvement Autonome des Nouvelles-Hebrides (MANH) formed in 1974, 
union des Communautes des Nouvelles-Hebrides, Federation des 
Independants formed in 1977, and Tan-Union (TU) which was also 
formed in 1977. 
One important difference between the VP and the francophone parties 
was the timing of independence. VP was strongly in favour of early 
independence. The francophone parties fearing domination by the 
anglophone majority preferred a slower pace, ostensibly to allow for 
further economic and social development of the country before 
poli tical independence. 116 Such differences between the parties and 
the British and French policies created political turmoil within 
Vanuatu in the lead up to independence, as discussed in more detail 
in Chapter II. Eventually, in 1980 Vanuatu received independence 
under a VP government. 
Post-in~endence Political structure and Government 
On independence, Vanuatu became a Republic with a multi-party 
democratic system of government. The head of state is a President 
with a Prime Minister as. the Head of Government. The country's 
legislative body or the Parliament is unicameral and made up of 52 
members elected every four years through universal suffrage. An 
Institute of Pacific Studies of the University of the South 
Pacific, Suva, 1977, pp. 17-34; Van Trease, 'The Colonial Origins', 
op. cit., pp. 20-58; V. Boulekone, 'The Politics of Tan-Union', in 
Van Trease (ed.), Melanesian Politics, op. cit., pp. 197-209. 
116 Van Trease, 'The Colonial Origins', op. cit., p. 31. 
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electoral college made up of the members of parliament and the 
chairmen of 11 regional councils elects the President for a five-
year period. 
The Parliament is responsible for appointing the Prime Minister from 
among its members. In turn, the Prime Minister appoints the 
executive branch of the government consisting of a Council of 
Ministers or Cabinet. The President appoints the Chief Justice and 
three other justices after consultation with the Prime Minister. 
The VP headed by Father Walter Lini stayed in power from 1980 to 
1991. During this period divisions built up within the VP. On 7 
August 1991 Donald Kalpokas and his supporters ousted Lini from 
party presidency and passed a no-confidence vote against him in the 
Parliament. The no-confidence vote brought to an end Lini's 11 years 
of leadership but not his political career. Lini went on to form the 
National united Party (NUP).117 
The Kalpokas government decided to hold elections in December 1991 
only two months after taking on the leadership of the country. The 
main parties which competed in the elections were the VP; NUP; Union 
of Moderate Parties (UMP) formed in 1981 and brought together 
several small francophone parties; TU which broke away from the UMP 
and allied with VP in 1989; and the Melanesian Progressive Party 
(MPP) established in 1988 by Barak Sope the former Secretary General 
of VP. UMP won a narrow victory in the elections and sought a 
coalition with NUP. The UMP leader, Maxime Carlot Korman, became the 
new Prime Minister of Vanuatu. us 
117 Van Trease, 'Years of Turmoil: 1987-91' in Van Trease (ed.), 
Melanesian Politics, op. cit., pp. 73-118. 
118 EIU, Country Profile, 1996, op. cit., p. 78. 
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In the run-up to the 1995 elections, Serge Vohor ousted Korman from 
his position as the President of UMP. The latter succeeded in 
becoming the Prime Minister of Vanuatu with the support of NUP.1l9 
Vohor managed to hold onto power for only two months when he was 
ousted by a vote of no confidence. He was replaced yet again by 
Carlot Korman who secured the support of the Unity Front (UF), 
formed in 1992 and included VP, MPP and TU. Less than eight months 
later Korman lost a vote of confidence and resigned and once again 
Vohor became the Prime Minister of Vanuatu. Following May 1998 
elections UMP and NUP joined to form the new government with 
Kalpokas as the Prime Minister and Lini as Deputy Prime Minister .120 
Economy 
Vanuatu is in the category of Least Developed Countries (LDC). The 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of the country was US$ 1,304 
in 1998. 121 The country's economy is largely dominated by subsistence 
agriculture. The principal export products of Vanuatu include copra, 
beef, squash, coffee, kava, cocoa, and sawn timber. 122 The main 
export markets in 1997 included Japan, Spain, Germany Cote d'Ivoire, 
and the united Kingdom. Being a small island state Vanuatu imports 
quite a large variety of products ranging from heavy machinery to 
119 Ibid., p. 79. 
120 The Commonwealth Secretariat, The Commonwealth Yearbook 1999, 
Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1999, p. 359. 
121 National Planning Office Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Management, 'Vanuatu's Vulnerability Indices', paper prepared for 
presentation to the United Nations, made available to this author 
by the National Planning Office Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Management, Port Vila, 1998. The criteria used by the United 
Nations in classifying LDCs are discussed in p. 159. 
122 EIU, Pacific Islands: Fiji, New Caledonia, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu, 3 rd quarter 1998, EIU, London, 1998, p. 48. 
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food and live animals. The main import sources in 1997 included 
Japan, Australia, Singapore, New Zealand and France. Tourism and an 
offshore financial centre or tax haven play an important role in 
Vanuatu's economy as discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. 
Foreign Relations 
Over the past 20 years since independence Vanuatu gained membership 
of a large number of multilateral organisations and forged links 
wi th a number of bilateral sources. Vanuatu assumed membership of 
the Commonwealth in 1980. 123 In 1981, Vanuatu gained membership of 
two other important organisations namely the United Nations and the 
Non-Aligned Movement. Vanuatu is today a member of over 70 
multilateral organisations including the Alliance of Small Island 
States (AOSIS), World Trade Organisation (WTO) , United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), International Bank on Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) , International Monetary Fund (IMF) , Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) , and the World Health Organisation (WHO). 124 
Presently Vanuatu has diplomatic relations with some 74 countries. 125 
The former colonial powers, Britain and France, together with 
Australia, New Zealand and China maintain resident diplomatic 
missions in Port Vila. Vanuatu itself does not have any diplomatic 
missions abroad with the exception of the Permanent Mission of the 
country to the United Nations in New York. 
123 Hoadley, S., The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, Allen 
and Unwin, Sydney, 1992, p. 207. 
124Interview conducted by the author with Mr. Belleay Kaloti ti, 
Acting Director, Department of Foreign Affairs, 4 January 1999, 
Port Vila (unpublished). 
125 Ibid. 
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Vanuatu is also acti vely involved in regional cooperation in the 
South Pacific. 126 Some of the important features of the South Pacific 
region and regionalism are briefly discussed below. 
Region and regionalism 
Vanuatu is located in a region consisting of some 23 countries which 
include American Samoa, Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Northern Mariana 
Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna, and Samoa. Of these countries Cook 
Islands, Niue, Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia 
and Palau are self-governing in free association with their former 
colonial powers. Seven countries including Tokelau, French 
Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, American Samoa, Guam 
and Northern Mariana Islands continue to be dependent. The rest of 
the countries are independent. 
All South Pacific island states with the exception of Australia, New 
Zealand and Papua New Guinea, fall into the category of small island 
states used in this dissertation. Papua New Guinea with a population 
of 4.3 million is however often considered a small island state 
because the country shares a number of characteristics with the rest 
of the regional small states. 127 
126 The history of regionalism in the South Pacific is discussed in 
detail in Haas, The Pacific Way, op. cit. 
127 See for example, Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability, 
op. cit., pp. 9-10; Commonwealth Advisory Group, A Future for Small 
States, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
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The islands of the South Pacific have been classified into three 
groups based on the ethnicity of the indigenous populations. These 
groups include Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia. Melanesia 
consists of Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, New 
Caledonia, and Fiji. The latter is also considered a Polynesian 
state, as the indigenous inhabitants of the country are part 
Polynesian. The rest of the Polynesian states include American 
Samoa, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Wallis and Futuna and Samoa. Micronesia consists of Kiribati, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Guam, Nauru, and the Northern 
Mariana Islands. 
In comparison with Polynesia and Micronesia, the islands of 
Melanesia are larger, more populous and richer in natural 
resources. 128 The rugged terrain of Melanesian countries also 
produced more fragmented communities and diverse cultures than in 
Polynesia or Micronesia. Melanesia is home to over one thousand 
languages of which over eight hundred are in Papua New Guinea. 
Nevertheless, a Melanesian consciousness or identity has emerged 
over the years facilitated by a pidgin English, widely spoken and 
understood in all the countries of the group except Fiji. The 
following reasons have been suggested by Grynberg and Kabutaulaka, 
for the emergence of the Melanesian consciousness 1) ethnic 
affiliation between the states; 2) geographical proximity of the 
Melanesian countries; 3) the classification of the Pacific islands 
into Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia by Europeans which gained 
acceptance and perpetuated the conceptualisation of the sub-regional 
128 T. I. J. Fairbairn, et al., The Pacific 
Economics, and International Relations, The 
Honolulu, 1991, p.4. 
Islands: Politics, 
East-West Centre, 
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identi ty. 129 The formation of MSG was facilitated by this sub-
regional identity. 
Regionalism in the South Pacific began in the 1940s. Then almost all 
the Pacific island countries were colonies. It was the colonial 
powers that laid the foundation of regionalism in the region. 
Regional organisations such as the SPC were set up and funded by 
these powers. Interestingly even after the regional countries gained 
independence most of the former colonial powers maintained their 
membership of the SPC and continued to support regional initiatives 
in the South Pacific. Australia and New Zealand which provide a 
significant proportion of the funds for regional initiatives, being 
regional countries, are members . of most of the regional 
organisations. Presently a number of other external sources such as 
Japan, China, and the united States support regional initiatives in 
the South Pacific. Support received by regional bodies of the South 
Pacific is discussed in more detail in chapters III and IV. 
Regionalism in the South Pacific would not have survived if not for 
continued funding from the developed countries of the region and 
external sources. 
One of the main reasons why the region attracts a substantial amount 
of funding from external sources is because the region consists of a 
large number of small island states with a range of similar needs 
and interests. Thus supporting regional projects is seen as a more 
cost-effective way of assisting the regional countries. This issue 
will be discussed in more detail in the analysis of the foreign 
policy of Vanuatu with respect to the objective of maximising 
foreign aid in chapter III. 
The most significant aspect of regionalism in the South Pacific is 
the cohesion within the region despite the large number of countries 
involved. This is undoubtedly because of the similarity of problems 
129 Grynberg & Kabutaulaka, 'The Political Economy of Melanesian 
Trade Integration', op. cit., pp. 48-60. 
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and interests of these states in a number of areas such as economic 
development, and environment protection. It is also because of the 
benefi ts reaped by the regional countries through their membership 
in regional organisations largely funded by external sources. The 
cohesion and commonality of interests facilitate the evolution of 
common positions on international issues and the smooth functioning 
of regionalism as a whole. These significant aspects of regionalism 
are covered in more detail in the relevant segments of the thesis. 
1.4b - Maldives 
Geography and Popu1.atioll 
The Republic of the Maldives lies in the Indian Ocean some 700 
kilometres to the South West of India, The country consists of 
approximately 1,200 very small coral islands spread out over an area 
of 820 kilometres from the North to South and 130 kilometres In 
breath at the widest point ,130 These islands are grouped into 26 
natural atolls divided into 20 administrative units, 
All the islands of the Maldives are low-lying with land elevation of 
around three metres being the highest point above sea level. The 
total land area of the country is approximately 300 square 
kilometres. This land is divided between 1200 islands and only 10 
per cent of it is arable. The EEZ of the Maldives covers an area of 
around 900,000 square kilometres. 131 
The population of the Maldives is homogeneous with all Maldivians 
being Muslims, sharing one mother tongue namely Dhivehi, and a 
common history and culture. The total population of the country was 
130 Ministry of Planning, Human Resources and Environment (MPHRE), 
Republic of Maldives: National Development Plan 1994-1996, MPHRE, 
Male', 1994, p. ix. 
131 MPHRE, state of the Environment: Maldives, MPHRE, Male', 1994, 
p. i. 
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estimated at 267,400 people in 1998. 132 The population growth rate is 
around 2.8 percent per annum. 
The inhabitants of the country live on about 200 of the 1200 islands 
of the Republic. About 90 percent of these inhabited islands have 
populations of less than 1000 people and only 4 islands have 
populations over 4,000 people. Male' the capital island which is 
around 2 square kilometres in land area, is crowded with over 70,000 
people. 
Pre-1965 History 
Very little is known about the ancient history of the Maldives. It 
is believed that Aryans and Drawidians from Sri Lanka and India 
initially settled the country around the fifth century Be. Through 
the influence of Arab traders the inhabitants of the Maldives 
embraced Islam in 1153 AD. In the sixteenth and the seventeenth 
centuries, the Portuguese and the Dutch respectively, colonised the 
Maldives for short periods. 
Amidst a high level of political instability in the Maldives in the 
1880s the British established a protectorate over the country.133 The 
decision to do so stemmed from Britain's interest to pre-empt any 
other power from gaining a foothold in the Maldives, which was very 
close to Britain's prized colony of India. Under the protectorate 
agreement the Maldives surrendered the conduct of foreign affairs 
and defence to the British. 134 In return the British agreed to 
refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of the country. 
132 MPHRE, Statistical Yearbook of the Maldives 1998, MPHRE, Male', 
1998, p. 28. 
133 A detailed account of the events leading up to the establishment 
of the protectorate is in, M. Nasheed, Dhagandu Dhahanaa, 
Lomaafaanu Publishers, Male', 1995, pp. 143-223. 
134 U. Phadnis & E.D. Luithui, Maldives: Winds of Change in an Atoll 
State, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1985, p. 19. 
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During the Second World War the British set-up a temporary airforce 
base on the island of Gan in Addu Atoll, the southern-most atoll of 
the Maldives. In 1956 following Sri Lanka's refusal to allow Britain 
to continue using the airforce facilities in Katunaike and the Royal 
Naval Yard at Trincomalee, the British decided to upgrade and 
reactivate the wartime airforce base in Gan. 135 Consequently an 
agreement was extracted from the Maldivian Prime Minister Ibrahim 
Ali Didi, which allowed Britain the use of Gan and the island of 
Hithadhu in Addu Atoll as an airforce base and communication centre 
for a period of 100 years, as a "free gift".136 
Prime Minister Didi resigned in 1957 for health reasons, without 
finalising the agreement that required the approval of the Maldives' 
Parliament known as the citizens Majlis. The agreement created much 
discontent in Male', the country's capital. The opposition was 
particularly strong because the British commenced work on Gan 
wi thout finalising the agreement. The new Prime Minister, Ibrahim 
Nasir, appointed in 1957, requested the British to suspend the 
demolition of buildings and certain aspects of the construction work 
on Gan until the agreement was reviewed and finalised. 137 The British 
complied with this request. 
Some of the Nasir government's demands in the re-negotiation process 
included: the right to conduct non-political foreign affairs; use of 
the airforce base only in the defence of the Maldives and the 
Commonwealth; resettlement of the inhabitants of Gan; and ensuring 
that the base did not disrupt the local fishing industry. 138 While 
the negotiations were ongoing a secessionist movement which emerged 
in Addu Atoll joined with a latent movement in neighbouring Huvadhu 
Atoll and declared independence from the Maldives under the name 
'United Suvadhiva Islands Republic'. The threat of Suvadhiva gaining 
international recognition weakened the bargaining position of the 
Maldives in its negotiations with Britain. Consequently, in 1960 an 
135 Ibid., p. 28; Keesing's contemporary Archives, January, 1957, p. 
15295. 
136Phadnis & Luithui (eds.), Maldives, op cit., p. 28. 
137 Commonwealth Survey, vol. 4, no. 11, 27 May 1958, p. 494. 
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agreement was reached under which Britain received approval for the 
use of Gan and Hithadhu for a period of 30 years instead of the 100 
years in the previous agreement. The British also paid £100,000 to 
Male' immediately following the agreement and another £750,000 was 
promised over a five year period. 139 Having secured the lease of Gan, 
the British conceded independence to the Maldives in 1965. 
Post-1965 Political structure and Histo~ 
At independence the Maldives was a sultanate under Sultan Mohamed 
Farid Didi, with Nasir as Prime Minister. A referendum in 1968 
abolished the Sultanate in favour of a Republican form of 
government. 140 There are no political parties in the country. The new 
constitution that came into effect in 1998 allows aspiring 
candidates to nominate themselves to the post of the President. The 
Parliament then selects a candidate for the post from the list of 
nominees, through a secret ballot. Following the selection, a 
national referendum is held to decide whether the public approves 
the candidate. If the candidate does not succeed in the referendum a 
new candidate is to be elected. The president is appointed for a 5-
year term. 
The executive branch of the government includes the President and 
his cabinet ministers. There is no limit on the size of the cabinet. 
The legislature consists of a unicameral parliament made up of 2 
members elected from Male', 2 from each of the 20 administrative 
atolls, and 8 members appointed by the President. The judiciary is 
made up of the High Court, Lower Courts and the President, who is 
the supreme judicial authority. The President appoints the Chief 
Justice and all other judges. 
138 Phadnis & Luithui, (eds.), Maldives, op cit., pp. 30-31. 
139 Ibid.,p. 33. 
140 This was the second time the Maldives became a republic. The 
first republic was declared in 1953 and lasted for 8 months before 
the country reverted to a sultanate. 
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The Maldives has had two Presidents since independence. The first 
was Ibrahim Nasir, elected President in 1968 when the country became 
a Republic. He was re-elected for a second term in 1973. In 1978, 
Nasir announced his intention to quit politics and the elections 
that followed brought Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, to power. Gayoom 
continues to rule the country since and was re-elected for a fifth 
consecutive term of office in 1998. 
The Economy 
The Maldives is a LDC with a GDP per capita of US$ 990 in 1997. 141 
During the 1986-96 period the country's GDP growth rate was 5.2 per 
cent per annum.142 Fishing and tourism are the two key sectors of the 
country's economy. Fishing is the largest industry employing over 20 
per cent of the workforce and accounting for 70 per cent of 
exports .143 Nevertheless, 90 per cent of the government income is 
derived from import duties and tourism related taxes. 
Maldives has a large shortage of local labour as evident from the 
fact that there are over 21 thousand foreign nationals working in 
the country, while local unemployment is negligible. 144 Approximately 
90 per cent of these foreign workers are from SAARC countries. Over 
50 percent of the workers are employed in unskilled jobs the rest in 
semi-skilled and skilled jobs mainly in hotels, shops and 
restaurants. 
Marine products such as canned and frozen tuna together with 
garments are the principal exports of the Maldives. The most 
significant export markets of the country include the United states, 
United Kingdom, Sri Lanka, singapore, Germany, Japan and Thailand. 
141 Committee for Development Planning, Committee for Development 
Planning: Report of the 31st Session, ECOSOC, New York, 1997, p. 45. 
142 MPHRE, Fifth National Development Plan, MPHRE, Male, 1997, p. 
40. 
143 MPHRE, Fourth National Development Plan, MPHRE, Male, 1994, pp. 
45 and 63. 
144 Ibid. p. 45. 
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The Maldives like Vanuatu is heavily dependent on a large variety of 
imports. The main import sources of the country include, Singapore, 
Sri Lanka, India, Germany and Japan. 
Foreign relations 
The Maldives has maintained a diversified and outward looking 
foreign policy since independence. The country became a 
member of the United Nations on 21 September 1965, less than 
two months after independence. Presently the Maldives has 
membership in some 56 international organisations including 
the Commonwealth, NAM, IMF, AOSIS, WTO, and the OIC. The 
Maldives has also established diplomatic relations with 124 
states. Of these countries, Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan 
maintain diplomatic missions in the Maldives. The Maldives 
has resident diplomatic missions in Colombo, London and New 
York. 
The Maldives is also very actively involved in regional 
cooperation in South Asia. The Maldives' participation in 
regional cooperation and its benefits to the country will be 
discussed in detail in chapters II, III, and IV. However some 
important features of South Asia and its regionalism are 
outlined below. 
Region and regionalism 
The South Asia region consists of seven states including Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, Nepal, the Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. There 
are vast differences between the regional countries in terms of 
population, land area, topography and so on. The largest in the 
region is India with a population of some 967.5 million people. 145 
145 The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1998, World Almanac Books, 
New Jersey, 1998, p. 773. 
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Pakistan and Bangladesh have populations of over 100 million people. 
Nepal and Sri Lanka have populations of 23, and 18.5 million 
respectively. 146 Bhutan's population of 1.8 million people is the 
smallest in the region with the exception of the Maldives. 147 
However, Bhutan's population is still larger than those countries in 
the category of small states used in this thesis. 
India with a land area of over 3 million square kilometres is the 
largest in the region. 148 Most of the regional countries are over 
100,000 square kilometres in land area .149 Sri Lanka, which is the 
only other island state in South Asia apart from the Maldives, has a 
land area of around 65,610 square kilometres .150 Bhutan's land area 
of 47,000 is the smallest in South Asia with the exception of the 
Maldives that has only 300 square kilometres of land area. As such 
various problems and vulnerabilities which arise from being small 
island states do not apply to the states of South Asia except the 
Maldives. 
Despite their asymmetries, South Asian countries have some common 
characteristics. They share some ethnic and cultural affinities, 
most countries have contiguous borders and most of all the countries 
of the region are all developing states. Despite these common 
characteristics no attempt was made at regional co-operation in 
South Asia until the 1980s, probably because of the high level of 
mutual suspicion and tension among certain regional countries. 
Between 1947 and 1971 for example, India and Pakistan fought three 
wars and the tension between them is t · . 151 con lnulng. India and 
Bangladesh also have conflicts over the sharing of the waters of 
Brahmaputra River and the migration of Bangladeshis to India. 152 
Mukherji has noted that India in the 1960s and 1970s did not attempt 
146 Ibid., pp. 742, 806, 802, and 820. 
147 Ibid., p. 745. 
148 D. Crystal (ed.), The Cambridge Encyclopaedia, 3rd Edition, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 542. 
149 Ibid., pp. 751, 115, and 80l. 
150 Ibid., p. 1012. 
151 Anand, South Asia, op. cit., p. 6-9. 
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regional co-operation in South Asia because it might raise doubts 
among its smaller neighbours regarding the country's intentions. 153 
It was the late President of Bangladesh, Zia-ur-Rahman, who in 1981 
proposed regional co-operation in South Asia .154 After extensive 
discussion, South Asian Regional Co-operation (SARC) was formally 
launched in 1983. In 1985 a formal regional organisation was set up 
and SARC was renamed the South Asian Association for Regional Co-
operation (SAARC). 
Regionalism in South Asia is a very recent phenomenon unlike 
in the South Pacific. As such South Asian regionalism has not 
had the benefit of time to mature. The process of development 
is also hindered by the high degree of tension in the region. 
Furthermore, the differences in the physical characteristics 
and interests among the regional states contribute to the 
inertia in South Asian regionalism. 
There are no developed countries in South Asia and regional 
initiatives do not receive much support from external sources 
as discussed in more detail in chapters III and IV. This is 
probably because the regional countries do not show a strong 
commitment to regionalism. Moreover the financial outlays by 
regional countries themselves for the SAARC process are 
extremely modest compared to the large amounts some countries 
are prepared to spend on other activities such as defence for 
example. While this is the case the financial requirements of 
the SAARC is comparatively much greater than the South 
Pacific to have a substantial impact on the regional 
populace. 
152 Disputes within the region are outlined in, G. Umar, SAARC 
(Analytical Survey), Pakistan Institute of international Affairs, 
Karachi, 1988, pp. 72-82. 
153 I.N. Mukherji, 'India and Regional Cooperation', in A. Majeed, 
Indian Ocean: Conflict and Regional Cooperation, Ayaz Books, 
Lahore, 1987, pp. 157-173. 
~4 History of regional co-operation in South Asia is 
comprehensively discussed in, Anand, South Asia, op. cit., pp. 56-
73. 
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As mentioned before the Maldives is the only small island 
of 
of 
the needs and 
the regional 
SAARC to the 
state in South Asia" Thus the differences in 
interests of the Maldives and the rest 
countries are reflected in the usefulness 
Maldives. The characteristics and features of South Asian 
in the relevant regionalism are discussed in more detail 
sections of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER II 
PRESERVING AND ENHANCING SECURITY AND SOVEREIGNTY 
2.1 - Introduction 
No nation in this world is immune to threats to their security and 
sovereignty. Yet, there is no other group within the global 
community that faces threats to security and sovereignty more 
seriously than small island states. Preserving and enhancing 
security and sovereignty are therefore among the fundamental foreign 
policy needs of small island states. It is the aim of this chapter 
to assess the foreign policies of both Vanuatu and the Maldives .at 
the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels in the area of 
preserving and enhancing security and sovereignty. 
The discussion in this chapter is divided into six sections. section 
2.1 is the introduction that also provides the definitions of 
security and sovereignty used in the thesis. The second section or 
section 2.2 will discuss Vanuatu's foreign policy objectives. This 
will be followed by section 2.3 that aims to assess the 
effectiveness of foreign policy actions at the multilateral, 
regional and bilateral levels in contributing towards Vanuatu's 
obj ecti ves. section 2.4 will discuss the foreign policy obj ecti ves 
of the Maldives while section 2.5 will assess the foreign policy 
actions of the latter country. Section 2.6 will attempt to sum up 
the discussion in the chapter with an intra-country comparison of 
the effectiveness of multilateralism, regionalism and bilateralism 
in contributing towards the foreign policy objectives of Vanuatu and 
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the Maldives. This latter exercise will not only serve to conclude 
the chapter but also facilitate the inter-country comparison in 
chapter V. 
2.1a - Security 
As Barry Buzan has argued security is a contested concept that is 
without a universally accepted definition. 155 Therefore, it is 
imperative that the concept of security used in this thesis be 
defined from the outset. This is particularly important because 
traditional definitions of security are too narrow or inadequate to 
use in discussing the security of small island states. Such 
definitions are largely restricted to the context of confrontation 
or war between states. Lippmann for example, linked security to the 
"core values" of a nation and argued that the latter is secure 
insofar as it does not have to sacrifice its core values to avoid 
war and if challenged is able to protect them by winning the war.~6 
Such definitions exclude from the ambit of security the threats 
posed by some non-state actors such as mercenaries, terrorists and 
drug traffickers that do not eventuate in war or the threat of war. 
Nevertheless, such non-state actors have the potential to seriously 
destabilise or erode the security and sovereignty of a small state. 
This thesis favours a definition of security that takes into 
consideration the special security needs of small island states. 
Such a definition has been offered by the Commonwealth Consultative 
155 B. Buzan, People, Sta tes and Fear: The Na tional Securi ty Problem 
in International Relations, University of North Carolina Press, 
Chapel Hill, 1983, p.11. 
156 W. Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, Little 
Brown & Co., Boston, 1943, p.51. 
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Group which defined security as, "the absence of threat to the 
capacity to govern, preserve and advance the state and its peoples 
consistent with the principle of respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of other states". 157 Under this definition no 
country in the present day world is fully secure since total 
security depends on the elimination of all threats. Yet small states 
that face a wider range and a higher intensity of threats are more 
insecure. 
2.1b - Sovereignty 
The concept of sovereignty can be explained by distinguishing 
between internal and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty is 
based on the idea that there exists an absolute authority or a 
sovereign within society.158 In contemporary society the absolute 
authority lies with the state. Internal sovereignty therefore refers 
to the ability of a state to assert absolute authority within its 
area of jurisdiction. Any threat to such authority is a threat to a 
state's sovereignty. 
The term external sovereignty refers to sovereignty of a state 
within the international community. In this context, sovereignty 
does not mean absolute authority of a state but being an equal 
member within the community of nations. Couloumbis and Wolfe have 
succinctly defined external sovereignty as the "recognition by all 
states of the independence, territorial integrity, and inviolability 
157 Commonweal th Consul ta ti ve Group, Vulnerabili ty, op. cit., p. 23. 
158 J.A. Camilleri, The End of Sovereignty: The Politics of a 
Shrinking and Fragmenting World, Edward Elgar, Hants, 1992, p.15. 
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of each state as' represented by its government". 159 These definitions 
of internal and external sovereignty are collectively referred to in 
this thesis as sovereignty. 
2.2 - Vanuatu's Foreign policy objectives 
This thesis has identified the following four foreign policy 
objectives of Vanuatu in the area of preserving and enhancing its 
security and sovereignty. These four objectives include the 
assertion of sovereignty; support for decolonisation; realising a 
nuclear free Pacific; and combating the threat of transnational 
crime. The reasons for and the nature of these objectives are 
outlined below after a brief discussion of the guiding philosophy of 
Lini and Vanua'aku Patio This philosophy is important to the 
understanding of all the foreign policy objectives of Vanuatu in the 
1980s. 
Lini has described the guiding philosophy or principles of his 
nation as Melanesian Socialism. 160 Lini points out that Melanesian 
Socialism constitutes Melanesian values, principles and 
expectations. These values and principles might have similarities 
with communism or Soviet socialism but Melanesian Socialism is 
claimed to have its origins or roots strictly in the Melanesian 
past. The process of colonialism is believed to have suppressed 
Melanesian values and principles. On independence Lini wanted to 
instigate a renaissance of Melanesian Socialism. 161 
159 T.A. Couloumbis and J.H. Wolfe, Introduction to International 
Relations: Power and Justice, 2nd edition, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New 
Jersey, 1982, pp. 54-55. 
160 Lini, statement to the Australian and South Pacific Conference, 
February 18-19, Pacific Islands Monthly, April 1982, pp. 25-27. 
161 Ibid., p. 25. 
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Premdas questions the validity of Lini' s claim that the source of 
Melanesian Socialism is strictly in the Melanesian past and has 
identified three other sources that influenced the philosophy. 162 The 
first source was Christianity. During Lini's childhood he was 
educated in Christian denominational schools and later became a 
trained Anglican (Episcopalian) pastor. 163 Although Lini criticised 
early Christian missionaries for failing to understand and outlawing 
Melanesian spiritual practices he noted that in their ideal form, 
Christian ethical values bore great affinity to Melanesian values or 
Melanesian Socialism. 164 Many of the founders, activists, 
Parliamentarians and Cabinet Ministers of VP attended Christian 
denominational schools and theological colleges and became pastors 
and catechists. 165 
The second source identified by Premdas is Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
where a radical campaign for independence was mounted in the 1970s. 
Several ni-Vanuatu students who subsequently assumed executive 
positions in VP, including Barak Sope who became the Pati's 
Secretary, attended the university of Papua New Guinea which was 
then the hot-bed of anti-colonial radicalism in the South-West 
Pacific. This factor could perhaps have influenced Vanuatu's 
radicalism in foreign policy, which will be discussed in more detail 
later on in this Chapter. 
162 R. Premdas, Melanesian Socialism: Vanuatu's Quest for Self-
Definition and Problems of Implementation', Pacific Studies, vol. 
II, no. 1, November 1987, pp. 107-129. 
163 Lini's childhood is discussed in, Lini, Beyond Pandemonium, op. 
cit. 
164 Premdas, Melanesian Socialism, op. cit., p. 110. 
1~ Ibid., p. 111. 
78 
The third source was the influence of Tanzanians. Premdas has noted 
that there was a large and influential contingent of Tanzanian 
lecturers at the University of Papua New Guinea, who had sympathy 
for Julius Nyerere's populist socialist believes. 166 These lecturers 
had close relations with the PNG nationalists. On PNGs independence 
several of these Tanzanians travelled to Vanuatu and helped ni-
Vanuatu nationalists on constitutional and political matters. 
Furthermore, several ni-Vanuatu nationalists travelled to Tanzania 
and sought training and advice. 167 While Lini denied any Tanzanian 
influence on his Pati, he refers in his speech to the Australian 
and South Pacific Conference, to the "good thoughts of my 
Comrade Julius Nyerere" .168 Based on these factors Premdas has 
draw the conclusion that the non-aligned policy of Vanuatu and the 
critique of international capitalism and imperialism by Lini was 
very likely influenced by Tanzanian socialism. 169 
It is true that Christianity, radicalism of PNG nationalism and 
Tanzanian socialism could have influenced Vanuatu's policies. 
However one should not disregard the strong influence of Vanuatu's 
own history and physical geography on the country's foreign policy. 
These influences on Vanuatu's foreign policy will be discussed in 
the course of this chapter. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Lini, statement to the Australian and South Pacific Conference, 
op. cit. 
169 P remdas, Melanesian Socialism, op. cit., p. 111. 
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2.2a - Assertion of sovereignty 
In the 1980s, Vanuatu was renowned in the South Pacific for its 
fiercely independent foreign policy. 170 This foreign policy stance 
was largely influenced by the radical influences on the VP 
executives discussed above, and the small size and history of the 
country. The relationship between smallness and the desire to assert 
sovereignty was expressed by Lini in 1985 as follows: 
... small states such as ours are very vulnerable to outside 
influences, especially when they have to depend on foreign 
aid. In recognising this we have tried as much as possible, 
to protect our sovereignty. That is why we have maintained a 
non-aligned foreign policy as we have.l7l 
The bitter experience of ni-Vanuatu at the hands of early European 
traders and colonial powers are some of the most significant factors 
responsible for Vanuatu's foreign policy stance mentioned above. 
These factors are briefly discussed below as they are important to 
the understanding of most of Vanuatu's foreign policy objectives and 
actions discussed in this chapter. 
Blackbirding was among the early experiences of ni-Vanuatu at the 
hands of European traders. The resentment and bitterness caused by 
blackbirding linger on to this day among ni -Vanuatu. Hoadley has 
170 Useful discussions of Vanuatu's foreign policy in the 1980s are 
in, R. Premdas and M.C. Howard, 'Vanuatu's Foreign Policy: 
Contradictions and Constraint', Australian Outlook, vol. 39 no. 3, 
December 1985, pp. 177-186; and R. T. Robertson, 'Vanuatu: Fragile 
Foreign Policy Initiatives', Development and Change, vol. 19, no. 
4, 1988, pp.617-647. 
171 Vanuatu Weekly, 4 May 1985, p. 17. 
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noted that the xenophobic element of Vanuatu's nationalism can be 
traced back to the tactics of blackbirders. 172 
The colonial experience added to ni-Vanuatu resentment caused by 
blackbirders. Land alienation by foreigners that began before 
colonialism continued under the Condominium rule creating local 
hostility and sometimes physical opposition. In the 1960s for 
example, a grassroots movement known as Nagriamel, led by Chief 
Buluk and Jimmy stevens, began occupying land settled by a French 
company in Tanafo near Luganville. 173 Nagriamel argued that 
foreigners had no right to dark bush land. 174 It led Buluk and 
stevens to be arrested and jailed for several months, but increased 
the popularity of the movement. Consequently, the French 
administrators encouraged planters and companies involved to hand 
over parts of their undeveloped land to ni -Vanuatu so as to gain 
their acceptance of permanent alienation of the developed areas. 175 
The tactic worked well in resolving the Nagriamel grievances. 
However, opposition to land alienation by other groups of ni-Vanuatu 
in areas such as Malekula and Port Vila continued during the 1960s 
and 1970s. 176 
Another source of resentment of ni -Vanuatu, especially the 
anglophone majority, was the bifurcation of the indigenous society 
by the dual colonial administrations. According to Lini, the 
condominium administration "consciously advocated social 
172 S. Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, Allen 
and Unwin, Sydney, 1992, p. 202. 
173 Van Trease, 'The Colonial Origins', op. cit., pp. 12-14. 
174 Dark bush land is the Bislama term for virgin forest. 
175Van Trease, 'The Colonial Origins', op. cit., p. 18. 
176 Ibid., p. 14. 
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division" ,177 He likened the social situation in the country then to 
"hell",17B When time came for independence the anglophone aspirations 
for a united country under one government, one law, one education 
system and one health system faced stiff resistance from the 
francophones supported by the French government. 179 The bitter 
struggle that ensued, briefly discussed below, further incensed 
local resentment of the colonial powers and strengthened the push 
for independence. 
In 1975 France and Britain agreed to provide Vanuatu with 
independence and decided to elect a Representative Assembly. Robie 
has noted that the French agreed to independence on the belief that 
the francophone parties they nurtured over the previous few years 
would succeed in the elections. 180 The Representative Assembly was to 
be made up of 29 universal suffrage seats, 4 seats reserved for 
customary chiefs of four districts, and 9 seats to be elected by the 
Chamber of Commerce and Co-operatives. The elections gave VP 17 out 
of the 29 universal suffrage seats but not enough for a majority in 
the Assembly. It created much dissatisfaction and the VP blamed the 
colonial powers for the dilenuna. Lini argued that the British and 
the French purposefully tried to balance the power of the elected 
members by appointing members from the Chamber of Commerce to the 
Assembly, allowing Europeans in the country to participate in the 
elections, and preventing 18 year old ni -Vanuatu from voting. 181 
177 Lini, address to the UN Committee of 24, 19 August 1976, in 
Lini, Beyond Pandemonium, op. cit., pp.35-37. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid, 
180 Robie, Blood on their Banner, op. cit., p. 72. 
181 Lini, Beyond Pandemonium, op. cit., p. 40, 
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At the first meeting of the Assembly, a motion to remove the Chamber 
of Commerce seats from the body was tabled by VP. 182 Vote on this 
motion was tied and the VP decided to boycott the Assembly. It led 
to a series of developments including: VP deciding to use more 
activist methods to force colonial powers to commit to a clear plan 
for independence; colonial powers deciding to hold new elections; 
the raising of VP's flag in a number of locations and the 
declaration of the establishment of a Peoples Provisional Government 
by VP members. These events provoked numerous incidents of violence 
between VP and opposition supporters. Consequently, fresh elections 
were held in 1979 under united Nations' observation and monitoring. 
In this elections the VP won a landslide victory gaining 62 percent 
of the total votes and 26 seats in the 39 seat Assembly. 183 
The situation in Vanuatu took a turn for the worse on VP's victory. 
Jimmy stevens and his supporters began threatening and intimidating 
VP supporters in Santo, forcing over 400 anglophones to flee the 
town. 184 The French would not agree to a British suggestion to send a 
joint police unit to the island to establish law and order. Being 
given a free hand Jimmy Stevens declared his intention to secede 
Santo from Vanuatu and gain independence as the Republic of 
Vemarana. 
Stevens had the backing of the French government, French settlers, 
mixed race planters and businessmen seeking to protect land-
holdings. 185 On 28 May 1980 the secessionists launched a co-ordinated 
182 Van Trease, 'The Colonial Origins', op. cit., p. 36. 
183 Ibid., p. 40. 
~4 Ibid., p. 41. 
185 G. Molisa, N.N. Vurobaravu, & H. Van Trease, 'Background to "The 
Eve of Independence": The Hidden Agenda', in Lini, Beyond 
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offensive in Santo during which they attacked government buildings 
and the police headquarters, ransacked houses belonging to 
anglophones, confiscated private property and forced the remaining 
anglophones to flee. The actions of Jimmy Stevens and his followers 
were mimicked in Tanna by members of francophone parties. Despite 
pleas for help by the Lini government to quell the lawlessness the 
colonial powers stood by as the situation deteriorated in Vanuatu. 
Consequently, on independence Lini was forced to look for support 
from regional states in reuniting his divided country. 186 
The bitter historical experience had a profound influence on the 
foreign policy of Vanuatu. As Premdas has argued, no evaluation of 
Vanuatu or its ideology can fail to consider the adverse historical 
background from which the country sought to extricate itself to 
assert its independence and a dignified identity.187 Lini government 
was determined to ensure that Vanuatu's bitter struggle was not in 
vain and that the country would not be treated as a second class 
state in international relations. Vanuatu wanted nothing less than 
total control over its own destiny. In this respect Vanuatu's Roving 
Ambassador, Nike Nike Vurobaravu, stated that "historical experience 
has made us determined that those big nations will no longer 
influence Vanuatu as they did in the past". 188 
The salience of the assertion of sovereignty as a foreign policy 
objective began diminishing in the late 1980s due to divisions 
Pandemonium, op. cit. , pp. 56-59; Keesing's contemporary Archives, 
2 January 1981, p. 30642. 
186 The suppression of the rebellion is discussed in pp. 37-38. 
187 R. R. Premdas, 'Melanesian Socialism: Vanuatu's Quest for self-
determination and Problems of Implementation', Pacific Studies, 
vol. 11, No.1, November 1987, pp. 107-129. 
188 Interview conducted by R. T. Robertson in Vila, on 12th February 
1986, quoted in Robertson, 'Vanuatu', op. cit., pp.621-622. 
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within the VP, which will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter. Moreover, the UMP that came to power in 1991 did not have 
the same passion for the assertion of sovereignty as the Lini 
government. The members of the UMP were predominantly francophones. 
Thus, reactions against nuclear testing and colonialism that were 
effectively used by the VP in asserting Vanuatu's sovereignty, were 
not important in the foreign policy of UMP. However, there have been 
a couple of instances, discussed later in this chapter, in which UMP 
took bold steps in asserting Vanuatu's sovereignty. 
2.2b - Supporting Decolonisation 
The colonial history of Vanuatu was influential in dictating the 
country's foreign policy objective of supporting decolonisation. 
Having undergone a very bitter colonial experience the ni-Vanuatu 
were anxious to see an end to the practice which held them captive 
for over 75 years. Consequently on independence Vanuatu strongly 
supported decolonisation world-wide. However, it was the 
continuation of colonialism in Vanuatu's neighbourhood that most 
seriously concerned Lini government. The decolonisation of the 
region was not merely an issue of morality and justice as far as the 
Lini government was concerned, but a matter of crucial importance 
for the security of Vanuatu. In an address to the Australia and 
South Pacific Conference, in 1982, Lini explained that the "Pacific 
is one of the last regions of the world where the heavy hand of 
colonialism continues to be played", and that "these remnants of the 
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past must be lifted from our ocean, for, in all truth, and as I have 
remarked before, until all of us are free, none of us are". 189 
The above threat perception was particularly pertinent with respect 
to French colonialism in New Caledonia. The suppression of the Santo 
secessionist movement in August 1980 led some 387 rebels, mostly 
French settlers and half-castes, to flee to New Caledonia. 190 They 
were joined there by many of the 127 foreigners (110 of whom were 
French citizens) declared prohibited immigrants in Vanuatu following 
the rebellion. This community of disgruntled rebels, a number of 
whom lost their properties in Santo, openly threatened to 
destabilise the VP-Ied government in Vanuatu. 191 
The threats from the community of rebels in Noumea could not be 
taken lightly given New Caledonia's role in the secessionist 
movement. While the actual extent of Noumea's involvement in the 
rebellion is uncertain, it is clear that during Lini-government's 
blockade of Santo following the unrest, New Caledonia allowed the 
rebel-owned vessel, Vemerana Federation, to dock in Noumea for 
supplies. 192 It is also known that three days prior to the rebellion, 
New Caledonia allowed a flight carrying rebel leaders to fly 
straight from Noumea to Santo without authorisation from Vanuatu. 193 
There is a suspicion that the flight also carried arms and 
189 W. Lini's keynote address to the Australia and the South Pacific 
Conference, 18 February 1982,in Pacific Islands Monthly, April 
1982, pp. 25-28. 
190 The number of rebels who fled Noumea was obtained from, J. 
Beasant, The Santo Rebellion: An Imperial Reckoning, Heinemann 
Publishers Australia, Richmond, 1984, p. 143. 
191 Premdas & Howard, 'Vanuatu's Foreign Policy', op. cit., p. 184. 
192 G. Molisa, et ai, 'Vanuatu Overcoming Pandemonium', in R. 
Crocombe and A. Ali (eds.), Politics in Melanesia, Institute of 
Pacific Studies of the University of the South Pacific, Suva, 1982, 
p. 110-12. 
193 Ibid. p. 97. 
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ammuni tion. Van Trease has argued that while the French government 
encouraged and supported the rebellion the rebels themselves were 
allied with right-wing elements in New Caledonia whose ultimate aim 
was to link the islands of Santo and Tanna with the Loyalty Islands 
to form a separate buffer state between them and Vanuatu. 194 
Not surprisingly, the fear of external intervention caused a "siege 
mentali ty" to prevail in Vanuatu in the 1980s. 195 It was the 
perception of the Lini-government that as long as the French were in 
control of New Caledonia the security of Vanuatu would remain under 
threat. As such, Lini was keen to see an end to colonialism in his 
country's neighbourhood and particularly in New Caledonia. 
The Lini-government was certain that France would not grant 
independence to New Caledonia unless compelled to do so. In an 
interview with Robertson, Ambassador Vurobaravu explained his 
country's position on the question of New Caledonia, as follows: 
Everyone wants New Caledonia to be independent, but Vanuatu 
says that France will never freely bestow independence on 
New Caledonia. Again this comes down to experience. Ask 
vietnam or Algeria if the French gave them independence? We 
say if you don't give New Caledonia independence there will 
never be peace in the region. Our foreign policy is aimed 
always at ensuring stability. Vanuatu asks what is the best 
way of ensuring stability? Surely by respecting people, by 
permitting self-determination. 196 
Consequently, the decolonisation of New Caledonia was very 
significant among the foreign policy objectives of Vanuatu. The 
194 Van Trease, 'The Colonial Origins', op. cit., p. 49. 
195Premdas & Howard, 'Vanuatu's Foreign Policy', op. cit., P .184. 
196 Excerpt from the interview conducted by Robertson in, Robertson, 
'Vanuatu', op. cit., p. 625. 
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struggle for independence by the West Papuans and East Timorese were 
the other two causes in the area of decolonisation in which Vanuatu 
was particularly interested. 
The support for decolonisation receded in significance in Vanuatu's 
foreign policy in the 1990s largely due to the assumption of power 
by the UMP. As mentioned before the UMP was dominated by 
francophones who had no inclination to pursue issues related to 
decolonisation. This was most importantly because France continued 
to colonise New Caledonia. Serge Vohor who became the Foreign 
Minister of Vanuatu in 1991, explained the UMP position on New 
Caledonia thus: 
The French government and the people of New Caledonia alone 
will decide on the issue of independence. The new government 
in Vanuatu today faces many urgent problems of its own, 
which will occupy its time and energy. The independence of 
New Caledonia is, therefore, not one of our top priority 
issues. 197 
2.2c - Realising a nuclear-free South Pacific 
In 1962, France decided to use the French Polynesian atolls of 
Moruroa and Fangataufu in the South Pacific, for its nuclear testing 
program. 198 This decision caused serious concern wi thin the South 
Pacific because of the potential risk to the region from nuclear 
testing. Assurances by France regarding the safety of the tests did 
little to calm the fears of the Pacific islanders. 
197 Serge Vohor, 'UMP Foreign Policy', in Van 
Politics, op. cit., pp. 175-180. 
198 Yoko Ogashiwa, Microstates and Nuclear 
Cooperation in the Pacific, Institute of 
University of the South Pacific, Suva, 1991, pp. 
Trease, 
Issues: 
Pacific 
1-34. 
Melanesian 
Regional 
Studies, 
88 
The ni-Vanuatu, even before independence, shared the sentiments of 
the other Pacific islanders on the issue of nuclear testing and 
dumping in the region. A statement issued in 1975 by the New 
Hebrides National Party (NHNP) for example, condemned any form of 
nuclear acti vi ty and supported the move by other Pacific island 
countries to declare the region a nuclear-free zone. 199 Further an 
organisation called the Social Concerns Committee, formed in 1979 by 
representatives of churches, chiefs, women's groups, youth groups, 
trade unions, university students, political parties and the 
government, began a local anti-nuclear movement. 200 Ms. Hilda Lini, a 
sister of Prime Minister Lini, was very active within the movement 
and later represented the VP in the meetings of the Nuclear-free 
Pacific Movement, the regional anti-nuclear movement founded in Fiji 
in April 1975. 201 The anti -nuclear awareness created by such 
movements and the strong stand they take against nuclear 
proliferation tended to support and influence Vanuatu's policies on 
nuclear issues. Moreover Ms. Lini is believed to have been a strong 
influence on the VP's stand against nuclear testing and 
proliferation. 
On independence, the realisation of a nuclear-free South Pacific was 
among the most significant foreign policy objectives of the VP. The 
Lini government saw the nuclearisation of the Pacific as a 
continuation of colonialism and a direct threat to Vanuatu. As such 
Vanuatu emerged as one of the most hard-line in the region against 
199 statement issued by NHNP quoted in Hoadley, The South Pacific, 
op. cit., p. 205. 
200 Ogashiwa, Microstates and Nuclear Issues, op. cit., p. 61. 
201 Representation by Hilda Lini in the Nuclear-free Pacific Forum 
in Sedney in 1980, on behalf of VP is discussed in Pacific Islands 
Monthly, December 1980, p. 37. 
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nuclear testing. Barak Sope, the Secretary-General of VP until 1988, 
explained Vanuatu's opposition to nuclear testing in the following 
words: 
In the past colonialists wanted our labour, so they 
kidnapped us. Then they wanted our land, so they stole it 
from us for their plantations. Now they want our sea for the 
dumping of nuclear waste, testing of nuclear missiles and 
passage of submarines. The Trident submarine may be a far 
cry from a blackbirding vessel, but to us they are both 
ships from the same old fleet. That is why Vanuatu is 
opposing nuclear colonialism in the Paci fic. 202 
2.2d - Combating the threat of transnational crime 
Transnational crime has been a concern for Vanuatu since 
independence. Initially it was the possibility of attempts by the 
large community of Santo rebels in New Caledonia, at destabilising 
Lini-government, which was the most serious transnational threat 
facing Vanuatu. This perception was not far-fetched since the 
ability of externally based dissidents to destabilise a small state 
is well known. The Commonwealth Consultative Group for example, 
identified destabilisation by externally based dissidents as one of 
the serious threats facing small states. 203 
More recently transnational criminal activity such as drug 
trafficking and money laundering increased world-wide threatening 
small island states of the South Pacific region. The seriousness of 
this threat is underlined by factors such as the discovery of some $ 
202 A quotation from a speech made by Barak Sope at the University 
of the South Pacific, in Robertson, 'Vanuatu', op. cit., p. 626. 
203 Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability, op. cit., p. 26. 
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30 million worth of hashish in Fiji in 1992. 204 The report of a task 
force appointed by the New Zealand Government to review New 
Zealand's relations with the South Pacific noted that, "recent 
seizures suggest that the Pacific Island countries are being seen as 
potential transit points from Asia to Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States". 205 
Vanuatu's tax haven had attracted some 2,500 foreign companies by 
1997 and was a prime target for such crime. 206 Vanuatu's Prime 
Minister Donald Kalpokas expressed his concern that the continuing 
escalation of international criminal activity such as drug 
trafficking and money laundering, "have the potential of placing the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of small states at great 
risk".207 While the protection against such threats is among the 
declared foreign policy objectives of Vanuatu the seriousness of the 
country in combating transnational crime is questionable. This issue 
will be further explored in the course of this chapter. 
2.3 - Vanuatu's Foreign Policy Actions 
Vanuatu employed a number of foreign policy actions at the 
bilateral, regional and multilateral levels, in pursuance of the 
country's foreign policy objectives namely, assertion of 
sovereignty; supporting decolonisation; realising a nuclear free 
204 Pacific Islands Monthly, March 1992, p. 6. 
205 South Pacific Policy Review Group, Towards a Pacific Island 
Community, Wellington, 1990, p. 218. 
206 The World of Information Asia and the Pacific Review, 16th 
edition, Walden Publishing Ltd., Essex, 1997, p. 193. 
207 Prime Minister Kalpokas, statement to the 53 rd Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly, New York, 30 September 1998, a 
copy of the statement was made available to the author by the 
Permanent Mission of the Maldives to the United Nations. 
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Pacific; and combating transnational crime. A broad range of 
Vanuatu's foreign policy actions at the multilateral, regional, and 
bilateral levels are discussed below with the aim of assessing their 
effectiveness in furthering the foreign policy obj ecti ves of the 
country. 
The discussion in this section is carried out under three 
subheadings multilateralism, regionalism and bilateralism. The 
foreign policy actions at the multilateral, regional and bilateral 
levels in furthering a single objective or regarding a single issue 
will be discussed in this section under one or more of the three 
separate sub-headings mentioned above. For example, Vanuatu's 
foreign policy actions at the global level in pursuit of the 
independence of New Caledonia will be discussed in this section 
under the subheading multilateralism. The attempts made at the 
regional level to further the said cause will be discussed under the 
subheading regionalism, and bilateral contributions to the process 
will be discussed under the subheading bilateralism. 
2.3a - Multilateralism 
In relation to most other South Pacific island states, Vanuatu made 
quite extensive use of multilateralism in the pursuit of security 
and sovereignty related foreign policy objectives. This section will 
discuss Vanuatu's foreign policy actions at the global level and 
attempt to assess their contribution towards the country's 
objectives in the area of security and sovereignty. In doing so, 
examples will be drawn from Vanuatu's membership of and actions 
through multilateral organisations such as the United Nations, 
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Commonwealth and the NAM. However, the discussion in this section is 
structured based or focused on issues and not organisations. This 
means that the foreign policy actions of Vanuatu through several 
organisations 
moving on 
regarding 
to actions 
a single 
on the 
issue will be 
next issue 
discussed before 
through various 
organisations. For example, the section will discuss actions of 
Vanuatu through the Commonwealth, NAM and the united Nations on the 
issue of the security of small states before going on to discuss the 
actions of the country through these same organisations on the issue 
of decolonisation. 
The membership of global organisations such as the united Nations 
and the NAM were very important in terms of symbolism in the 
assertion of Vanuatu's sovereignty. The membership of the united 
Nations for example, is considered by many as the ultimate symbol of 
sovereignty and independence of a state. The Commonwealth 
Consultative Group noted that, "it is only through the membership of 
the United Nations, where the principle of sovereign equality of all 
states is written into its constitution, that the right of a small 
state to have its independence and territorial integrity respected 
on the same legal terms as other nations is formally recognised". 208 
Vanuatu's membership of the united Nations therefore served to 
confirm the equality of the country with the other nations of the 
global community and acted as the psychological climax of the 
country's struggle for 
gaining membership of 
independence and sovereignty. Furthermore, 
the united Nations so quickly after 
independence was also a clear signal to the international community 
of Vanuatu's determination to assert its sovereignty and freedom. 
This signal was particularly strong because some Pacific island 
208 Commonwealth Consul ta ti ve Group, Vulnerabili ty, op. cit., p. 70. 
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states such as Samoa joined the United Nations a long time after 
independence, while others like Kiribati, Tonga, Nauru and Tuvalu 
initially opted not to become members of the organisation. 209 
As a corollary of Lini government's espousal of non-alignment, 
Vanuatu gained membership of NAM in 1981. This was an organisation 
associated by many with radical states such as Cuba and perceived as 
opposed to the West. 210 Vanuatu's membership of NAM was therefore a 
radical move for an island state of the South Pacific since all the 
regional countries have traditionally maintained very close 
relations with the West. However, the membership of the organisation 
was important for Vanuatu at the symbolic level in contributing 
towards Lini government's objective of asserting the country's 
sovereignty. The membership was at a symbolic level an expression of 
Vanuatu's resolve to maintain an independent foreign policy. 
According to Natuman, who worked as a private secretary to Lini, the 
membership of NAM was aimed at making the statement that Vanuatu was 
an "independent country and can join any organisation it wants. fl211 
Vanuatu's membership of NAM did indeed serve the latter purpose. 
The membership of multilateral organisations such as the 
Commonwealth, the United Nations and the NAM also offered Vanuatu a 
cost-effective means to sensitise the international community on 
various issues and have the country's interests, grievances and 
problems heard. This was extremely important since financial and 
manpower constraints made it virtually impossible for Vanuatu or any 
209 Samoa joined the United Nations in December 1976, some fourteen 
years after independence. 
210 J. Natuman, 'Vanuatu's Sovereignty in Jeopardy', in Van Trease 
(ed.), Melanesian Politics, op. cit., pp. 413-422. 
211 Ibid., p. 414. 
94 
other small island state to effectively reach the global community 
through bilateral channels. The one stop exposure to the 
international community offered through multilateral forums enabled 
Vanuatu to further all four foreign policy objectives in the area of 
security and sovereignty, focused in this chapter, with varying 
degrees of success. 
In Vanuatu's campaign against colonialism, the membership of 
multilateral organisations provided Lini-government with the 
opportunity to join forces with the other like-minded states in 
pushing for decolonisation world-wide. However, it was the 
continuation of colonialism in Vanuatu's neighbourhood that most 
seriously concerned Lini-government. The large international forums 
made accessible through the membership of global organisations 
provided Vanuatu the opportunity to voice its opposition to 
continuing colonialism especially in the South Pacific. For 
instance, in the address to the United Nations General Assembly in 
1981, Lini argued: 
It is a fact that some of our concerns are regional, based 
on support for what we regard in Vanuatu as a natural 
expectation held by those Pacific peoples still subject to 
colonial rule. That they have the right to be promptly 
granted a free and unfettered political determination is a 
principle we will not abdicate. 212 
Furthermore, Lini went on to calIon the united Nations community to 
support the principle of prompt decolonisation and unfettered 
political determination. In 1983, Vanuatu was instrumental in 
getting the Commonwealth to stress the need for the early 
212 W. Lini' s address to the United Nations, in Pacific Islands 
Monthly, November 1981, pp.35-36. 
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independence of New Caledonia. 213 The same year Vanuatu used the NAM 
forum to condemn Indonesian policies in East Timor. 214 While such 
condemnation by representatives of Lini government might not have 
any direct effect on the policies of the colonial powers, they 
served in furthering Vanuatu's objective of asserting the country's 
sovereignty and contributing to the global lobby against 
colonialism. 
Vanuatu had more apparent success in its support for the Kanak 
struggle against French domination, than any other issue related to 
decolonisation. Under Vanuatu's initiative the South Pacific island 
states in 1986, raised at the united Nations, the issue of French 
colonialism in the South Pacific and sought to re-inscribe New 
Caledonia in the united Nations Decolonisation Committee's list of 
colonies. 215 The aim of the Pacific island states was to exert 
international pressure on France to relinquish its hold over New 
Caledonia. France which took New Caledonia off the list in 1947 
vigorously opposed re-inscription. 216 Yet, the island states 
succeeded with 89 votes in their favour, 24 against and 34 
abstentions. 
The successful re-inscription of New Caledonia with the 
Decolonisation Committee has largely been ascribed to the support of 
the NAM member states lobbied by Vanuatu. Natuman has argued that if 
213 Commonwealth Secretariat, Report of the Commonwealth Secretary-
General 1987, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1987, p. 4. 
214 Robertson, 'Vanuatu', op. cit., p. 625. 
215 I bid., p. 623; Natuman, 'Vanuatu's Sovereignty', op. cit., p. 
416; and Premdas & Howard, 'Vanuatu's Foreign Policy', op. cit., 
p. 184. 
216 K. Ross, Regional Security in the South Pacific: The Quarter-
Century 1970-95, The Australian National University, Canberra, 
1993, p. 138. 
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Vanuatu was not a member of the NAM the re-inscription of New 
Caledonia would have been more difficult to achieve. 217 He also noted 
that Vanuatu has often lobbied the member states of the NAM when 
regional countries needed to push certain issues at the united 
Nations. It demonstrated the usefulness of membership in 
multilateral organisations in furthering Vanuatu's foreign policy 
objectives, and in this case, placing New Caledonia on the united 
Nations Decolonisation Committee's list of colonies. 
It would be fair to argue that the overwhelming support for the 
decolonisation of New Caledonia demonstrated by the united Nations 
member states contributed to a softening of the French position on 
the independence of New Caledonia. As Ganesh Chand has argued, "for 
France, public opinion meant nothing, unless it damaged French 
interests in the regionH , and the re-inscription of New Caledonia in 
the United Nation's list of colonies showed that public opinion, and 
the South Pacific island states mattered. 218 
The international pressure on France together with heightening 
political conflict within New Caledonia were largely instrumental in 
the signing of the Matignon Accords of 1988 between the French 
Government, Front de Liberation National Kanak et Socialiste 
(FLNKS), and Rassemblement pour la Caledonie dans la Republique 
(RPCR) .219 Under the Accords, a referendum was to be held in 1998 to 
217 Natuman, 'Vanuatu's Sovereignty', op. cit., p. 416. 
2W G. Chand, 'France and South Pacific Regionalism in the 1980s and 
1990s', Journal of Pacific Studies, vol. 17, 1993, pp. 57-79. 
219 A useful discussion of Matignon Accords is in, D. Winslow, 
'Kanaky: Mid-way Point in the Matignon Accords', Fourth World 
Bulletin, July 1994, vol. 3, no.3, 20 December 1998, online 
available: http://carbon.cudenver.edu/fwc/lssue8/kanaky-1.html, 7 
April 1999. FLNKS is a pro-independence party dominated by Kanaks. 
RPCR is an anti-independence party dominated by the French in New 
Caledonia. 
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allow the people of New Caledonia to decide whether their country 
was to remain a part of French terri tory or become independent. 
However, instead of holding the said referendum the parties to the 
Matignon Accords decided to come to a negotiated settlement thereby 
signing the Noumea Accords, which set New Caledonia on the road to 
independence over a 20-year period. 220 During this period, New 
Caledonia is to gradually receive greater autonomy although defence, 
currency, public order and some areas of foreign relations are to be 
excluded. At the end of the 20-year period a referendum by the 
people of New Caledonia is to be held to decide whether or not the 
country is to become independent. 
Vanuatu's campaign for the decolonisation of the South Pacific had 
some negative side effects for the country. Lini's criticism of the 
Suharto regime for its policies in East Timor and West Papua for 
instance, led Indonesia to become critical of Vanuatu and its 
policies. Premdas and Howard have noted that Lini's criticisms, 
often in "extremely strong denunciatory language", led Suharto 
regime to react in warning against Vanuatu's foreign policies such 
as its ties with Cuba. 221 The tension between the two regimes did not 
lead to reprisals by Indonesia apart from criticism. However, 
provoking the hostility of any state, let alone a larger state, was 
not a prudent pOlicy for a small island state like Vanuatu, 
especially when the issue in question was not directly related to 
the security or sovereignty of the country. Vanuatu's campaign for 
the decolonisation of New Caledonia also attracted French hostility 
in the form of threats to halt aid to the country as discussed in 
220 An informal English translation of the Noumea Accords provided 
to the author by Mr. Paul A. Sami, Assistant Secretary, Asia 
Pacific Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Vanuatu. 
221 Premdas & Howard, 'Vanuatu's Foreign policy', op. cit., p. 184; 
Pacific Islands Monthly, March 1984 , p. 25, and May 1984, p. 59. 
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section 3. 3c. 222 However, the issue of New Caledonia unlike East 
Timor and West Papua, was directly related to Vanuatu's security. 
Vanuatu also used multilateral organisations to push for the 
denuclearisation of the South Pacific. Lini announced at the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1981 for example, that his country 
advocated with strong conviction that the ~Pacific Ocean be free of 
nuclear contamination through the practice of dumping nuclear waste 
or the testing of nuclear weapons". 223 The same year Vanuatu and 
other South Pacific island states lobbied the Commonwealth to 
condemn nuclear testing in the South Pacific. 224 since then, the 
Commonwealth member states on a number of occasions have reaffirmed 
their united opposition to nuclear testing. 225 Despite such 
opposition through the Commonwealth and numerous united Nations' 
resolutions against nuclear testing, France continued until it had 
completed all her nuclear test related requirements. As such, while 
it is not possible to say that France ended its nuclear testing 
solely due to the effort made by Vanuatu and the international 
community, scholars have argued that international opposition was 
indeed a contributing factor in France calling off the tests 
early.226 
The inability of the united Nations to effectively deal with nuclear 
testing demonstrates an inherent weakness of the organisation in 
dealing with powerful states. Some scholars have argued that this 
222 See pp. 186-187 
223 Lini's address to the UN in 1981, op. cit. 
224 Pacific Island Monthly, November 1981, p. 11. 
225 See for example, Commonwealth Secretariat, Report of the 
Commonwealth Secretary-General 1985, op. cit., p. 4. 
226 See for example, Commonwealth Advisory Group, A Future For Small 
States op. cit., p. 108. 
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obstacle would have come into play had Vanuatu relied on the 
assistance of the united Nations Security Council in resolving the 
secessionist revolt in the country. In fact Vanuatu requested for 
the assistance of the United Nations in dealing with the 
secessionist rebellion. However, the request did not find its way 
onto the Security Council's agenda. As Norman MacQueen has noted, 
even if the request did find its way onto the agenda of the Security 
Council, it was unlikely to have been successful because France 
would have vetoed it. 2v 
2.3b - Regionalism 
Most of the security and sovereignty related interests of Vanuatu 
such as denuclearisation and decolonisation lay within the South 
Pacific region. The nature of these interests is such that most of 
them could be successfully realised only through a joint effort by 
the regional states. This section will try to assess the 
significance of regionalism in contributing towards the foreign 
policy objectives of Vanuatu in the area of preserving and enhancing 
security and sovereignty. 
The establishment of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) was 
among the foreign policy objectives pursued by Vanuatu through the 
SPF. The idea of setting up a SPNFZ was first discussed at the SPF 
in 1975 under a New Zealand initiative, before Vanuatu joined the 
227 N. MacQueen, 'Beyond Tok Win: The Papua New Guinea Intervention 
in Vanuatu, 1980', Pacific Affairs, vol. 61, no. 2, Summer 1988, 
pp. 235 - 252. 
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organisation. 228 Then the SPF decided to gain the endorsement of the 
united Nations before a formal declaration of a nuclear free zone in 
the region. Resolution 3477 of the United Nations General Assembly 
endorsed the SPNFZ idea by a vote of 110 to 0 and 20 abstentions. 229 
Despite the endorsement, the defeat of the Labour governments in 
both Australia and New Zealand in late 1975 led the SPNFZ idea to 
loose its previous priority. 
Vanuatu's membership of the SPF in 1981 revived the SPNFZ idea 
within the organisation. One of the very first steps taken by 
Vanuatu at the SPF was to present to the organisation in 1981 a 
proposal for the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the region. 
Vanuatu's proposal received the support of some Forum island states 
such as Papua New Guinea but was rej ected by Australia and New 
Zealand, the two developed countries within the organisation. 230 It 
demonstrated the heterogeneity and conflicts of interest within the 
region. The SPNFZ idea however survived. 
In 1982 Lini government further publicised the nuclear free zone 
issue within the South Pacific by denying diplomatic clearance for 
two navy frigates from the United states to enter into Vanuatu's 
territory.231 The incident occurred when the united states' 
government refused to reveal to Vanuatu authorities whether or not 
the frigates in question were carrying nuclear weapons. Vanuatu 
being a strong advocate of SPNFZ and having a national law 
prohibiting on its soil nuclear weapons, nuclear power, nuclear 
228 Ogashiwa, 
Robie, Blood 
229 Ibid., p. 
230 Ibid. 
Micro States and Nuclear Issues, 
on their Banner, op. cit., p. 147. 
27. 
op. cit., pp.23-24; 
231 'Are there 'nukes' aboard? Vanuatu says 
warships', in Pacific Islands Monthly, March, 
'no' to visit of U.S. 
1982, p. 17. 
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waste dumping and the passage within its waters of nuclear powered 
ships, refused clearance for the frigates. 232 
Robertson has argued that while Vanuatu's actions of 1982 pUblicised 
the issue of a SPNFZ it also encouraged Australia to pre-empt any 
growth in radicalism that might harm Western military interests 
within the region. 233 Australia did so by supporting a tame treaty, 
which, while appearing to support Pacific island concerns, actually 
allowed the nuclear status quo to be substantially maintained in the 
region. At the fifteenth Forum meeting in Tuvalu in 1984, member 
countries agreed in principle to the Australian proposal for a SPNFZ 
resulting in the Treaty of Rarotonga. D4 
The Treaty of Rarotonga or the SPNFZ Treaty was signed by eight 
regional states on 6 August 1985 and entered into force on 11 
December 1986. 235 The treaty covered large ground. Articles 3, 5 and 
6 of the Treaty, for example, required parties to renounce nuclear 
explosive devices inside and outside the region and prevent nuclear 
testing and the stationing of nuclear weapons within the SPNFZ. The 
Treaty also included three protocols to which non-regional states 
could accede. Protocol 1 of the Treaty was open for Britain, France 
and the United states, requiring them in respect of their 
territories within the SPNFZ, to accept the prohibitions contained 
in paragraphs 3, 5 and 6, of the Treaty. Protocol 2 and 3 were open 
to all five nuclear powers in the world then. Protocol 2 required 
signatories to refrain from using nuclear weapons against any party 
232 Premdas & Howard, 'Vanuatu's Foreign policy', op. cit., p. 184. 
233 Robertson, 'Vanuatu' I op. cit., p. 623. 
234 R. Thakur, 'Nuclear-Weapon-Free South Pacific: A New Zealand 
Perspective', Pacific Affairs, vol. 58, no. 2, 1985, pp. 216-238. 
235 The text of the treaty is in Ogashiwa, Micro States and Nuclear 
Issues, op. cit., pp. 75-85. 
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to the Treaty and not to contribute to any act that constituted a 
violation of the Treaty. Protocol 3 committed signatories not to 
test nuclear weapons within the SPNFZ. Although the latter protocol 
was open to all five nuclear powers it was directed against France 
which was the only power conducting nuclear tests in the region. 
China signed protocols 2 and 3 on 10 February 1987 and the Soviet 
Union signed them on 15 December 1987. France, Britain and the 
United states signed the three protocols nine years later on 25 
March 1996. 
Eleven SPF countries became party to the SPNFZ Treaty by 1987 but 
Vanuatu was not among them. The South Pacific island states that did 
not sign the Treaty in the 1980s were Vanuatu and Tonga. Vanuatu 
attended all the working group meetings held to draw up the treaty 
but declined to sign it on the grounds that the treaty was not 
comprehensive enough. 236 In contrast to Vanuatu's perception of a 
nuclear free zone, the Rarotonga Treaty left it open for individual 
states to decide whether to allow nuclear powered and armed ships 
and aircraft to enter their territories. Lini blamed the Australian 
government for political expediency in pushing through the SPNFZ 
Treaty.237 Asked why Vanuatu did not obstruct the necessary consensus 
wi thin the South Pacific Forum, to frustrate the signing of the 
treaty, Mr. Kalotiti said that it was in the "Pacific spirit" that 
his country allowed the treaty to be signed. 238 
The limitations of the SPNFZ Treaty or Vanuatu's refusal to sign the 
treaty did not indicate a total failure of the foreign policy of 
236 Pacific Islands Monthly, April 1986, p. 17. Tonga's reason for 
not signing the treaty was the very opposite of vanuatu's. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Interview with Mr. Kalotiti, op. cit. 
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Lini government. On the contrary, the Rarotonga Treaty formalised 
the non-nuclear status of South Pacific states, which was an 
important contribution in itself to Vanuatu's foreign policy. 
Further, the Soviet Union and China signed the protocols to the 
Treaty in 1986 and 1987 respectively, assuring that they do not pose 
a nuclear threat to the region. 
Vanuatu's refusal to sign the Treaty demonstrated the country's 
strong views on the issue of nuclear weapons. Such foreign policy 
stances of Vanuatu greatly enhanced the country's image, especially 
among the developing countries. 239 Furthermore, Britain, France and 
the United states eventually acceded to the Treaty Protocols in 
1996. Therefore as one senior Melanesian diplomat argued, the Treaty 
was "half a loaf" which was better than none. 240 Overall, the policy 
of sustained resolute opposition to nuclear testing by the South 
Pacific countries through initiatives such as the Rarotonga Treaty 
is held by many as a crucial element of world wide opposition which 
contributed to an early end to the tests by France.241 
Vanuatu signed the SPNFZ Treaty in September 1995 under an UMP 
government led by Maxime Carlot Korman. The position of the UMP on 
the issue of nuclear testing was very different to that of the VP. 
Serge Vohor for example, in discussing the UMP foreign policy, 
referred to denuclearisation of the South Pacific as "nonsense". 242 
However, given the strong local and international opposition to 
239 Natuman, 'Vanuatu's Sovereignty', op. cit., p. 414. 
240 Pacific Islands Monthly, September 1986, p. 35. 
241 Commonwealth Advisory Group, A Fu ture for Small Sta tes, op. 
ci t ., p. 108. 
242 Vohor, 'UMP Foreign Policy', op. cit., pp. 177. 
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nuclear testing, the UMP announced in 1995 its opposition to 
France's decision to renew nuclear testing in the South Pacific. 243 
Regionalism proved useful for Vanuatu in furthering some aspects of 
its objective of decolonisation. The SPF on the one hand, provided a 
sympathetic arena for Vanuatu's campaign against colonialism. This 
sympathy stemmed from the fact that most of the island states of the 
region had experienced some form of colonialism in the past. Yet on 
the other hand, the colonial experiences of Vanuatu and the rest of 
the regional countries were very different and so were the 
enthusiasm and commitment to the cause of decolonisation. As such, 
while Vanuatu managed to get some regional support for its campaign 
against colonialism in New Caledonia, Vila was largely a lone voice 
in the region in supporting the East Timorese and West Papuan 
struggles against Indonesian rule. The Solomon Islands has from time 
to time expressed misgivings in the united Nations General Assembly 
about the Indonesian policy in East Timore. 
In supporting the Kanak struggle for independence, Vanuatu managed 
in 1983 to convince the SPF to issue a joint communique supporting 
self-determination in New Caledonia. 244 Such collective opposition to 
colonialism was important both to persuade France to relinquish its 
hold on New Caledonia and as moral support for the Kanak liberation 
movement itself. Furthermore, collective action was necessary in 
gaining international support for the cause. 
243 Henningham, The Pacific Island 
244 R. Keith-Reid, 'Death Knell 
1983, vol. 9, no. 10, pp. 16-19. 
States, 
at the 
op. ci t ., p. 41 . 
Forum', Island Business, 
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Vanuatu needed the support of the regional and international 
community in its aim to re-inscribe New Caledonia in the United 
Nations Decolonisation Committee's list of colonies, discussed 
earlier under multilateralism. The initial response of the SPF to 
Vanuatu's proposal of petitioning the united Nations to re-inscribe 
New Caledonia was not positive. In both 1984 and 1985, the idea was 
rej ected by the SPF. 245 However, the policies of the newly elected 
conservative government of France led by Prime Minister Jacques 
Chirac, which resulted in the deterioration of the political 
situation in New Caledonia, made conditions more conducive for 
Vanuatu to influence the SPF on the issue of decolonisation. 
In lobbying the SPF to petition the united Nations for the inclusion 
of New Caledonia in the list of colonies Vanuatu had the support of 
the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). Since Kanaks were Melanesians 
Vanuatu found more enthusiasm for the decolonisation of New 
Caledonia among the Melanesian states including Papua New Guinea and 
Solomon islands than the rest of the regional countries. At the MSG 
meeting in Port Vila in 1985, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and 
Vanuatu reaffirmed the legitimate right of the Kanak people to 
independence and pledged to push the SPF to re-inscribe New 
Caledonia in the United Nations Decolonisation Committee's list of 
colonies.~6 The change in France's policy on New Caledonia and heavy 
lobbying by Vanuatu and the rest of the MSG succeeded in 1986 in 
persuading the SPF to petition the United Nations on the issue of 
New Caledonia. As discussed earlier the joint effort by the South 
Pacific island states was successful in placing New Caledonia on the 
Decolonisation Committee's list of colonies. 
245 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. XXXI, September 1985, p. 
33855. 
246 Robie, Blood on their Banner, op. cit., p. 134. 
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While regionalism and sub-regionalism proved useful for Vanuatu in 
advancing the Kanak cause the same cannot be said of supporting 
other liberation movements. Lini's attempts to persuade the Pacific 
island states to adopt Vanuatu's internationalist views and support 
liberation movements within the international community did not 
succeed. 247 As for the question of East Timor and Irian Jaya, most of 
the South Pacific island states perceived Jakarta as having a 
legitimate right to impose its will on these territories. m Even the 
members of the MSG had no inclination to support the liberation 
movements in East Timor and Irian Jaya. Papua New Guinea that shared 
its border with Irian Jaya was strictly against any action that 
might damage relations with its bigger and more powerful neighbour, 
Indonesia. Papua New Guinea's Foreign Minister, Akoka Doi, noted in 
1986 that as far as his country was concerned the inclusion of West 
Papua within Indonesia was a "mistake done by colonial powers so let 
it stay as it is". 249 
Regionalism also was a useful avenue through which Vanuatu could, if 
willing, deal with the threat of transnational crime such as drug 
trafficking and money laundering. The South Pacific region consists 
of a number of small island states and all of them face the common 
threat of transnational crime. It is a threat that individual 
countries cannot single-handedly defend against. Vanuatu along with 
other South Pacific island states have on many occasions expressed 
concern over the continuing threat from criminal elements, some of 
which had sought to take advantage of rapid developments in 
247 Robertson, 'Vanuatu', op. cit., p. 623. 
248 Henningham, The Pacific Island Sta tes, op. cit., pp. 53. 
249 MacQueen, 'Beyond Tok Win', op. cit., p. 241. 
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technology. 250 Several regional specialist bodies have also been 
created in the South Pacific to protect against such crime. Vanuatu 
is a member of a number of these bodies including Customs Heads of 
Administration Regional Meeting (CHARM) , Pacific Islands Law 
Officers Meeting (PILOM) and the South Pacific Chiefs of Police 
Conference (SPCPC) through which regional countries are trying to 
co-ordinate and strengthen their pOlicing and law enforcement 
activities in the area of transnational crime. In 1988 a Forum 
Regional Security Committee was also set-up largely to oversee the 
effective co-ordination of regional law enforcement amongst 
specialist agencies while at the same time providing a mechanism for 
urgent regional consul ta tions .251 
Furthermore, the Twenty-Third SPF Meeting held in Honiara in 1992 
adopted a Declaration on Law Enforcement Co-operation, also known as 
the Honiara Declaration, in recognition of the threats posed to the 
stability of the region by increased criminal activity. In 1997, 
regional states adopted the Aitutaki Declaration on Regional 
Security Co-operation. Under this declaration the SPF countries 
decided to further develop regional mechanisms for preventative 
diplomacy; strengthen the Forum Regional Security Committee to 
consider, among other things, a regional approach to transnational 
crime in the South Pacific; and develop emergency response 
procedures for the region's security forces. 252 Such co-operation is 
essential in minimising the vulnerabilities and enhancing the 
250 See for example, SPF, 'Communique of the Twenty-Seventh SPF', 
Majuro, 3-5 September 1996. 
251SPF, 'Communique of the Twenty-Eighth SPF', Rarotonga, 17-19 
September 1997, paragraph 23. 
252Ai tutaki Declaration on Regional Cooperation, in SPF, 'Communique 
of the Twenty-Eighth South Pacific Forum', Rarotonga, 17-19 
September 1997, annex two. 
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security and sovereignty of regional small island states such as 
Vanuatu. 
Despite these developments at the regional level and Vanuatu's 
membership in a number of those organisations the sincerity of the 
country in combating transnational crime is questionable. For 
instance during the past three years Vanuatu did not attend the 
meetings of the Regional Security Committee. The financial burden of 
paying for the airfare of the delegate attending the meeting has 
been cited as the reason for the failure to participate. 253 This is a 
flimsy excuse given the fact that Vanuatu is one of the most 
seriously at risk of being targeted by transnational crime in the 
region, and a single air ticket would definitely be within the means 
of the country. Moreover allegations of corruption and fraud at the 
top ranks of the country's bureaucracy are common in Vanuatu and the 
government is encouraging foreign companies to Vanuatu's tax haven 
with full knowledge that some of them would be involved in illegal 
business such as money laundering. 254 
2.30 - Bilateralism 
Vanuatu has extensively employed bilateralism in the pursuit of its 
foreign policy objectives. While Vanuatu's use of bilateralism had 
its benefits it also incurred costs for the country. It is the aim 
253 Interview conducted by this author with Mr. Paul A. Sami, 
Assistant Secretary, Asia Pacific Division, Department of Foreign 
Affairs of Vanuatu, Port Vila, 4 February 1999, (unpublished). 
254 See Pacific Islands Monthly, January 2000, p.32, for an article 
on money laundering in Vanuatu. Vanuatu government's efforts to 
promote the country's tax haven is discussed in, Pacific Islands 
Monthly, August 1984, pp. 36-37. The issue of corruption by top 
officials of the government is discussed in Pacific Islands 
Monthly, January 2000, p. 14. 
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of this section to assess the significance of bilateralism in 
contributing towards Vanuatu's foreign policy goal of enhancing 
security and sovereignty. 
It did not take long after independence for Vanuatu to realise the 
value of some bilateral partners in preserving and enhancing its 
security and sovereignty. As mentioned before when Vanuatu received 
its independence the Santo rebellion was threatening to rip the 
country in two. Lini imposed a blockade of Santo on 30 May but was 
in no position to suppress the revolt without external assistance. 
Requests for assistance from Britain and France proved futile. While 
France was not interested in assisting the Lini-government, Britain 
was reluctant to provoke French hostility by sending in troops. 
However, as violence became rampant the British and the French 
agreed to send troops to save face within the international 
community and to avoid unilateral action by anyone state. Their 
troops that arrived in Vanuatu did not act to put down the revolt. 255 
The unwillingness of the British and the French forces to defuse the 
revolt led Vila to seek assistance from other sources. As mentioned 
earlier Vanuatu approached the United Nations for assistance, but 
the request did not make it to the Security Council. Vanuatu also 
looked to the Ninth SPF Meeting for assistance. The Forum's response 
was limited to a resolution tabled by the Australian Prime Minister, 
Malcolm Fraser, calling on Britain and France "to use all means 
within their authority" to end the rebellion. 256 
255 M. Gubb, Vanuatu's 1980 Santo Rebellion: International Responses 
to a Microstate Security Crisis, Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994, p. 16. 
256 J. Beasant, The Santo Rebellion: An Imperial Reckoning, 
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1984, p. 119; Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives, 2, January 1981, p. 30643. 
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At that time of need, Papua New Guinea came to Vanuatu's rescue by 
agreeing to send in troops to help suppress the revolt. 257 On Papua 
New Guinea's insistence Australia, which was very reluctant to get 
embroiled in the situation, agreed to provide transport aircraft and 
personnel for non-combat roles. 258 Papua New Guinea's "Kumul Force" 
with logistical support from Australia, arrived in Vanuatu on the 18 
August 1980. Within two weeks of arrival, the Kumul Force succeeded 
in suppressing the revolt and arresting the rebel leaders involved. 
Mission completed Papua New Guinean troops left Vanuatu in mid-
September. 
Again in 1988 Vanuatu had to seek the assistance of its bilateral 
partners following riots in Port Vila which threatened to run out of 
control. The riots which began on 16 May 1988 were instigated by 
land issues including the closure of the lease administering Vila 
Urban Land Corporation (VULCAN) which was under investigation for 
financial irregularities; but was also connected to the bitter power 
struggle between Lini and Barak Sope, the Secretary General of VP. 259 
A small group of the rioters went on a rampage through the streets 
of Port Villa, smashing windows, and looting shops causing an 
estimated damage of A$2 million. 260 Faced with the riot, Lini made an 
urgent appeal to Australia and New Zealand on 19 May, for equipment 
to re-supply the police and the 250 strong Vanuatu Mobile Force 
257 Gubb, Vanuatu's 1980 Santo Rebellion, op. cit., p. 20. 
258 Ibid. 
259 The incident is discussed in detail in H. Van Trease, 'Years of 
Turmoil: 1987- 91', in Van Trease (ed.), Melanesian Politics, op. 
cit., pp. 73-80; Gubb, Vanuatu's 1980 Santo Rebellion, op. cit., 
pp. 47-52; Henningham, The Pacific Island States, op.cit., pp. 139-
140. 
260 Van Trease, 'Years of Turmoil', op.cit., p. 78. 
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(VMF). Both countries obliged promptly by sending supplies including 
riot control equipment. 
Furthermore, the provision of more substantive military assistance 
was also considered by Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. 
Canberra and Wellington assured Lini that in case of an emergency 
his request for direct assistance in the form of troops would be 
sympathetically received. 261 contingency plans were also made by 
Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea for direct assistance to 
Vanuatu including the possible dispatch of Papua New Guinean police 
in Australian aircraft. 262 None of these were eventually necessary as 
Vanuatu's police and VMF managed to bring the situation under 
control. 
These two incidents discussed above underline the significance of 
Melanesian neighbours such as Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea 
and other regional countries such as Australia and New Zealand, to 
the security and sovereignty of Vanuatu. In the Santo incident, 
Vanuatu's Melanesian neighbour, Papua New Guinea, extended its 
assistance despite considerable opposition from Fiji and Polynesian 
states in the SPF. 263 This opposition stemmed from the fear that the 
incident could set a precedent for foreign military intervention in 
regional states. MacQueen has noted that the only country that 
expressed unconditional support for the proposed intervention by 
Papua New Guinea was Vanuatu's other Melanesian neighbour, Solomon 
Islands. 264 However, the Solomon Islands itself was not in a position 
261 Gubb, Vanuatu's 1980 Santo Rebellion, op. cit., p. 49. 
262 Ibid. 
263 N. MacQueen, 'Sharpening the Spearhead: Subregionalism in 
Melanesia', Pacific Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, March 1989, pp. 33-52. 
264 MacQueen, 'Beyond Tok Win', op. cit., p. 244. 
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to contribute to the effort in terms of material assistance. Papua 
New Guinea was also involved in assisting Vanuatu during the 
incident of 1988 discussed above. 
Furthermore, the two incidents also proved the importance of 
regional powers like Australia and New Zealand for the preservation 
and enhancement of the security and sovereignty of Vanuatu. 
Australia and New Zealand are the best equipped in the South Pacific 
in terms of resources and military capability making their support 
and involvement very important in any military operation within the 
region. Even in the Santo incident, it was only with the backing of 
Australia that Papua New Guinea intervened in Vanuatu. In 1988, 
Australia and New Zealand took the lead in assisting Vanuatu. 
The recurrence of incidents such as those discussed above are a very 
real threat for Vanuatu. This threat is underlined by more recent 
events such as the abduction of the country's President Jean-Marie 
Leye Lenelcau Manatawai in October 1996, by 138 members of the 
country's 300-strong paramilitary force, over a dispute regarding 
back pay and allowances.2~ The potential for such instability in the 
future makes bilateral partners such as the Melanesian neighbours, 
Australia and New Zealand, very important with respect to Vanuatu's 
foreign policy goal of preserving and enhancing security and 
sovereignty. 
As mentioned in section 2.3a on multilateralism, the overall 
bilateral policy of the Lini government was largely based on the 
philosophy of non-alignment. This policy was dictated by the need to 
265 The World of Information, op. cit. , p. 193. 
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maintain an independent foreign policy and thereby assert Vanuatu's 
sovereignty. Based on the philosophy of no-alignment Vanuatu 
established diplomatic relations with a broad array of states from 
varied geographical and ideological backgrounds. The countries that 
were placed in Vanuatu's diplomatic fold included those such as 
Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France, West and East Germany, 
Vietnam, North Korea, Nicaragua, and China. 266 During the first ten 
ye.ars of independence Vanuatu established diplomatic relations with 
" . 
72 states. 267 
Some of Vanuatu's diplomatic connections created much concern and 
apprehension in certain quarters of the region. For instance, the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1983 is said to 
have "set an alarmist cat among the South Pacific pigeons". 268 Some 
regional countries felt that Vanuatu was thoughtlessly leading the 
South Pacific into danger. 269 Lini government defended the 
relationship as a matter of reciprocity. 270 Cuba was supportive of 
Vanuatu's quest for independence and as far as Lini government was 
concerned it was time for Vanuatu to show its appreciation. This 
policy of establishing diplomatic relations based on the principle 
of non-alignment was important in furthering the country's objective 
of asserting its sovereignty. 
In pursuance of its non-aligned policy Vanuatu did not establish 
diplomatic relations with any of the superpowers until 1986. 
266 Hoadley, The South Pacific, op.cit., p. 207. 
267 Interview with Mr. Kaloti ti, op. cit. 
268 Pacific Islands Monthly, March 1984, p. 25. 
269 Ibid.; Pacific Islands Monthly, May 1984, p. 59. 
270 Natuman, 'Vanuatu's Sovereignty', op. cit., p. 415. Cuba chaired 
the UN Decolonisation Committee when the case of New Hebrides was 
taken up. 
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Moreover, Lini government wanted to maintain a superpower balance in 
the region. At the Commonwealth Summit in 1982 for example, Lini 
criticised the "excessive" US presence in the South Pacific and 
suggested that in the interest of balance he would be willing to 
extend port facilities to Soviet vessels. 271 This offer was a strong 
assertion of sovereignty but conflicted with the general Western 
policy of "strategic denial" and was met with criticism by the 
Australian Defence Minister, Ian Sinclair. 272 
The concerns of Australia, New Zealand and some other regional 
states were heightened in 1986 when Vanuatu established diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in 1987 Vanuatu signed 
a fishing agreement with the Soviet Union amidst warnings by 
regional states of the danger of regional destabilisation by the 
Soviets.273 Vanuatu defended the agreement as motivated purely by 
economic reasons. Lini government further argued that as an 
independent nation Vanuatu had the right to deal with any state it 
wanted. m Pacific Islands Monthly noted that New Zealand's initial 
worries about the agreement dissipated after Prime Minister Lange 
spoke with Lini at the next SPF Meeting. 275 
The establishment of diplomatic relations between Vanuatu and Libya 
in 1986, shortly after the bombing of Tripoli by the United States, 
also caused regional apprehension. The link with Libya was a result 
271 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. XXX, April 1984, p. 32789. 
272 Ibid.; Concerns of Australia and New Zealand regarding Soviet 
influence in the region are discussed in, J. C. Dorrance, 'Soviet 
Union, China and the Pacific Islands', in J.C. Dorrance, et ai, The 
South Pacific: Emerging Security Issues and U.S. Policy, Special 
Report 1990, Brassey's (US), Inc., Washington, 1990, pp. 66-92; 
Robertson, 'Vanuatu', op. cit., pp. 638-644. 
273 Henningham, The Pacific Island States, op. cit., p. 95. 
274 Pacific Islands Monthly, March 1987, p. 5. 
275 Ibid. 
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of personal contacts between the VP Secretary, Barak Sope, who was 
one of the most radical within the party, and the Libyan leader. 276 
The normal procedure for the establishment of diplomatic relations 
was bypassed by Sope who passed a resolution through the VP 
Executive Council to instruct the government to establish diplomatic 
relations with Kaddafi's • 277 reglme. Natuman has noted that the 
government was not very comfortable with the decision but went along 
with it and that Libya's attraction to some party leaders was 
Kaddafi's support for decolonisation world-wide. 278 
Libya was in fact one of the few countries from which Vanuatu could 
find support for its quest for decolonisation with respect to Irian 
Jaya and East Timor. In an interview with the author, the Acting 
Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs of Vanuatu, Mr. 
Belleay Kalotiti, noted that Libya was one of the countries with 
which Vanuatu was "working secretly, meeting in Europe and other 
places" in trying to enlist East Timor and West Papua with the 
Decolonisation Committee of the United Nations. 279 Kalotiti did not 
name the other countries involved in the secret effort but stated 
that they were members of the NAM. 
Some other considerations that could have been instrumental in the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Libya could be discerned 
from Vanuatu's foreign policy. Links with a radical anti -Western 
state like Libya could have been seen as a way of asserting 
Vanuatu's sovereignty and independence in foreign policy and also 
276 Natuman, 'Vanuatu's Sovereignty', op. cit., p. 415. 
277 Normally initiatives to establish diplomatic relations with 
particular countries come from the government through the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Author's interview with Mr. Kalotiti, op. cit. 
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counter-balancing western influence In the region. Relations with 
Libya could also have been perceived as a means for obtaining 
development aid. Hegarty has noted that the possibility of obtaining 
Libyan finance for joint ventures, direct investment and aid could 
have been among the considerations for establishment of relations 
with Libya. 280 Barak Sope was identified by Hegarty as an 
entrepreneur-cum-power broker who is said to have a keen eye for a 
business deal, an aspect of his career that attracted criticism from 
some Pati supporters. 281 
Unfortunately for Barak Sope and Vanuatu, the relationship with 
Libya did not realise any substantial assistance or succeed in 
placing East Timor and West Papua on the United Nations' list of 
colonies. Instead, the relationship created regional apprehension 
and discontent regarding Vanuatu's foreign policy. 
In April 1987, Libyan plans to open a Peoples' Bureau in Vila led to 
an outcry in the South Pacific particularly in New Zealand and 
Australia. 282 Prime Minister Hawke accused Libya of attempting to set 
up a permanent base in Vanuatu to further penetrate and destabilise 
the region. He also accused Libya of offering $29,000,000 in aid to 
Vanuatu in return for permission to open its Bureau. Australian 
Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, even flew to New Zealand for secret 
talks with the New Zealand Prime Minister, David Lange. According to 
Robertson the journalists covering the event maintained that the two 
leaders were concerned that a pro-Libyan faction led by Barak Sope 
280 D. Hegarty, Libya and the South Pacific, working paper no. 127, 
Australian National University, Canberra, 1987, p. 18. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. XXXIII, p. 35325. 
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was about to seize power from Lini, who was still recuperating from 
a stroke suffered in February that year. 283 
Vanuatu defended its policy on the grounds that the country had the 
right to decide its foreign relations and that the relationship with 
Libya was in line with the country's policy of non-alignment and the 
diversification of the sources of aid and economic co-operation. 284 
Furthermore, the heavy criticism by Prime Minister Hawke led Lini to 
ban Australian military vessels and aircraft from entering Vanuatu's 
territory. 
The total breakdown in relations with Australia was counter-
productive to the foreign policy of Vanuatu. As discussed before, 
Vanuatu had to seek Australia's assistance from time to time in the 
protection of its sovereignty. Moreover, Vanuatu was also heavily 
dependent on aid and the loss of a donor like Australia could 
seriously affect the country's socio-economic development. 285 In 
other words, by breaking relations with Australia, Vanuatu failed to 
exercise the caution necessary of a small island state in ensuring 
that the overall foreign policy goals of the country were not placed 
at stake. 
Faced with strong regional opposition and the threat to Vanuatu's 
foreign aid the Lini government quickly expelled the two Libyans who 
arrived in Port Vila to set-up the Peoples Bureau. 286 Vanuatu's 
283 Robertson, 'Vanuatu' f op. cit., p. 627 . 
284 s. Arutangai, 'Post-Independence Developments and Policies', Van 
Trease, Melanesian Politics, op. cit., pp. 59-71. 
285 Australia's assistance to Vanuatu is discussed in section 3.3c. 
286 Hegarty, Libya, op. ci t. , p. 14; Keesing's Can temporary 
Archives, vol. XXXIV, May 1988, p. 35907. 
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explanation for the expulsion was that the Libyans breached 
diplomatic protocol by arriving unannounced and without proper 
accreditation. The ban on Australian military vessels was also 
lifted within two weeks of its placement. Furthermore, Vanuatu 
announced the decision to postpone the establishment of the Peoples 
Bureau indefinitely. Foreign Minister of Vanuatu, Sela Molisa, 
denied that the move was prompted by pressure from regional 
countries. 287 Lini maintained that Libya and Vanuatu would continue 
to enjoy a close relationship. 288 
since the end of the Libyan episode the Lini-government moderated 
its foreign policy and did not assert its sovereignty in ways that 
provoked regional apprehension and controversy. This change has 
largely been ascribed to infighting within the VP between Lini who 
was ailing from a stroke suffered in 1987 and Barak Sope who led the 
radical wing of the party. 289 Sope was eventually forced out of the 
VP in mid-1988. 
The UMP, which came to power in 1991, did not have the radical 
trappings of the VP government of early 1980s. 290 The UMP considered 
the former government's policy of non-alignment to have "ceased to 
be an issue because of the changes which have taken place in the 
world", and did not intend to associate with radical regimes. 291 
However, UMP has shown a readiness to assert Vanuatu's sovereignty 
287 Pacific Islands Monthly, July 1987, p. 19. 
288Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. XXXIII, August 1987, p. 
35325. 
289Henningham, The Pacific Island States, op.cit., p. 40. 
290The foreign policy of Vanuatu under Vohor and Korman are 
discussed in S. Vohor, 'UMP Foreign Policy'; M.e. Korman, 'Time for 
a change'; and Van Trease, 'Epilogue:1992-95'; in Van Trease 
(ed.), Melanesian Politics, op.cit., pp. 175-180, 167-174, and 435-
450 respectively. 
291Vohor, 'UMP Foreign Policy', op. cit., p. 179. 
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even if it meant challenging its larger neighbours such as 
Australia, if the need arose. In July 1992 for example, the Korman 
government expelled the acting Australian High Commissioner, James 
Pearson, on the grounds that he improperly interfered in the 
internal affairs of Vanuatu by speaking strongly about a proposed 
legislation, at a UMP meeting at which he was an observer. 292 
Australia's support for the previous government of Vanuatu under VP 
probably played a part in this drastic measure by the UMP. Attempts 
by Australian Foreign Minister Evans to resolve the issue through 
discussion with Korman failed in part because of the use of 
undiplomatic language according to Vila. 293 Consequently, a planned 
Australian navy visit and other official visits during the year were 
cancelled. However, Australia's desire to retain its links with its 
neighbouring states and Vanuatu's need for cordial relations with 
its most important aid donor, Australia, led relations between the 
two countries to get back on track by the end of the year. 
In the area of transnational crime Australia has been sharing 
intelligence and providing technical assistance under the Defence 
Co-operation program. 294 New Zealand also has a Mutual Assistance 
Program under which technical and other assistance is provided to 
Vanuatu's police. 295 According to Kalotiti, a joint effort is 
underway by Australia, New Zealand, the united states and Vanuatu in 
tackling the threat of transnational crime, especially money 
laundering. 296 However these programs can be effective only if 
292Henningham, The Pacific Island States, op. cit., p. 132. 
293I bid. 
294Interview conducted by the author with Mrs. Susan Cox, First 
Secretary, Australian High Commission, Port Vila, 4 February 1999. 
2%English News - 26/08/98, online available: 
http://www.vol.com.vu/VanuatuWeeklyPages/English980826.html, 15 
February 1999. 
296Interview conducted by the author with Mr. Kalotiti, op. cit. 
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Vanuatu is committed to the cause of combating transnational. crime 
and this does not seem to be the case at the moment. 
2.4 - Maldives' Foreign Policy Objectives 
This section will focus on three foreign policy obj ecti ves of the 
Maldives in the area of preserving and enhancing security and 
sovereignty. These objectives include the assertion of sovereignty; 
supporting the establishment of a SANWFZ and an IOZOP; and combating 
the threat of transnational crime. It is the aim of this section to 
outline the nature of the said objectives. However, before 
proceeding to do so, some possible influences on the Maldivian elite 
who were instrumental in fashioning the foreign policy of the 
country will be briefly discussed below. 
Gayoom, who continues to rule the country since 1979 attended Ai 
Azhar University in Cairo during the 1960s. 297 Foreign Minister 
Jameel who has been serving as the Foreign Minister since 1977 also 
attended the University with Gayoom. There they were exposed to 
Arabic language and culture, views, ideas and influences prevailing 
in Egypt. Then Egypt under Jamal Abdul Nasser, was the hotbed of 
nationalism in the Middle East. Non-alignment was among the 
fundamental tenets of Nasser's political ideblogy. such influences 
were manifest in the foreign policy of the Maldives as demonstrated 
by the close links with Arab countries, the strong nationalist 
tendencies in foreign policy, and the advocacy of non-alignment. 
297 Al Azhar University is one of the oldest and most respected 
Universities in the Islamic world. 
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However, one should not disregard the strong influence of the 
Maldives' history itself on the country's foreign policy. Thus 
historical aspects that have relevance to the understanding of 
foreign policy of the country will be discussed in this thesis. 
2.4a - Assertion of sovereignty 
As in the case of Vanuatu, the historical experience and the small 
size of the Maldives were largely responsible for the country's 
desire to assert its sovereignty. Although the Maldives was not a 
colony, it had an unpleasant experience as a British protectorate. 
Consequently, on independence the assertion of sovereignty became 
one of the foreign policy objectives of the country. 
The Maldives became a British protectorate in 1887. The relationship 
between the two countries remained relatively trouble free until the 
1950s. This was probably because there was not much interaction 
between the two countries during that period. The British did not 
maintain a resident mission in the Maldives and virtually left the 
country alone. However, as discussed in Chapter I, Britain's 
decision to reactivate the airforce base in Addu Atoll and the 
subsequent agreement of 1956 marked the beginning of strong anti-
British sentiments in the Maldives. These sentiments were 
particularly strong in Male'. The agreement was perceived in the 
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Maldives as a violation of the country's sovereignty and tantamount 
to an illegal occupation of Addu Atoll. 298 
Male's resentment of the British was further heightened when the 
secessionist revolt broke out in the Southern atolls. Despite the 
lack of direct evidence of British complicity, the circumstances 
surrounding the revolt made it difficult to believe that Britain was 
innocent. For instance, most of those involved in the revolt were in 
the employment of the British Royal Airforce; The British had strong 
connections, presence and influence in the region; and the secession 
was timely for the British in weakening the bargaining position of 
the Maldives in the negotiations over the lease of Gan. Furthermore, 
Britain landed an army battalion in Gan and flew in a party of 
journalists who met the President of the rebel Republic. 299 The 
British also informed Male' that any use of force in the suppression 
of the rebellion in Addu Atoll would be considered a threat to 
British installations in the atoll and would necessitate protective 
measures. 
Having gained permission to set-up the airforce base in Gan in 1960, 
the British promised to negotiate in normalising relations between 
Male' and Addu. In 1963 the British negotiated an end to the 
secessionist revolt and gave asylum to the rebel leader and his 
family in Seychelles. However, the bitter experience as a British 
protectorate left lasting memories within the Maldivian society. It 
also created strong feelings against any foreign domination or 
control of the Maldives. 
298Phadnis & Luithui, Winds of Change, op. cit., p. 29. 
299 Ibid., p. 33. 
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Closely linked to the historical experience of the Maldives, which 
created the strong desire for the assertion of sovereignty, was the 
smallness of the country. History had proved the vulnerability of 
the security and sovereignty of the Maldives to various external 
influences. There was very little the Maldives could do to defend 
against such threats. Assertion of sovereignty was a tactic which 
could be used to minimise the threat to security and sovereignty. 
2.4b - Supporting the establishment of a SANWFZ and an IOZOP 
The Maldives is located in a region fraught with instability. In the 
1970s and 80s, superpower rivalry was one of the most significant 
factors that contributed to regional instability in South Asia. 300 
During this period the Maldives found itself in the middle of 
superpower activity in the Indian Ocean. In 1973 the United states 
established a military communication and refuelling centre on the 
island of Diego Garcia just 250 miles south of the Maldives. 301 
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 Diego Garcia 
was upgraded as the main united States' naval and airforce base in 
the Indian Ocean providing berthing facilities for aircraft 
carriers, and extended runways to cater for huge cargo planes and 
fighter aircraft. A Study Group of the David Davies Memorial 
Institute of International Studies noted that the navies of the 
superpowers treated waters of the Maldives as if they were part of 
the high seas, and that the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet of some thirty 
h . th 302 vessels established regular anc orage In e area. 
300 Anand, South Asia, op. cit., pp. 40-56. 
301 S. U. Kodikara, 'Role of Extra-Regional 
Security', in S. K. Khatri (ed.), Regional 
Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, 
Kathmandu, 1987, pp. 41-55. 
Powers and South Asian 
Securi ty in South Asia, 
Tribhuvan Uni versi ty, 
302Harden, Small is Dangerous, op. cit., p. 6. 
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Along with the superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean came the 
threat of nuclear weapons. The United states' military base in Diego 
Garcia and the superpower competition in the Indian Ocean exposed 
South Asia to the threat of direct nuclear attacks and accidental 
fallout. Furthermore, in 1974 India conducted a nuclear test raising 
fears of a race for nuclear arms in South Asia, between India and 
Pakistan. 303 While the end of the Cold War reduced the threat from 
superpm,-Jers the rivalry between India and Pakistan moved to a new 
level in 1998 with both countries conducting their own nuclear tests 
and bringing South Asia one step closer to nuclear catastrophe. 
The superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean and nuclear proliferation 
in South Asia were serious threats to the security and sovereignty 
of the Maldives. The latter being a small island state was among one 
of the most vulnerable in both a military and an environmental 
sense. The vulnerability of the natural environment and the military 
weakness of the Maldives meant that the escalation of superpower 
tension or a nuclear accident in the neighbourhood could have very 
serious consequences for the country. The desire to minimise these 
threats placed the support for the establishment of a SANWFZ and an 
IOZOP among the foreign policy objectives of the Maldives. 
2.4c - Combating transnational crime 
There is general agreement that transnational criminal activities 
are a major threat to the security and sovereignty of small states. 
As for the Maldives, foreign mercenaries posed the most serious 
303 S. Paranjpe, US Nonproliferation Policy in Action: South Asia, 
Envoy Press, 1987, pp. 53-54 and 75-77. 
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threat to security and sovereignty during the past two decades. In 
1981 for example, the government of Maldives led by Gayoom faced a 
coup attempt sponsored by a group of Maldivians and involving 
European mercenaries including former members of Britain's crack 
Special Air Services (SAS). 304 On this occasion the National Security 
Services (NSS) of the Maldives, acting on a tip-off, managed to foil 
the plot and arrest the locals involved. 
The Maldives was not so lucky in 1988 when a group of disgruntled 
Maldivians attempted to dislodge Gayoom's government and install 
themselves in power. This attempt was made with the services of 
armed Tamil mercenaries belonging to the People's Liberation 
organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLaTE), one of the many separatist 
groups in Sri Lanka. These mercenaries took the country by surprise 
on 3 November 1988 by launching an early morning attack on the NSS 
headquarters in Male'. Although the mercenaries did not succeed, 
their artillery kept NSS under siege for some 18 hours and cost the 
lives of 19 Maldivians. 305 
The mercenary attack awakened present day Maldives to the stark 
reality of the vulnerability of its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity to transnational criminal elements. The attack also 
demonstrated the spillover effect of internal conflicts over their 
national borders. The services of these mercenaries, for example, 
were made available in return for the promise of an island in the 
Maldives to set-up a PLaTE training camp, a tourist resort to 
304 Maj eed, Indian Ocean, op. cit., p. 100. 
305 The failure of the attack has been ascribed to various flaws in 
the strategy used, sheer bad luck on the part of the mercenaries 
and the resistance by NSS. The most detailed account of the 
mercenary attack is published in, President's Office, Novembaru 
Thinehge Udhvaanee Hamalaa, Presidents Office, Male', 3 November 
1991. 
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finance their war, and assistance to smuggle weapons into Sri Lanka. 
Similar attacks in the future are a very real threat for the 
Maldives, which is a small island state in a region fraught with 
instability. 
Mercenaries are however not the only transnational criminal threat 
to the Maldives. Like other small states the security and 
sovereignty of the Maldives are also vulnerable to threats from 
those such as arms smugglers, drug traffickers, money launderers and 
the like. Thus, it is no surprise that combating the threat from 
transnational crime is among the foreign policy objectives of the 
Maldives today. 
2.5 - The Maldives' Foreign Policy Actions 
The Maldives employed multilateralism and bilateralism since 
independence and regionalism since the mid-1980s, in the pursuance 
of her foreign policy objectives. It is the aim of this section to 
assess the significance of these strategies in contributing towards 
the foreign policy obj ecti ves of the Maldives. This section will 
discuss the foreign policy actions of the Maldives at the 
multilateral, regional and bilateral levels separately under the 
headings, multilateralism, regionalism and bilateralism 
respectively. 
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2.5a - Multilateralism 
One of the first foreign policy initiatives of the Maldives on 
independence was to apply for the membership of the united Nations 
on 26 August 1965. Gaining membership of this world body was 
important, as discussed previously with respect to Vanuatu, due to 
its symbolic significance as the ultimate confirmation of a 
country's sovereignty. In the case of the Maldives, the membership 
of the united Nations was also necessary to gain sovereignty within 
the international community since in 1965 independence did not 
automatically render a small state sovereign. This was demonstrated 
by the half-heartedness of some states in welcoming the Maldives to 
the united Nations. At the Security Council Debate on the admission 
of the Maldives to the united Nations the united states' 
representative, for instance, argued: 
There are many small entities in the world today moving 
steadily towards some form of independence. We are in 
sympathy with their aspirations and applaud this 
development. However, the Charter provides that applicants 
for united Nations membership must be not only willing but 
also ~able" to carry out their Charter obligations ... Today, 
many of the small emerging entities, however willing, 
probably do not have the human or economic resources at this 
stage to meet this secondary criterion. We would therefore 
urge that Council Members and other united Nations Members 
give early and careful consideration to this problem in an 
effort to arrive at some agreed standards some lower 
limits - to be applied in the case of future applicants. 306 
The Maldives' application for membership was accepted on 20 
September 1965 making her the smallest member of the united Nations 
306 Excerpts from the Security Council debate on Maldives' 
application for membership, in, Ministry of Information and Culture 
(comp.), Maldives Foreign Policy in Perspective, Ministry of 
Information and Culture, Male' 1995, Annex. 
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at that time and confirming international recognition of the 
country's sovereignty. 
The Maldives' membership of the NAM in 1976 was an expression of the 
country's determination to maintain an independent foreign policy. 
Unlike in the case of Vanuatu, the Maldives membership of the NAM 
was neither radical nor created concern in the region as South Asian 
states such as India and Sri Lanka were themselves members of the 
organisation. The NAM membership therefore served to strengthen the 
relationship with regional countries instead of alienating them. 
India for instance, which was keen on excluding superpower activity 
in the region, would have taken comfort in the Maldives' membership 
of the NAM, which confirmed the country's espousal of a non-aligned 
foreign policy. 307 
As discussed previously with respect to Vanuatu, the membership of 
multilateral organisations provided the Maldives the opportunity to 
communicate its views and interests to the international community 
at a level that was not possible through bilateral or regional 
channels. In doing so the Maldives also had the opportunity to 
assert the country's sovereignty. In this respect, large forums such 
as the united Nations, NAM, the Commonwealth and the orc have been 
particularly useful because of their size and their openness to 
discussion of security and sovereignty related issues. 308 Presently 
the united Nations has some 185 states in its membership, the NAM 
307 India's opposition to superpower intrusion into the region is 
discussed in S. Chopra, 'Indian Ocean Politics - A challenge to 
India's Diplomacy', in Majeed, Indian Ocean, op.cit., pp. 70-91. 
308 The Maldives became a full member of Commonwealth in 1985, and 
OIC in 1974. 
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constitutes of 114 states, the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference and the Commonwealth have 55 members each. 
In asserting the country's sovereignty through multilateral 
organisations, President Gayoom in his address to the sixth 
Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, for example, argued: 
As you all know, ours is a small country in relation to the 
majority of countries that are represented here. We may lack 
in numbers; we may lack in material wealth; we may lack in 
technological advancement; in fact we may lack in many of 
the material criteria by which progress is measured in the 
present-day world. But I assure this distinguished gathering 
that my country, the Republic of Maldives, does not lack the 
courage to speak out freely according to its own 
convictions. 
Our views on international affairs, whether political, 
economic or social, are based on the fundamental principles 
that we believe in. They do not stem from any desire to 
please the powerful, or to side with the majority. What we 
say in any world problem may not influence this august 
assembly's opinion or change the course of events, but we 
deem it our duty to say it freely and honestly.30g 
The Maldives, in its foreign policy, assumed the moral high ground 
on all international issues. In line with this policy, the country 
has been vocal at multilateral forums in calling for disarmament, 
denuclearisation, decolonisation and the like. In supporting issues 
based on the principles of morality and justice, the Maldives voiced 
its opposition against the Israeli policies regarding Palestinians, 
apartheid in South Africa under the former white regime, Soviet 
309 President Gayoom, address to the 6th Summit Meeting of Non-Aligned 
Countries, Havana, 6lli September 1979, distributed at the conference 
as document NAC/CONF.6/DISC.24. 
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invasion of Afghanistan, United states bombing of Tripoli, and so 
on. 
The Maldives has also used multilateralism forums in working to 
realise an IOZOP. The credit for the initial idea of establishing an 
IOZOP goes to sri Lanka which first raised the issue at the Lusaka 
Conference of NAM in 1970. 310 The united Nations General Assembly 
endorsed the IOZOP in 1971 through its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 
December, by a vote of 61 to none and 55 abstentions. 311 This 
resolution declared Indian Ocean a zone of peace "for all times", 
and called upon the great powers to enter into consultation with the 
littoral states of the Indian Ocean with a view to: "(a) halting the 
further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the 
Indian Ocean; and (b) eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, 
military installations and logistical supply facilities, the 
disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and 
any manifestation of great power military presence in the Indian 
Ocean conceived in the context of great power rivalry". 312 The 
resolution also called upon littoral and hinterland states of the 
Indian Ocean, members of the Security Council, and other users of 
the Ocean, to enter into consultation so as to ensure the 
implementation of the resolution. 
The Maldives has since been pushing to hasten the implementation of 
the above-mentioned resolution. In the statement to the Thirty-
310 K. R. Singh, 'The Indian Ocean: Politics of the Peace Zone', in 
Majeed, Indian Ocean, op. cit., pp. 124-136. 
311 The IOZOP is analysed in, Anand, South Asia, op. cit., pp.46-54; 
Singh, 'The Indian Ocean', op. cit.; and K. S. Sidhu, 'The Indian 
Ocean as a Zone of Peace: Problems and Prospects', in Majeed, 
Indian Ocean, op. cit., pp. 137-146. 
312Anand, South Asia, op. cit., Appendix A. 
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Eighth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, for example, 
the Chairman of the Maldives' delegation Hon. Ahmed Zaki, stated: 
I wish to express the immediate and deep concern of our 
country on the steadily escalating tension created by great 
power rivalry for military superiority in the Indian Ocean. 
My delegation wishes to reaffirm our full support to the 
declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. . .. as 
long as foreign military bases and other such facilities 
remain in our area, tension will continue to build up . ... if 
this trend continues, disputes can easily lead to conflicts . 
. . . we shall do every thing possible, along with other 
countries of the region, to prevent our area being subjected 
to such potential dangers. 313 
Unfortunately for the Maldives, the IOZOP has not taken effect to 
this day. The Ad Hoc Committee set up under the aegis of the United 
Nations to work for the implementation of the Declaration has not 
been able to make progress due to the reluctance of major powers 
such as the United states to withdraw forces from the area. 3H 
The circumstances under which the IOZOP was declared have also 
changed with the end of the Cold War. The superpower rivalry that 
was the main reason for the peace zone idea became irrelevant at the 
end of the 1980s. In April 1990, France, the united Kingdom and the 
United States withdrew from the Indian Ocean Ad Hoc Committee. The 
Maldives still supports the idea and is keen to see it revived. As 
such Maldivian representatives continue to use multilateral forums 
to campaign for the establishment of the IOZOP. At the Fifty-First 
313A . Zaki, Permanent Representative of the Maldives to the United 
Nations, statement to the 38 th Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, 11 october 1983, New York, a copy of the statement was 
made available to the author by the Permanent Mission of the 
Maldives to the United Nations. 
314 The progress made by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean is 
discussed in Anand, South Asia, op. cit., pp. 80-86. 
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Session of the united Nations General Assembly, for example, Foreign 
Minister Jameel argued: 
The Maldives views that proposals for zones of peace and the 
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be re-
addressed or revived in the context of the current and 
emerging new international situation. with regard to the 
proposals relevant to our own region, Maldives continues to 
support the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian 
Ocean and the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone 
in South Asia. However, it may now be time to reinvigorate 
the process through the application of new and fresh 
ideas. 315 
The idea of establishing a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia 
has also not been successful despite its endorsement by the United 
Nations. 316 The Twenty-Ninth Session of the united Nations General 
Assembly held in 1974 endorsed the idea as resolution 3265 B (XXIX). 
However, India opposed the idea and without her support there was no 
hope of realising a nuclear weapons free zone in the region. The 
united Nations General Assembly has since adopted several 
resolutions reaffirming, in principle, its endorsement of the 
concept and urging regional states to make every possible effort to 
establish such a zone and to refrain in the meantime from any action 
contrary to that objective. 317 The Maldives has over the years 
maintained at the united Nations that its, "support and commitment 
for the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones and zones of 
peace are complete and unequivocal". 318 However, no progress has been 
315 Foreign Minister Jameel, statement at the 51st Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly, 26 November 1996, New York, a copy 
of the statement was made available to the author by the Permanent 
Mission of the Maldives to the United Nations. 
316 B. Rahmathulla, 'Perspectives of Nuclear Policies of India and 
Pakistan in South Asia: An Evaluation', in Maj eed, Indian Ocean, 
op. cit., pp. 214-230. 
317 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/51/42, 7 
January 1997. 
318A. Shahid, Maldives' delegate, statement at the general debate on 
disarmament and international security issues, First Committee, 48 th 
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made on these issues except for the united Nations' resolutions 
calling for the establishment of such zones. 
The nuclear tests conducted by both India and Pakistan in May 1998 
have killed even the faintest hope of establishing a SANWFZ in the 
foreseeable future. Yet the tests also enhanced the need for action 
in minimising the threat of nuclear catastrophe. The Maldives cannot 
expect to influence the nuclear policies of either India or Pakistan 
at a bilateral level, nor is there a regional organisation in South 
Asia that could deal with such an issue. Therefore, multilateral 
organisations such as the united Nations remain the most conducive 
avenues through which small island states like the Maldives can best 
hope to make a difference in minimising the nuclear threat in the 
region. As such, at the Fifty-Third Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly 1998 the Maldives stressed the importance of the 
establishment of the proposed SANWFZ, and took the "opportunity to 
call upon all countries in South Asia to exercise maximum restraint 
and contribute to the realisation of this noble obj ecti ve" . 319 
The Maldives also looked to multilateral organisations in combating 
threats to its security and sovereignty from transnational criminal 
elements. As discussed before small island states are not in a 
posi tion to effectively deal with such threats on their own. The 
Maldives, faced with the mercenary attack of 1988, for example, was 
forced to seek external assistance. The Commonwealth Secretary 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 22 October 1993, a 
copy of the statement was made available to the author by the 
Permanent Mission of the Maldives to the United Nations. 
319 Foreign Minister Jameel, statement to the 53 rd Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly, 1 October 1998, a copy of the 
statement was made available to the author by the Permanent Mission 
of the Maldives to the United Nations. 
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General, Sir Shiridath Ramphal, was among those the government of 
the Maldives contacted for help. The Secretary General readily 
extended his support by contacting regional Commonwealth states 
requesting for emergency military assistance to the Maldives to 
repel the mercenary attack. 320 Such support is very important for 
small island states. However, in that particular incident in 1988, 
it was a bilateral partner that sent military support to the 
Maldives to help fight against the mercenaries, as discussed in more 
detail in the course of this chapter. 
The Commonwealth's main contribution to the security and sovereignty 
of small states has been at an intellectual level. 321 In the wake of 
the American intervention in Grenada in 1983 the Commonwealth 
leaders commissioned a study on the special needs of small states. 
Foreign Minister Jameel was in the Consultative Group assigned for 
the study. 322 The group's landmark report entitled, Vulnerability: 
Small States in Global society, concluded in 1985, was a significant 
contribution to the understanding of the vulnerabilities of small 
states and the steps needed at the national, regional, and 
international levels to address them. Further, in 1991 an 
international workshop on the protection and security of small 
states was held in the Maldives with the assistance of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat. Such effort is essential for the process 
of developing mechanisms and garnering international co-operation in 
overcoming or minimising the vulnerabilities of small states. As 
Secretary General Ramphal noted, "if we do not help to provide an 
320 President's Office, Novembaru Thinehge, op. cit., p. 100. 
321 The Commonwealth's role in addressing the special needs of small 
states is discussed in, Commonwealth Secretariat, Report of the 
Commonwealth Secretary-General 1997, Commonwealth Secretariat, 
London, 1997, pp. 85-86. 
322 Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability, op. cit., p. v. 
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intellectual response to the needs that are at the heart of the 
problems, we can hardly complain if the wider community passes them 
over" . 323 
The Maldives considers the united Nations as the "best hope" for 
small states "in warding off challenges to their sovereignty and 
territorial integrity". 324 As such, following the mercenary attack of 
1988 the Maldives' sought to mobilise support of the united Nations 
communi ty for the protection and security of small states. The 
response was not too promising. The larger states were not willing 
to go any further than provide lip service to the special security 
needs of small states. Therefore, as an initial step the Maldives in 
1989 introduced a resolution at the united Nations General Assembly 
entitled, Protection and Security of Small states, that was 
acceptable to small and large states alike. The resolution was co-
sponsored by 55 states and was adopted without a vote as Resolution 
A/RES/44/51. This resolution recognised that small states may be 
particularly vulnerable to external threats and acts of interference 
in their internal affairs, and (a) appealed to regional and 
international organisations to assist small states in strengthening 
their security; (b) urged the Secretary General to pay special 
attention to monitoring the security situation of small states and 
to consider making use of the provisions of Article 99 of the 
organisation's Charter; 325 and (c) invited the Secretary General to 
323 Ibid., p. 120. 
324 Foreign Minister Jameel, address to the 46th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly, New York, 20 October 1991, a copy 
of the statement was made available to the author by the Permanent 
Mission of the Maldives to the United Nations. 
325 Article 99 of the United Nations Charter states, "the Secretary 
General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any 
matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of 
international peace and security". 
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explore ways and means, within the united Nations and in accordance 
with the Charter, of preserving the security of small states. 
Subsequent efforts to strengthen the resolution have not been very 
successful as demonstrated by the revised resolutions A/RES/46/43 of 
9 December 1991 and A/RES/49/31 of 30 December 1994, that go no 
further than recognising that small states might need a special 
measure of support for protection and security. Some larger powers 
like the United States have stressed at the united Nations that they 
will not agree to make any distinction among states with respect to 
security. 326 They argued that it was unnecessary to make such 
distinction since the United Nations was based on the sovereign 
equality of states and provided for the security of all. This was an 
argument that was hard for small states to accept. At the 
Commemorative Meeting of the General Assembly on the occasion of the 
fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, for example, President 
Gayoom used the following words to express dismay over the 
inconsistency of the organisation and pleaded for greater importance 
to be assigned to the needs of small states. 
Just a few weeks ago a band of foreign mercenaries invaded 
... the Comoros, and toppled its legitimate government. The 
United Nations did nothing. In November 1988 armed foreign 
terrorists attacked my own country and tried to do the same. 
We received no assistance from the united Nations to repel 
the attack. We acknowledge what the united Nations had done 
to stop aggression in the Middle East in 1956 and 1967, and 
what it did in Kuwait in 1991. We want the United Nations to 
react to the threats that we small states are frequently 
exposed to with the same urgency, commitment and 
effectiveness. The security and protection of small states 
326 Commonwealth Advisory Group, A Future for Small States, op.cit., 
p. 145. 
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must be accepted as an integral part of international 
"27 security and peace." 
The Maldives has also been stressing at the United Nations the need 
for member states to urgently sign and ratify the International 
convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries, which would contribute to the security of the 
international community at large. This Convention according to 
President Gayoom, provides a great opportunity to challenge the acts 
of "terrorism and mercenarism". 328 
2.5b - Regionalism 
The benefit of regionalism as a strategy in realising the security 
and sovereignty related foreign policy objectives of the Maldives 
has been limited due to the political climate within South Asia. As 
mentioned before, South Asia has a very high level of political 
tension due to hostility between certain countries of the region 
such as India and Pakistan. As such, contentious and bilateral 
issues are excluded from the ambit of SAARC thereby limiting the 
scope of the organisation in enhancing the security and sovereignty 
of the Maldives. 329 
327 President Gayoom, address to the Special Session of the General 
Assembly on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the United 
Nations, 24 October 1995, New York, a copy of the statement was 
made available to the author by the Permanent Mission of the 
Maldives to the United Nations. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Article X, Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Co-operation, a copy of the document was made available to the 
author by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maldives. 
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At a symbolic level, SAARC has been significant for the Maldives in 
contributing towards the foreign policy objective of asserting the 
country's sovereignty. As mentioned before the Maldives is the 
smallest in a region of larger states. Yet the framework of SAARC 
enables the Maldives to be involved on an equal footing as the rest 
of the regional countries, in charting the future of South Asia, in 
important areas such as trade. 330 
On the issues of establishing an IOZOP the Maldives has not been 
able to make any gains through SAARC. The IOZOP concept was 
supported by regional countries when it was initially proposed. 
However, the support for the cause by regional powers such as India 
waned when global powers began to insist that the regional countries 
themselves accept the same conditions demanded of foreign powers 
within the region. For instance, the elimination of nuclear weapons 
of the major powers was linked with overall denuclearisation of the 
region. Similarly, a reduction in the military presence by external 
powers was linked to an equal cut in the military forces of the 
regional countries. 331 As such, while larger South Asian countries 
like India opposed the idea of an IOZOP regional small states such 
as the Maldives, which had nothing to loose but a lot to gain from a 
zone of peace, were in favour of it. Consequently, the idea of 
establishing an IOZOP was a political and contentious issue and 
could not be discussed under the SAARC framework. 
Similarly, the establishment of a SANWFZ was outside the ambit of 
SAARC. The establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in South 
330 Regional co-operation in trade will be discussed in section 
3.3d, chapter III. 
331 Singh, 'The Indian Ocean', op. cit., pp. 128. 
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Asia was initially put forward to the international community by 
Pakistan. Given the political tension and rivalry between Pakistan 
and India it was not surprising that the latter opposed the SANWFZ 
idea. Furthermore, a SANWFZ was perceived by India as discriminatory 
and dividing the world into "nuclear haves and the have-nots". 332 As 
such the establishment of a SANWFZ was a contentious issue which 
could not be tackled through the SAARC forum. 
The Maldives, particularly after the mercenary attack of 1988, 
looked to a number of avenues including the SAARC in the hope of 
strengthening the security and sovereignty of the country. At the 
SAARC Summit in 1990 the Maldives raised the issue of the 
vulnerability of small states and went on to argue that "as a 
regional association we can jointly face the challenge of putting an 
end to all outside intervention and of ensuring that our countries 
do not become hotbeds of conflicts engineered from outside". 333 The 
SAARC leaders at the summit acknowledged the vulnerability of small 
states and have since reaffirmed in almost every Summit Declaration 
that small states needed a special measure of support from the 
international community for safeguarding their independence and 
territorial integrity. 
Despite the SAARC Declarations reaffirming the vulnerability and the 
special needs of small states a comprehensive mechanism to protect 
such states has not evolved through the organisation. Given the 
tension between regional countries, it is unrealistic to expect such 
a mechanism to emerge through SAARC in the near future. As such, 
332 Ibid., p. 131. 
333 President Gayoom, statement delivered at the Fifth SAARC Summit, 
Male', 22 November 1990, a copy of the statement was made available 
to the author by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Maldives. 
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small states like the Maldives have to rely on some other strategy 
to enhance their security and sovereignty. 
In combating the threat of transnational crime, SAARC has initiated 
co-operation in the area of tackling terrorism and drug trafficking. 
Since terrorism and drug related crimes often have international 
connections, a co-ordinated approach among regional countries is 
essential for a comprehensive solution. In response to this need a 
SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism was signed in 
November 1987 and entered into force in August 1988. 334 This 
convention committed regional countries to co-operate in the 
suppression of terrorism through the exchange of information, 
intelligence and expertise, and to extradite or prosecute alleged 
terrorists thereby preventing them from enj oying safe haven. 335 The 
Maldives has enacted the necessary enabling legislation for the 
implementation of the convention but not all of the South Asian 
countries have done so yet. 
A SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk (STOMD) has also been 
set-up in Colombo to collate, analyse and disseminate information on 
these crimes in the region. According to captain Ibrahim Latheef of 
the NSS of the Maldives, STOMD has not been of much use to his 
country yet, since the information exchanged through the desk has 
been very limited. 336 Captain Latheef is however optimistic that 
STOMD will become more active in the future since the annual 
conferences of SAARC on police matters, which began in 1996, are 
334 SAARC Secretariat, SAARC in Brief, SAARC Secretariat, Kathmandu 
1994, p. 27. 
335 Ibid. p. 27. 
336 Interview conducted by the author with Captain Ibrahim Latheef, 
of the NSS of the Maldives, Male', 16 February 1999. 
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creating a closer bond between regional officials involved in 
tackling drug and terrorism related offences. 337 South Asian leaders 
at the Tenth SAARC summit expressed the need for greater co-
operation by calling for the continued sharing of expertise in 
different areas of police investigation, including investigations 
related to organised crime and drug related offences. 338 
A SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances has 
also been signed in November 1990. 339 This convention was aimed at 
supplementing at the regional level, the relevant international 
conventions and promoting regional co-operation in both law 
enforcement and demand reduction with respect to narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances. 340 The Maldives has enacted the necessary 
enabling legislation for the implementation of the convention, but 
some of the other South Asian countries are yet to do so. 
In the drive to curb drug offences in South Asia, a SAARC Drug 
Offences Monitoring Desk (SDOMD) has been set-up in Colombo, to 
collate analyse and disseminate information on relevant offences in 
the region. captain Latheef noted that the effectiveness of SDOMD 
has also been very limited. However, Captain Latheef foresees SDOMD 
playing a more active role in the future as the bond between 
regional law enforcement officials, fostered through the regional 
conferences on police matters, strengthen. 
337 Ibid. 
338 SAARC Secretariat, SAARC in Brief, op. cit., p. 27. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Ibid. 
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2.5c - Bilateralism 
Bilateralism like regionalism and multilateralism has been employed 
by the Maldives in its endeavour to realise the security and 
sovereignty related foreign policy objectives. The contribution of 
bilateralism has been crucial in certain instances, yet not the 
preferred choice. This section will attempt to assess the 
significance of bilateralism in contributing towards the foreign 
pOlicy objectives of the Maldives focused in this chapter. 
Bilateralism has proved useful for the Maldives in the assertion of 
the country's sovereignty. In 1965, bilateral partners, particulaily 
the united Kingdom, were very helpful for the Maldives in its bid to 
join the United Nations. In the face of reluctance among certain 
members of the Security Council in granting full membership, the 
United Kingdom made a very strong case by arguing that despite the 
remoteness and smallness of the Maldives, her application "could not 
be supported by better qualifications". m Such support from 
bilateral partners was crucial for the Maldives in gaining the 
membership of the organisation - an achievement that was important 
in contributing towards the Maldives' foreign policy objective of 
asserting her sovereignty. 
The Maldives, by advocating a policy of non-alignment, assuming the 
moral high ground on all international issues, and by exercising 
341 Lord Caradon, statement delivered at the Security Council debate 
on the admission of the Maldives to the United Nations, in, 
Ministry of Information and Culture, Maldives Foreign Policy, op. 
cit., . Annex. 
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some caution not to provoke hostility, has been able to employ 
bilateralism in asserting its sovereignty within the international 
community. In line with its non-aligned policy the Maldives 
established diplomatic relations with a number of countries from 
diverse politico-economic and ideological backgrounds including 
those such as the United Kingdom, united states, Sri Lanka, India, 
Soviet Union, Cuba, Libya, China, Iran and Iraq. This policy was 
important as a symbolic expression of the country's sovereignty but 
did not cause any concern in the region or elsewhere. 
Amidst the strong Cold War currents traversing the Indian Ocean in 
the 1970s and 80s, the bilateral policy of the Maldives based on 
non-alignment, morality and pragmatism, was important in trying to 
maintain independence and sovereignty. The Maldives was well aware 
of its smallness and weakness and the dangers of being draw into the 
Cold War conflict. As such, when the Soviet Union made an overture 
in 1979 to lease Gan for one million dollars per annum, the Maldives 
chose to reject it politely.342 The explanation for the rejection was 
that the Maldives did not want any foreign military presence within 
its territory although the country badly needed the money. 
The rejection of the Soviet offer served the dual purposes of 
contributing towards the proposed SANWFZ and IOZOP, and demonstrated 
the country's determination to retain its sovereignty. In connection 
with this incident the Asia Year Book noted that the Maldives 
"prides itself on its fearless articulation of what it considers 
right and proper". 343 The Asia Yearbook further argued that the 
strategic location of the Maldives "coupled with a strictly non-
342 Phadnis & Lui thui, Winds of Change, op. cit., p. 84. 
343 Asia Yearbook, 1982, pp. 192-196. 
144 
aligned policy creates the ability to secure assistance and support 
from all without sacrificing too much freedom of action". 344 
The Maldives has diplomatic links with a large number of countries 
but close bilateral connections have been fostered with a smaller 
group of regional and non-regional countries such as India, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Germany, Japan, Singapore and the United 
Kingdom. The support of one of these countries, namely India, proved 
invaluable for the Maldives in 1988 in defending the country against 
the mercenary attack. Following the attack the government of the 
Maldives requested assistance from a number of sources, and India 
was quick to respond by landing troops in Male' international 
airport within a short duration of about 12 hours. 345 By the time the 
Indian forces arrived the mercenaries had taken some 14 hostages and 
were fleeing the country in a hijacked vessel. 346 The Indian navy 
intercepted the vessel carrying the mercenaries, arrested them and 
freed eight hostages. The rest have either been executed or died in 
the exchange of gunfire between the Indian navy and the mercenaries. 
Despite the fact that it was a bilateral partner that came to the 
assistance of the Maldi ves following the mercenary attack, 
bilateralism is not the most desired by the country on issues 
related to security and sovereignty, and especially when it involves 
military intervention. Dependence on bilateral military assistance 
has the potential to force small island states to forfeit their 
sovereignty at least to some degree in favour of the assisting 
country. Furthermore, even if the motives of the assisting country 
344 Ibid. 
345 Presidents Office, Novembaru Thinehge, op. cit., p. 98. 
346 A few mercenaries who could not make it to the boat on time were 
left behind on Male' and were caught, a few days later. 
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are purely altruistic and the sovereignty of the state which receive 
the assistance remains intact, continued dependence on such 
assistance from anyone bilateral source is bound to have an adverse 
effect on the international profile of the small state in question. 
As such, the Maldives favours assistance from international 
organisations instead of bilateral sources. Foreign Minister Jameel 
explained this preference in 1989 at the Forty-Fourth Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly, in the following words: 
.. . bilateral security arrangements in the international 
system have not yet evolved to a level of maturity whereby 
the interests of the weaker partner can be assured. Nor are 
the socio-political identity of the weaker state and the 
principle of sovereign equality strong enough to be 
impervious to the possible vicissitudes of unequal 
relationships. 
Moreover, our political systems continue to be afflicted by 
misperception which can distort actions taking place with 
the best intentions. Consequently, the greater the power 
differential, the greater the propensity to misperception 
and the more hapless the predicament of the weaker parties. 
It is for this reason that we believe that multilateral 
frameworks are the most feasible modes for a sound security 
mechanism for the weakest members of this Organisation. 347 
Until sound security mechanisms are in place through multilateral 
forums small island states like the Maldives will have to rely on 
bilateralism in defending against threats to security and 
sovereignty. 
347 Foreign Minister Jameel, statement to the 44th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly, New York, 1989, copy made 
available by the Permanent Mission of the Maldives to the United 
Nations. 
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2.6- Conclusions 
Multilateralism, regionalism and bilateralism have all been useful 
for both Vanuatu and the Maldives in the pursuit of their security 
and sovereignty related foreign policy objectives. However, the 
significance of these strategies in realising the objectives of both 
countries and thereby contributing towards their foreign policy 
goals varied. Often two or more strategies complemented each other 
in contributing towards the foreign policy objectives. 
In the case of Vanuatu the three foreign policy strategies of 
mul tilateralism, regionalism and bilateralism were useful in the 
assertion of the country's sovereignty. Membership of multilateral 
organisations such as the united Nations and the NAM were important 
at a symbolic level as expressions of the country's sovereignty and 
independence. Large multilateral forums also proved to be the most 
cost-effective channel for Vanuatu to express its views to the 
international community and further the country's objectives 
including the assertion of sovereignty. Using non-alignment, 
morali ty, and justice as the guiding principles of foreign policy 
Vanuatu, through multilateral forums, championed causes such as 
decolonisation and denuclearisation, and in the process asserted the 
country's sovereignty. 
Similarly, regional forums enabled Lini government to assert the 
country's sovereignty at the regional level but was not as effective 
as multilateral forums due to the relatively small size of the 
former organisations. The stands taken by Vanuatu at regional forums 
on issues such as colonialism and nuclearisation made the country 
renowned in the South Pacific for its hard line policies. These 
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stands were often directed against the policies of major powers such 
as France and the united states, thereby demonstrating the 
independence and sovereignty of Vanuatu in its foreign policy. 
Some of Lini government's bilateral polices were also significant in 
the assertion of Vanuatu's sovereignty, although at a symbolic 
level. For instance the diversification of Vanuatu's bilateral 
connections to include countries such as Vietnam, Cuba and Libya, 
despite regional opposition, was a radical move for a South Pacific 
island state but a strong assertion of the country's sovereignty. 
Nevertheless bilateral policies sometimes proved counter-productive 
for Vanuatu in the assertion of sovereignty. For instance when 
Vanuatu gave permission for Libya to open a Peoples Bureau in Vila, 
the regional opposition became extremely strong and relations with 
Australia had to be severed. Australia was however the biggest aid 
donor and a very valuable partner. Severing relations with such a 
useful partner was not a pragmatic move for a small island state. 
Eventually Vanuatu had to change its policy and loose face within 
the region. 
Multilateral and regional organisations also enabled Vanuatu to draw 
international attention to the struggle for independence by 
colonised peoples. The SPF proved effective for Vanuatu to gain 
regional support in petitioning the united Nations Decolonisation 
Committee to re-inscribe New Caledonia in its list of colonies. The 
support of the member states of NAM, lobbied through Vanuatu's 
connection with them, is said to have been instrumental in the re-
inscription of New Caledonia. 
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There were however limits to the usefulness of multilateralism and 
regionalism on the issue of decolonisation. Even bilateralism was of 
little use for Vanuatu on these issues. The support of certain 
bilateral partners such as Libya, to enlist East Timor and West 
Papua on the united Nations list of colonies, was limited to secret 
meetings in Europe and elsewhere but they did not achieve any 
concrete results. 
Vanuatu and the other regional states managed to gain international 
support through the Commonwealth, the united Nations and other such 
multilateral organisations, for the establishment of a SPNFZ. 
However, Vanuatu's push for a comprehensive SPNFZ through the SPF 
was pre-empted by Australia, which wanted to avoid a radical 
decision that might harm Western interests, by supporting a tame 
treaty which appeared to address the concerns of the island states 
but enabled the nuclear status quo in the region to be maintained. 
This incident demonstrated the limitations of regionalism for 
Vanuatu in pursuing issues that contradict the interests of larger 
regional countries. Nevertheless, the Rarotonga Treaty itself was, 
as one regional diplomat said, "half a loaf" that was better than 
none. 
Bilateralism proved more effective than regionalism or 
multilateralism in instances when the sovereignty of Vanuatu was 
under threat due to unrest as during the Santo rebellion. Bilateral 
partners such as Papua New Guinea and Australia came to Vanuatu's 
assistance in 1980 in suppressing the Santo revolt. Similarly in 
1988, Papua New Guinea, Australia and New Zealand offered their 
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assistance to Vanuatu to put down a rebellion that was threatening 
the internal stability of the country. These two instances 
highlighted the importance to Vanuatu of the Melanesian neighbours, 
Australia and New Zealand. 
In the fight against transnational crime, regionalism is promising. 
The establishment of the Forum Security Committee and the adoption 
of the Honiara Declaration and the Aitutaki Declaration for example, 
are important steps in the battle against transnational crime, made 
possible through regionalism. An efficient mec;hanism to deal with 
such threats is however yet to evolve. Moreover Vanuatu has not 
shown any interest in strengthening the regional mechanism and has 
not participated in the meetings of the Forum security Committee 
during the last three years. Bilateral partners have shown a 
readiness a to support Vanuatu in the fight against transnational 
crime. But the usefulness of such support will depend on Vanuatu's 
commitment to the cause of combating transnational crime. 
In the case of the Maldives too multilateralism continues to playa 
very significant role in enabling the country to assert its 
sovereignty. The membership of the United Nations for example, has 
been of symbolic significance as the confirmation of Maldives' 
sovereignty. Likewise, the membership of the NAM proved to be a 
symbolic expression of the country's determination to maintain an 
independent foreign policy. 
Multilateral organisations also afford the Maldives access to large 
international forums through which the country could cost-
effectively express its views and interests to the international 
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community. At these forums the Maldives was vocal in condemning and 
lobbying against unjust and immoral practices such as apartheid, 
colonialism, and nuclear proliferation, and thereby asserting the 
country's sovereignty. 
Regionalism and bilateralism were not options for the Maldives in 
pursuing its objectives such as the establishment of a SANWFZ and an 
IOZOP. These peace zones were closely linked to the security and 
political interests of the larger regional powers and the Maldives 
was not in a position to influence these interests through bilateral 
channels or through SAARC which could not address contentious 
issues. As such, the Maldives had to rely on its membership of 
multilateral organisations, particularly the United Nations, in 
striving for a SANWFZ and an IOZOP. However, the effort through the 
United Nations has not yet been successful. Moreover, both India and 
Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998 thereby contributing to the 
instability in South Asia or the problem the Maldives was trying to 
resolve. Nevertheless, the Maldives is continuing to call for an 
IOZOP and a SANWFZ, through the United Nations. 
I 
In the fight against transnational crime multilateralism, 
regionalism and bilateralism complemented each other although the 
latter tended to be more crucial for the defence of the Maldives. 
The Commonwealth has been contributing to the 
states through intellectual studies that 
securi ty of small 
help to enhance 
international awareness of the special needs of small states. 
Through the United Nations the Maldives was able to table a few 
resolutions on the security of small states. These resolutions did 
not produce any solutions to the threat facing the Maldives. Some 
larger states were unwilling to allow the Maldives to place the 
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responsibility of protecting small states on the united Nations. As 
such the resolutions on the security of small states did nothing 
more than draw international attention to the threat facing small 
states. 
SAARC has signed conventions in the area of combating terrorism and 
drugs. However, the enabling legislation necessary to implement 
these conventions have yet to be enacted in regional countries. 
Under the SAARC, two monitoring desks with respect to terrorism and 
drug-related offences have also been established and co-operation in 
police matters has been initiated. The concerned officials of the 
Maldives believe that the desks will be effective in the future as 
the connection between regional law enforcement officers strengthen 
through interaction at the regional meetings and conferences on 
police matters. 
Bilateralism has been more useful than multilateralism or 
regionalism, in defending the Maldives against threats from criminal 
elements such as mercenaries. In November 1988 for example, India 
came to the defence of the Maldives that was under attack by 
mercenaries. Nevertheless, the threat of having to forfeit the 
sovereignty of the country to the bilateral partner that helps 
defend against physical attacks, has made multilateralism the 
preferred choice of the Maldives for emergency assistance and for 
developing a comprehensive mechanism to guarantee the security and 
sovereignty of small island states. until such a mechanism is in 
place the Maldives will have to rely on bilateralism in case of an 
attack which the NSS is unable to repel or defend against. 
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CHAPTER III 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 - Introduction 
Two to three decades since independence both Vanuatu and the 
Maldives are still LDCs. The struggle of these countries to provide 
a better standard of living for their peoples and climb out of the 
LDC status have been hampered by a large range of impediments most 
of which stem from the physical characteristics of these countries. 
This chapter aims to discuss some of the important foreign policy 
objectives of the Maldives and Vanuatu in the 
development and assess the significance of 
regionalism and bilateralism in contributing 
objectives. 
area of economic 
multilateralism, 
towards these 
The discussion in this chapter is divided into four main sections. 
The first section or section 3.1 is evidently this introduction. 
Section 3.2 will discuss three foreign policy obj ecti ves shared by 
both Vanuatu and the Maldives in the area of economic development. 
These objectives are among the most discernible in the foreign 
policy of the two countries and include minimising vulnerability and 
the promotion of trade; protection of resources; and maximising 
foreign aid. section 3.3 attempts to assess the foreign policy 
actions of Vanuatu and the Maldives in the pursuance of the above 
obj ecti ves in the area of economic development. section 3.4 will 
sum-up the discussion in the chapter with an intra-country 
comparison of the effectiveness of multilateralism, regionalism and 
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bilateralism with respect to the foreign policy of Vanuatu and the 
Maldives. 
3.2 - Foreign policy objectives of Vanuatu and the Maldives 
This section will discuss the three foreign policy objectives shared 
by Vanuatu and the Maldives selected for use in this thesis 
minimising vulnerability and the promotion of trade; protection of 
resources; and maximising foreign aid. This discussion will provide 
the background for the assessment of the effectiveness or 
significance of the foreign policy strategies employed by Vanuatu 
and the Maldives, undertaken below. 
3.2a -Minimising vulnerability and the promotion of trade 
The vulnerabilities and constraints that impede the economic 
development efforts of Vanuatu and the Maldives stem predominantly 
from a range of intrinsic characteristics associated with being 
small island states. This is not to say that all small island states 
are alike - Vanuatu for instance is a largely mountainous country 
while the Maldives is very low-lying and made up entirely of coral 
atolls. While acknowledging such differences it is possible to 
identify a number of characteristics common to most small island 
states. These characteristics include those such as smallness of 
land area, geographical makeup as one or more small islands, 
remoteness from metropolitan states, and heavy dependence on the 
external community for trade and aid. 348 
348 A detailed discussion of the impediments to 
small island developing states is in, UNCTAD 
Developing, op. cit.; A.J. Dolman, 'Paradise 
the development of 
Panel of Experts, 
Lost?', op. cit.; 
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The small land areas of small island nations like Vanuatu and the 
Maldives limit the range and quantity of natural resources such as 
commercially exploitable minerals, these countries are endowed with. 
The Maldives, for example, has no known commercially exploitable, 
land based, natural resource. Vanuatu has a limited range and 
quantity of natural resources such as manganese that was mined until 
1979. Investigations in the early 1990s revealed that some 2 million 
tons of high-grade ore still existed in the area. 349 Prospecting for 
gold is also presently being carried out in Vanuatu. However, large 
deposits that could have a substantial long-term impact on the 
economic performance of the country have not been discovered yet. 
The paucity of even the most basic natural resource, arable land, 
restricts agriculture in the Maldives and Vanuatu to a narrow range 
and quantity of products. The coral islands of the Maldives are so 
small and low lying that only around ten per cent of the country's 
land area is sui table for agriculture. 350 This scarce agricultural 
land is distributed over one thousand widely dispersed islands. As 
such transportation difficulties and diseconomies of scale limit 
agricultural activity to an even smaller percentage of the country's 
land area. This factor together with manpower limitations resulted 
in a very weak agricultural sector confined to a narrow range of 
products and a low level of production. As such, even domestic 
demand for most agricultural products has to be met through imports. 
Commonweal th Consul ta ti ve Group, Vulnerabili ty, 
and 14-21. 
op . ci t ., pp . 8-10 
349 The EIU, Country Profile, op. cit., p. 86. 
350Government of the Maldives, Maldives 
Partners: An Agenda for Co-operation, vol. 
Sixth Round Table Meeting between Maldives 
partners, Geneva, 1999, Male', 1999, p. 11. 
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I, prepared for the 
and its development 
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As for Vanuatu, approximately forty-five per cent of the country's 
land area is arable. However, the rugged mountainous terrain makes 
it difficult to exploit the interior of the larger islands thereby 
restricting agricultural activity largely to the fertile coastal 
plains. 351 Subsistence agriculture plays an important role in the 
country's economy since eighty-two per cent of Vanuatu's population 
Ii ve in rural areas. 352 Nevertheless, the country's agricultural 
exports are limited to a very narrow range of products namely copra, 
beef, veal, squash, cocoa, coffee, kava and sawn timber. 
The small land areas, resource limitations and diseconomies of scale 
render small island states dependent on a very few exports. The 
Maldives for example is heavily dependent on canned and frozen tuna, 
and tourism, while Vanuatu is dependent on the agricultural products 
mentioned above plus tourism. The narrow range of products produced 
within these small island states necessitate a large range of 
imports. The Maldives, for example, imports virtually everything 
used in the country including staples such as rice and wheat flour. 
Figures for 1996 show that the value of the Maldives' imports 
exceeded her exports by US$ 199.1 million during the year. 353 
Similarly in 1994 the value of Vanuatu's imports exceeded her export 
earnings by US$ 72.84 million. 354 Such balance of trade deficits are 
a heavy burden for small island states. Moreover, the dependence on 
a narrow range of export products and their susceptibility to 
vagaries of the global market make the economies of these small 
island states extremely fragile. 
351 C. Brown, Economic Development in Seven Pacific Island 
Countries, IMF, Washington, D.C., 1989, p.157. 
352 Around one fourth of the country's GDP is attributable to the 
agricultural sector according to EIU, Country Profile, op. cit., p. 
82. 
353 MPHRE, Statistical Year Book of Maldives 1998, MPHRE, Male', 
1998, p.xix. 
354 The EIU, Country Profile, op. cit., p. 104. 
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These economic problems of Vanuatu and the Maldives are compounded 
by the isolation of these countries from the major export markets in 
terms of distance and the inaccessibility of efficient 
transportation. Consequently, transportation of products from the 
Maldives and Vanuatu to the export markets are difficult and the 
freight costs are high. The fishery exports from the Maldives for 
example, have to be trans-shipped through Sri Lanka since none of 
the major freight carriers are willing to divert their vessels 
through the Maldives just to pickup thirty or forty containers at a 
time. 355 As such, competitors of the Maldives that are further away 
from the export markets such as Europe, still enjoy much cheaper 
transportation costs to the destination. 356 Similarly, the 
transportation cost of unprocessed copra sold by Vanuatu to the 
European market, for example, is as high as half of the income 
derived from the sale of the product. 357 
The developmental problems of the Maldives and Vanuatu are further 
aggravated by diseconomies of scale in the provision of social 
services and the proneness of these countries to natural disasters. 
In the Maldives· for example, the population is dispersed over 200 
widely scattered islands. Over 90 per cent of these inhabited 
islands have populations below 1000 people and only four have 
populations over 4000 people. 358 Due to the long distances between 
the islands and transportation difficulties each and everyone of 
these small island communities have to be self-contained in terms of 
355 Information provided to 
Mr. Ibrahim Athif, Deputy 
Company Ltd. (MIFCO). 
356 Ibid. 
author by a fax dated 10 July 1998 from 
Director, Maldives Industrial Fisheries 
357 Bank of Hawaii, An Economic Assessment of the Republic of 
Vanuatu, Winter 1995, p. 12. 
358 MPHRE, Fourth National Development Plan, MPHRE, Male', 1994, p. 
1. 
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schools, hospitals and the like. The provision of such services to 
all of these small island conrrnunities is a formidable and taxing 
task that impedes economic development. Natural disasters such as 
tropical cyclones and high waves add to these impediments to 
development by periodically taking a heavy toll on the economies of 
Vanuatu and the Maldives respectively. 
Trade liberalisation under the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded in 1993 and 
discussed in more detail in section 3.3, is contributing to the 
developmental dilenrrna of small island states like the Maldives and 
Vanuatu. The concessions enjoyed by products from small island 
states to developed country markets under agreements such as the 
Lome Convention and the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) are 
presently being eroded due to trade liberalisation. The loss of 
preferential treatment reduces the competitiveness of the products 
from small island states. As such, states such as the Maldives and 
Vanuatu face the threat of being further marginalised from the 
global economy. Minimising the impact of the changing global trading 
environment and the inherent vulnerabilities associated with being 
small island states are naturally among the priority foreign policy 
objectives of Vanuatu and the Maldives. 
3.2b - Protection of Resources 
The Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 which emerged from UNCLOS III 
rewarded coastal states with territorial waters of 12 miles and an 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 miles off the coast of the 
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country.359 According to Article 56 of the Law of the Sea Convention, 
coastal and island states possess the sovereign right to explore and 
exploit, conserve and manage the living or non-living natural 
resources wi thin their own EEZs. This provision of the Convention 
endowed small island states like the Maldives and Vanuatu sovereign 
rights over relatively large EEZs in comparison with the land area 
of these countries. Vanuatu with a land area of approximately 12,000 
square kilometres received an EEZ of around 686,000 square 
kilometres. 36o Similarly, the Maldives with a land area of 300 square 
kilometres was endowed with an EEZ of approximately 929,400 square 
kilometres. 361These large EEZs partially compensated these small 
island states to some extent for their limited land based natural 
resources. 
The sustainability of the marine resources within the EEZs of 
Vanuatu and the Maldives have been under threat from factors such as 
wasteful fishing methods and poaching. Driftnet fishing introduced 
to the South Pacific in the middle of the 1980s, for example, by 
Japanese, South Korean and Taiwanese fishermen, posed a very serious 
threat to fish stocks and other marine mammals such as dolphins and 
sea birds in the region. 362 This technique involved the use of a 
series of very long nets deployed by several vessels working 
359 A comprehensive discussion on the delimitation 
territorial waters and EEZs of archipelagic states is 
Munavvar, Ocean States: Archipelagic Regimes in the law of 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995. 
of the 
in, M. 
the Sea, 
360 T.I.J. Fairbairn, C.E. Morrison, R.W. Baker, and S.A. Groves 
(eds.), The Pacific Islands: Politics, Economics, and International 
Relations, East-West Centre, Honolulu, 1991, p. 149. 
361 MPHRE, Fifth National Development Plan, op. cit., p. 26. 
362 D. J. Doulman, 'Fisheries Management in the South Pacific: The 
Role of the Forum Fisheries Agency', and M. Hagler, 'Driftnet 
Fishing in the South Pacific', in R. Thakur (ed.), The South 
Pacific: Problems, Issues and Prospects, St. Martin's Press, New 
York, 1991, pp. 81-94 and 95-105 respectively. 
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jointly, and stretching over thousands of kilometres. 363 These nets 
catch and kill every living creature they come in contact. Driftnets 
lost at sea could continue fishing as "ghost nets" for years to 
come. 364 
Taking advantage of the limitations of small island states to 
adequately monitor and police their EEZs, poachers have been 
illegally exploiting the waters of these countries. The extent of 
the problem is demonstrated by the fact that the handful of 
coastguard vessels in the Maldives, relying on information from 
local fishermen, managed to apprehend between 1994 and 1997, a total 
of 32 foreign fishing vessels for poaching within the country's 
EEZ.365 These vessels were from countries such as Japan, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, South Korea, but mostly from Sri Lanka. According to the 
Commonwealth Advisory Group, the incidence of poaching has 
mushroomed world-wide over the past decade. 366 The protection against 
such threats to marine resources, one of the very few if not the 
only type of commercially exploitable resources available to small 
island states, is among the foreign policy objectives of the 
Maldives and Vanuatu. 
3.2c - Maximising Foreign Aid 
A number of scholars have questioned the intentions of aid donors 
and the value of foreign aid to the socia-economic development of 
363G. Palmer, Environment: The International Challenge, Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 1995, p.180. 
364 Doulman, 'Fisheries Management', op. cit., p. 90. 
365 Statistics on illegal fishing was provided to the author by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Male'. 
366 Commonwealth Advisory Group, A Future for Small States, op.cit., 
p. 18. 
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the recipient countries. Some scholars maintain that foreign aid is 
creating economic dependence instead of development. Knapman for 
example argued that "aid will tend to create the need for more aid, 
leading to a condition of permanent aid dependence; and that this is 
the only available entry into 'developed' consumer society". 367 Bauer 
has pointed out that "external donations have never been necessary 
for the development of any society anywhere". 36B Hook has argued that 
although development aid appears to be founded on altruistic and 
humanitarian principles, "upon closer inspection, a variety of donor 
self-interests appear, along with sub-national interests within both 
donor and recipient states". 369 While there is some truth in the 
criticisms the alternative is for aid recipients to live within 
their own means and this is not an option for small island states. 
Development without aid is not possible for small island states 
given their very narrow resource base and innumerable developmental 
needs that cannot be met solely through the revenue generated from 
their weak economies. As such, small island states are forced to 
rely on external assistance or development co-operation to 
supplement their meagre resources to meet the socio-economic demands 
of their countries. Leaders and diplomats of both Vanuatu and the 
Maldives have consistently maintained that their social and economic 
progress are dependent on foreign assistance. President Gayoom for 
example, argued that, "it would be impossible for the developing 
countries alone to reverse the lingering inertia in their 
367 B. Knapman, 'Aid and Dependent Development of Pacific Island 
States', The Journal of Pacific History, vol. 21, July 86, pp. 139-
152. 
368 P. Bauer, et aI, Aid and Development in the South Pacific, 
Centre for Independence Studies, Auckland, 1991, pp. 3-18. 
369 S. W. Hook, National Interest and Foreign Aid, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., Colorado, 1995, p. 15; A comprehensive discussion 
of selfish donor interests behind foreign aid is in, A. Maizels 
and M. K. Nissanke, 'Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries', 
World Development, vol. 12, 1984, pp. 879-900. 
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economies", and that no significant economic improvement is possible 
"unless complementary commitments from their development partners 
can be mobilised". 370 Similarly, Vanuatu's Prime Minister, Vohor, 
called on the united Nations General Assembly in 1997, to mobilise 
development assistance in support of small island states such as his 
country.371 Not surprisingly, maximising foreign aid is among the 
most important foreign policy objectives of Vanuatu and the 
Maldives. 
3.3 - Foreign Policy Actions of Vanuatu and the Maldives 
This section aims to assess the significance of multilateralism, 
regionalism and bilateralism in contributing towards the three 
foreign policy obj ecti ves of Vanuatu and the Maldives discussed 
above. The section will first assess the significance of 
multilateralism in the foreign policies of both Vanuatu and the 
Maldives. This assessment is carried out jointly for the two 
countries under study to avoid repetition since the foreign policy 
actions of both these states at the global level are very similar 
and often overlap. The section will then go on to assess the 
significance of regionalism and then bilateralism in contributing 
towards the foreign policy objectives of Vanuatu. This will be 
followed by a similar assessment of the regional and bilateral 
strategies of the Maldives. 
370 President Gayoom, address to the 45 th Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly, September 1990, a copy of the document 
was made available to the author by the Permanent Mission of the 
Maldives to the United Nations. 
371 Prime Minister Vohor, address to the 52nd Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly, September 1997, a copy of the address was 
made available to the author by the Permanent Mission of the 
Maldives to the United Nations. 
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3.3a - Multilateralism - Vanuatu and the Maldives 
Multilateralism enabled Vanuatu and the Maldives to secure several 
gains in the area of economic development. It is not the contention 
of this thesis that these two states were solely responsible for all 
these gains but that they were able to contribute to their economic 
development through multilateral institutions. It should however be 
acknowledged that given the multitude of interests at work within 
multilateral organisations not all developments through them serve 
the best interest of small island states. Nevertheless, 
multilateralism has been favourable overall for both Vanuatu and the 
Maldives. 
Multilateralism proved very important for Vanuatu and the Maldives 
in their endeavour to protect their marine resources from 
destructive practices such as driftnet fishing. As mentioned before, 
driftnet fishing exploded in the South Pacific in 1989 posing a 
serious threat to the small island states of the region which were 
heavily dependent on fisheries for their livelihood. Concerned with 
this threat the South Pacific island states and New Zealand raised 
the issue of driftnet fishing at the Commonwealth Summit in Malaysia 
in 1989. 372 At this meeting the Commonwealth Heads of 
State/Government committed themselves through the Langkawi 
Declaration on Environment, to discourage and restrict non-
372 New Zealand's role in placing the issue of driftnet fishing on 
the international agenda is discussed in, Palmer, Environment, 
op.cit., pp. 179-181; and R. Kennaway, 'Environmental Issues: The 
Growing International Dimension', in Kennaway and Henderson (eds.), 
Beyond New Zealand II, op. cit., pp. 151-163. 
163 
sustainable fishing practices and seek to ban tangle net and pelagic 
driftnet fishing. 373 
The same year a resolution banning driftnet fishing was tabled at 
the united Nations General Assembly co-sponsored by New Zealand and 
the united states supported by the South Pacific island states. m 
This resolution was strongly resisted by those countries engaged in 
driftnet fishing such as Japan. However, the joint effort by the 
supporters of the resolution forced Japan and the other driftnet 
fishing nations to capitulate. It resulted in the United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 44/255 of 22 December 1989 on large-
scale pelagic driftnet fishing and its impact on the living marine 
resources of the world's oceans and seas, which was adopted 
unanimously.375 This resolution called for immediate action by the 
international community to progressively reduce driftnet fishing and 
to place a global moratorium on this method of fishing by 30 June 
1992. 
The effort to protect the marine resources of small island states 
such as the Maldives and Vanuatu were further strengthened by 
developments at the multilateral level. While the Maldives or 
Vanuatu cannot be singled out as the initiators they contributed to 
these developments especially through their involvement in the 
AOSIS. One of these developments was Agenda 21 adopted at the united 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in 1992. 376 
373 p . D. Abeyegunawardene, et al (comp. ), South Asia Handbook of 
Treaties and Other Legal Instruments in the Field of Environmental 
Law, UNEP, NORAD & SACEP, Colombo, 1997, p. 302. 
374Palmer, Environment, op. cit., p. 180. 
375 United Nations General Assembly resolution, A/RES/44/225, 
December 1989, United Nations Homepage, 1996, online available: 
gopher://gopher.un.org/00/ga/recs/44/225, 7 June 1997. 
376 'Agenda 21', Paragraph 20, Chapter 17, GAIA Environmental 
Information System site, 5 November 1998, online available: 
http://www.ess.co.at/GAIA/AG21/programme_areas/A21_17B_ba.html, 12 
January 1999. 
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Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 noted that over-fishing, poaching, 
degradation of the marine ecosystem and the use of inappropriate and 
wasteful fishing equipment was on the increase and committed nations 
to the sustainable use of marine resources. 
In following up the issue of managing and conserving marine 
resources raised at the UNCED and the Law of the Sea Convention of 
1982, the United Nations started work in 1993 on an international 
agreement on managing straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. 
In 1995 an agreement was reached on the implementation of the 
provisions of the united Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
relating to Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish stocks. 377 This agreement included a number 
of measures that needed to be implemented by states at the national, 
regional and global levels for the conservation and sustainable use 
of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. 
Multilateralism has also been useful for Vanuatu in minimising some 
of the vulnerabilities in the area of trade. First and foremost in 
this respect is the preferential access to European markets gained 
under the Lome Convention. The Lome Convention was an agreement 
first signed in 1975 between the European Union (EU) and members of 
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries. The 
Convention has since been renewed thrice. The existing Lome 
Convention is due to expire in the year 2000. Negotiations for Lome 
V began in September 1998. Vanuatu is a party to the Lome Convention 
by virtue of its colonial background and geographical location. 
Several attempts by the Maldives to accede to the Lome Convention 
377 United Nations document A/CONF.164/37, September 1995, United 
Nations Homepage, 1996, online available: 
gopher://gopher.un.org/OO/LOS/CONF164/164_37.TXT8. 2 July 1998. 
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were rej ected by the European Union on the basis of geographical 
location. 
Under the Lome Convention, Vanuatu, like the rest of the ACP states, 
received non-reciprocal preferential access for products to the 
markets of the EU member countries. 378 Such preferential access 
provide ACP states like Vanuatu with a competitive edge in the 
European markets with respect to non-ACP countries. However, it 
should be mentioned that preferential access does not remove all 
competition. ACP states have to compete with each other and the 
products from the host country. Furthermore, despite market access 
there are so many other factors which inhibit the ability of small 
island states like Vanuatu to effectively take full advantage of the 
opportunity. Irrespective of these difficulties the Lome Convention 
has been very useful for Vanuatu, although declining in importance, 
as evident from the country's trade statistics. Between 1989 and 
1995 Vanuatu's exports to EU as a percentage of the country's total 
exports declined from 57 per cent to 37.4 per cent. 379 Growth in 
exports to Japan was largely to account for this decline. 
GSP is another similar scheme from which developing countries such 
as Vanuatu and the Maldives have been benefiting. Under the GSP 
scheme member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) provide preferential market access to 
developing countries. It was through the work of the united Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that this scheme was 
378 The characteristics and contents of the four Lome conventions 
are tabulated in, E.R. Grilli, The European Community and the 
Developing Countries, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, 
pp. 28-29. 
379E1U , Country Profile, op. ci t., p. 91 i EIU, Country Report, 2nd 
quarter 1997,EIU, London, 1997, p.34. 
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operationalised in OECD countries. 380 However, the preferences 
offered under the scheme are decided on a bilateral basis. 
The preferences enjoyed by Vanuatu, Maldives and the rest of the 
developing countries under the Lome and GSP are presently being 
eroded by global trade liberalisation under the Uruguay Round 
Agreement of the GATT, as mentioned before. 381 While the Uruguay 
Round may have some gains for some small island developing states in 
the long run, both Vanuatu and the Maldives face the potential 
threat of economic losses in the short term. The Commonwealth 
Advisory Group has estimated that beef prices in EU could possibly 
fall by some 20 per cent due to trade liberalisation. 382 A fall in 
beef prices would adversely affect Vanuatu's beef exports. The 
Commonweal th Advisory Group has further noted that cocoa is also 
expected to be affected by the erosion of preferences and that some 
exporters in the South Pacific are likely to face market loss. 383 
The export of manufactured garments from the Maldives is also bound 
to be badly hit in the near future. Garment industry developed in 
the Maldives directly as a result of the country's quota under the 
Multi Fiber Agreement (MFA). It was largely foreign companies 
interested in taking advantage of the quota which invested in the 
garment industry in the Maldives. The material and most of the 
labour used in the industry is imported and the country benefits 
from jobs and royalty (three per cent of F.O.B.) on shipments 
380 Secretary-General of OECD, The Generalised System of 
Preferences: Review of the First Decade, OECD, 1983, p.9. 
381 An informative discussion of the impact of the Uruguay Round on 
the Lome trade provisions is in, M. Davenport, A. Hewitt and A. 
Koning, Europe's Preferred Partners? The Lome Countries in World 
Trade, Overseas Development Institute, London, 1995, pp. 37-52. 
382 Commonwealth Advisory Group, A Future For Small States, op. 
cit., p. 53. 
383 Ibid., p. 55. 
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exported. The united states' decision following the Uruguay Round, 
to phase out MFA by 2005 means that the garment industry in the 
Maldives would virtually die out by that date unless some 
arrangement is made to ensure that the garments produced in the 
country have some form of competi ti ve edge. 384 
Trade liberalisation is also likely to affect the export of marine 
products from the Maldives. Presently, marine products including 
frozen and canned tuna constitute almost 75 per cent of the 
country's exports. 385 Some form of preferential treatment is 
important for the Maldives' marine products to be competitive in the 
international market. 386 The erosion of preferential treatment due to 
trade liberalisation is likely to have a serious impact on the 
economy of the Maldives. As bilateral arrangements that discriminate 
against others become increasingly unacceptable due to WTO rules, it 
is perhaps a solution through multilateral organisations that will 
be required to cushion the impact of trade liberalisation on the 
Maldives. 
Both the Maldives and Vanuatu have been engaged in trying to protect 
their economies from the negative effects of trade liberalisation. 
Vanuatu and the other ACP countries, in protecting their economies, 
are seeking to retain in the new Lome Convention the preferential 
access to the EU market that they presently enjoy. It is doubtful 
whether they will succeed. A Green Paper published by the European 
Commission on relations between EU and ACP, and the mandate to 
384 The text of the Uruguay Round decision on 
is in, World Trade Organisation, The Resul ts 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The 
Secretariat, Geneva, 1994, pp. 85-137. 
385 MPHRE, Fifth National Development Plan 
MPHRE, Male', 1998, p. 18. 
386Fax from MIFCO, op. cit. 
textiles and clothing 
of the Uruguay Round 
Legal Texts, GATT 
1997-2000, Summary, 
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negotiate contained in a Commission's communication to the Council 
and the European Parliament expressed the desire to place the EU-ACP 
relationship on a new footing. 387 This new relationship is to be 
based on the changed realities of the present day world and aimed at 
steadily integrating the ACP countries into the world economy. The 
EU is also aiming to make the relationship more balanced reflecting 
the mutual interests of both parties. This means the introduction of 
reciprocity that would undermine the effectiveness of any 
preferential market access in the new Lome Convention. While Vanuatu 
is a very small country and might not be so important to ED in terms 
of reciprocal preferential access, any change in the Lome Convention 
will apply to the former country as well. 
Moreover, the future of the Lome Convention is in doubt since the 
Convention offers concessions to only one group of countries and so 
is technically incompatible with the Uruguay Round Agreement. 388 It 
is only a matter of time before the Lome Convention becomes 
redundant. The EU is planning to seek a waiver from the WTO to 
extend the existing trade provisions under the Lome Convention, with 
slight modifications, until 2005. 389 Some parties such as the German 
Government have expressed their doubt that a waiver will be granted 
since the Lome Convention discriminates against other developing 
countries. 390 
387European Commission, European Commission Green Paper on Relations 
Between the European Union and the ACP Countries on the Eve of the 
2r t Century: Challenges and Options for a New Partnership, Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 
1997. 
388 Under the Uruguay Round Agreement discriminatory market access 
is allowed only within regional organisations. 
389 J. Madeley, 'The Future of EU-ACP Cooperation: End of a 
Historical Relationship', Development and Cooperation (D+C), No.3, 
1998, May/June, pp. 8-11. 
390 Ibid. 
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The growing threat of further marginalisation of the Maldives and 
Vanuatu due to changes in the global economic environment highlights 
the importance of foreign policy at the multilateral level. As 
argued by the Commonwealth Advisory Group, small states have done 
much to protect their interests at the national and regional levels 
but "it is difficult to escape the conclusion that it is the 
international level which is decisive in setting the structure 
within which small states have to act and determining the agenda to 
which they must respond". 391 
The Maldives and Vanuatu have been over the years using the 
multilateral forums to add their voice to the unrelenting chorus of 
small island states in drawing international attention to their 
plight in the face of the changing global economic environment .To 
give an example, at the Fifty-First Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, Foreign Minister Jameel argued: 
While globalisation and liberalisation of the world economy 
had given the opportunity for some developing countries to 
assume a more prominent status in the world economy, the 
Least Developed Countries, the category to which my country 
unfortunately belongs, has continued to get marginalised. 
The standard of living in LDCs have in effect declined over 
the years, and poverty level has intensified in many of 
these countries .... This unfavourable situation, if allowed 
to drag on, can be calamitous for countries with severe 
resource constraints and fragile infrastructure like the 
Maldives. 392 
This effort by all small states to sensitise the international 
community to their plight has been successful only to a limited 
extent. The emphasis given to the particular vulnerabilities of 
391 Cormnonwealth Advisory Group, A Future for Small States, op. 
cit., p. 5. 
392 Foreign Minister Jameel, address to the Fifty-First Session of 
the United Nations General Assembly, 8 October, 1996, a copy of the 
speech was made available to the author by the Permanent Mission of 
the Maldives to the United Nations. 
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small island states at the Earth Summit and the United Nations 
Conference on the sustainable Development of Small Island Developing 
states are indicative of the growing recognition of the plight of 
these states. 393 The issue of the vulnerability of small states is 
now well placed on the agendas of the Commonwealth._ The Commonwealth 
study, Vulnerabili ty: Small States in the Global Society, 
demonstrates the importance assigned to the special needs of small 
states within the organisation. 394 
The increasing recognition of the special needs and vulnerabilities 
of small states led Commonwealth to set up a Ministerial Group on 
Small States (MGSS) in 1993. In 1994 MGSS was complemented by a 
Commonwealth Consultative Group on Small States (CGSS) composed of 
senior officials supported by Commonwealth Secretariat staff. This 
three tiered system is now in place to focus on the special needs of 
small states in areas such as trade and aid. 395 
The Commonwealth has been in the forefront in calling on the 
international community for special concessions for small states in 
the face of the potentially adverse effects of trade liberalisation 
on their economies. The Commonwealth Economic Declaration issued at 
the Edinburgh summit argued: 
We believe that world peace, security and social stability 
cannot be achieved in conditions of deep poverty and growing 
inequality. Special measures are needed to correct this, and 
in particular to help the integration of countries, 
especially small states and the Least Developed Countries, 
in the global economy and address the uneven development 
h h t · 396 t at t reatens many coun rles. 
393 These meetings are discussed in more detail in chapter IV. 
394 Commonwealth Consul ta ti ve Group, Vulnerabili ty, op. cit. 
395 Ibid., p. 63. 
396 'The Edinburgh Economic Declaration', Bulletin, edition 3, 
Saturday 25 and Sunday 26 October 1997, online available: 
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In July 1998 a Commonwealth Ministerial delegation visited 
international economic and financial institutions such as the World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), UNCTAD and WTO, seeking to 
broaden and strengthen the support of these organisations for the 
economic development of small states. 397 As a result of these visits 
the World Bank and IMF for example, set up a taskforce to seek ways 
of dealing with the difficulties faced by small states in accessing 
funding for development. UNCTAD also decided to intensify its co-
operation with the Commonwealth and in particular to "assist small 
states through analytical support and advice in negotiations for 
accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and with regard to 
the provision of special and differential treatment in the world 
trading system". 398 
The 1985 report of the Commonwealth on the vulnerability of small 
states was also renewed and updated in 1997 in the context of the 
changed global reality. The new report, A Future for Small Sta tes: 
Overcoming Vulnerability, identified the distinct characteristics of 
small states particularly those that render these states susceptible 
to risks and threats set at a relatively lower threshold than larger 
countries. It emphasised small states as a group requiring special 
attention within the international community. The report expressed 
the serious concern for small states arising from, among other 
factors, "economic threats linked to globalisation of trade, 
investment, finance and production". 399 The report in general 
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/latest/bulletin/index.html, 3 
November 1998. 
397 UNCTAD Press Release of 13 July 1998, online available: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/press/pr2758en.htm. 13 November 1998. 
398 Ibid. 
399 Commonwealth Advisory Group, A Future for Small States, op. 
cit., p. XI 
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highlighted the enormity of threats facing small island developing 
states and included recommendations on the measures needed to 
rectify the situation. 
The fact that the issue of the vulnerability of small states has 
been receiving increasing international attention did not mean that 
Vanuatu and the Maldives could relax their struggle for the 
protection of their economies from the adverse effects of the 
changing global economic environment. The decisions by the United 
Nations Committee on Development Planning in 1994 to graduate 
Vanuatu from the united Nations' list of LDCs as early as 1997, and 
the 1995 decision to graduate Maldives in the year 2000, are 
indicative of the threats still facing these small island states. 400 
The premature loss of LDC status would be a severe blow to the 
vulnerable economies of Vanuatu and the Maldives. The graduation 
from the list of LDCs will not only result in the loss of the high 
tariff concessions received in external markets but also restrict 
the access of these countries to concessional finance from 
institutions such as the World Bank and IDA. Protection against this 
threat of premature graduation from the list of LDCs has been one of 
the foreign policy priorities of both Vanuatu and the Maldives 
during the past few years. These countries have been arguing that 
the criteria used in the decision to graduate were flawed as 
discussed in more detail below. 
The graduation of Vanuatu and the Maldives was decided based on the 
following criteria - Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of over 
us $865, and either an Augmented Physical Quality of Life Index 
400 United Nations document E/1997/35, 'Report on the Thirty - First 
Session of the United Nations Committee on Development Planning', 
5-9 May 1997, United Nations, New York, 1997, paragraph, 229. 
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(APQLI) of greater than 52, or an Economic Diversification Index 
(EDT) greater than 29. 401 This criteria does not take into 
consideration the multitude of disadvantages that arise from the 
size and nature of small island states including their remoteness; 
dependence on a very few economic sectors, heavy reliance on aid, 
imports and international trade; and proneness to ecological 
disasters such as cyclones, climate change and sea level rise, which 
render their economies extremely vulnerable to forces outside their 
own control. 
In the case of the Maldives, for example, the economy is largely 
based on just two sectors - tourism and fisheries. Presently tourism 
contributes nearly 70 per cent of Maldives' foreign exchange 
't d t d f 19 3 t of GDP l'n 1996. 402 recelp s an accoun e or . per cen 
Fisheries, the second largest sector of the economy, employs 
approximately 20 per cent of the country's labour force but accounts 
for only 10.7 per cent of the GDP. 403 The heavy dependence on just 
two sectors renders the economy of the Maldives very delicate. 
Moreover, the very narrow economic base of the country necessitates 
a relatively high import content, creating a heavy dependence on 
foreign exchange earnings and rendering the economy extremely 
reliant on exports. Consequently, a sudden decline in world tuna 
prices which have shown a marked tendency to fluctuate or a 
recession in one of the country's major tourist markets could have a 
401 Ibid. r paragraph, 225. APQLI incorporates life expectancy, per 
capita calorie consumption, primary and secondary school enrolment 
and adult literacy; EDI includes share of manufacturing in GDP, 
share of labour in industry, per capita electricity consumption and 
exports. 
402 MPHRE, Statistical Yearbook of the Maldives 1998, op. cit., 
p.184. 
403 Ibid. , pp. 330-331. The statistic on the foreign exchange 
revenue generated by tourism was provided to the author verbally by 
the statistics section of the MPHRE, 3 March 1999. 
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debilitating effect on the economy of the Maldives. Tourism, the 
dominant sector of the country's economy, is also very sensitive to 
environmental threats such as coral bleaching or oil spills, which 
are not farfetched. Any criteria that do not take the above factors 
into consideration will depict a distorted picture of the economic 
development of the Maldives. 
Following a General Assembly request in 1997 the Committee on 
Development Planning, after reconsidering the case of Vanuatu, came 
up with the conclusion that the country was due for graduation with 
immediate effect. 404 Consequently, both Vanuatu and the Maldives have 
been very vocal at the united Nations over the past few years in 
trying to prevent premature graduation. These countries have been 
trying to convince the international community that their economic 
growth during the past decade or so provides a misleading image of 
the strength of their economies and that their graduation from the 
list of LDCs should be delayed until such time when a more 
comprehensive measurement that takes into consideration the 
vulnerability factor is available. Foreign Minister Jameel, for 
example, expressed his delight that the international community 
recognises the progress made by his country by deciding to graduate 
it from the list of LDCs, but argued that: 
If anyone would measure these few achievements [by the 
Maldives] against the background of an extremely fragile 
economy, deprived of natural resources, high dependency on 
tourism and fisheries, both of which are susceptible to 
global economic changes, environmental and other external 
factors, the whole scenario can easily change from a happy 
d .. t b d . 405 an promlslng one 0 an 0 scure an lnsecure one. 
404 United Nations document E/1997/35, op. cit., paragraph 229. 
405 Foreign Minister Jameel, statement to the 52nd Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly, New York, 3 October 1997, a copy 
of the statement was made available to the author by the Permanent 
Mission of the Maldives to the United Nations. 
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Similarly, Vanuatu's Prime Minister, Serge Vohor, argued at the 
United Nations General Assembly that the decision by the Development 
Committee to graduate his country with immediate effect came as a 
surprise and could only have been based on a lack of information. 406 
In dealing with this threat of premature graduation small island 
states including Vanuatu and the Maldives have been advocating the 
urgent formulation of a vulnerability index that identifies 
countries that are particularly at risk and warrant special 
treatment by financial institutions and in global economic 
arrangements. Both Vanuatu and the Maldives continue to argue that 
such an index should be used in association with the other criteria 
in the graduation of small island states from united Nations' list 
of LDCs. 
The work on the construction of a vulnerability index is now 
underway within the Commonwealth and the united Nations. 407 In an 
economic vulnerability index constructed by Lini Briguglio from the 
Foundation for International Studies of the University of Malta, 
Vanuatu ranked fourth and the Maldives twenty-second in a list of 
114 countries. 408 This vulnerability index was based solely on 
economic factors. It is reasonable to expect a more comprehensive 
index that includes both economic and environmental indicators to 
reveal an even higher level of vulnerability for small island states 
like Vanuatu and the Maldives. Based on his vulnerability index 
Briguglio argued that small island states were very fragile in the 
face of forces outside their control and that in many instances 
406United Nations, Press Release GA/9326, 7 October 1997. 
407 The evolution of the idea of constructing a vulnerability index 
is discussed in, L. Briguglio, 'Small Island Developing States and 
their Economic Vulnerabilities', World Development, vol. 23, No.9, 
1995, pp. 1616-1632. 
408 Ibid., p. 1626. 
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their GDP per capita was not too low conveying the impression that 
they had relatively strong economies when in reality they were 
delicate. 409 
Vanuatu succeeded in 1997 in convincing the General Assembly to 
defer the review of its graduation to the year 2000 by which time it 
is hoped that the vulnerability index will be complete. 410 The united 
Nations, which brings together a number of states that are bound to 
face in the future the same fate as Vanuatu, proved very effective 
in getting the graduation postponed. The membership of the united 
Nations also included developed countries that were sympathetic to 
the needs of small island states and were ready to extend their 
support. The Maldives and Vanuatu are presently gearing up to face 
the possible challenge of graduation in the year 2000. 
The developmental challenges and vulnerabilities faced by small 
island states such as Vanuatu and the Maldives resulted in these 
countries becoming heavily dependent on their bilateral partners for 
aid. Foreign aid or aDA is as important to Vanuatu and the Maldives 
today as it was over the past couple of decades. The changing global 
economic environment has been placing additional burdens on small 
island states and thereby increasing their dependence on foreign 
aid. In trying to meet this challenge Vanuatu for example, recently 
launched a Comprehensive Reform Programme. This programme according 
to the former Prime Minister Serge Vohor, was focused "firstly, on 
restructuring the government in order to be more transparent, more 
responsive and in general to observe the principles of good 
governance and, secondly, it will help boost the confidence of 
foreign investors through the introduction of appropriate 
409 I bid., p. 1624. 
410 United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/52/210, 27 
February 1998, United Nations Homepage, 1996, online available: 
gopher://gopher.un.org/OO/ga/recs/52/res52-en.210, 3 July 1998. 
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legislation, such as Vanuatu Foreign Investment Act and a new fiscal 
policy".41l Such reform needs additional international support and 
assistance for their success. 412 As such, both Vanuatu and the 
Maldives along with the other small states have been using their 
membership of multilateral organisations for calling on the 
international community to increase assistance. 
The global trend in foreign aid makes it doubtful whether small 
island states will receive enough development assistance to 
compensate for their increasing hardship. As shown in figure 1, the 
overall global foreign aid from the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) member states peaked at US$ 60.8 billion in 1992 and has 
declined since to a low of around US$ 47 billion in 1997. Most of 
the developed states are not showing any inclination to fulfil their 
UNCED commitment to meet the aDA target of 0.7 per cent of GNP. af 
the 21 member states of DAC only Norway, Denmark, Sweden and 
Netherlands have met the O. 7 per cent target. 413 The aDA 
disbursements of DAC as a whole were around 0.3 per cent of GNP 
until 1996 and fell to an all time low of 0.22 percent in 1997. 414 
The decline in aDA of DAC member states affected the level of 
development assistance received by Vanuatu. As Table II shows, the 
foreign aid received by Vanuatu peaked in 1991 and has been 
declining since. In the case of the Maldives there is no clear-cut 
411 Prime Minister Vohor, statement on the occasion of the Japan -
South Pacific Forum Nations Summit, Tokyo, Japan, 13 October 1997, 
Pacific Islands Development Programme's (PIDP) internet page, 
online available: http://pidp.ewc.hawaii.edu/PIReport/special/l0-
31-A.html, 24 August 1998. 
412 Ibid. 
413 DAC, Shaping the 21 st Century: The Contribution of Development 
Co-operation, Report adopted at the Thirty-fourth High Level 
Meeting of DAC, 6-7 May 1996, OECD, Paris, 1996, p. 16. 
414 Ibid; DAC, 'Aid and Private Flows Fell in 1997', 14 July 1998, 
online available, http://www.oecd.org/dac/htm/nw98-64a.htm. 15 July 
1998. 
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decline. However, there is no reason for optimism regarding future 
levels of ODA in spite of the growing awareness within the 
international community of the serious threats facing small island 
states. The Commonwealth Advisory Group in its report, A Future for 
Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability, argued that the emerging 
trends make it unlikely that the present level of ODA to small 
states can be sustained in the long run. us 
Figure 1 
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Source: based on OECD statistics, OECD Homepage, 14July 1998, online 
availabel: http://www.oecd.org/dac/pdf/aid98a.pdf, 15 July 1998. 
The emerging trends in the Commonwealth Report mentioned above 
include the general aid fatigue and domestic policy concerns of the 
major bilateral donors resulting in smaller aid budgets; the 
channelling of resources by bilateral and multilateral donors to new 
415 Commonwealth Advisory Group, A Future for Small States, op. 
cit. , p. 58. 
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states such as Bosnia and Croatia; and the increasing inclination of 
donors to assist the poorest of the poor such as those countries in 
Sub Saharan-Africa where GDP per capita is low and poverty is 
overwhelming. 416 
Table: II 
Total ODA received by Vanuatu and the Maldives from 1986-1996 
(in US$ millions) 
Date Vanuatu Maldives 
1986 24 16 
1987 51 19 
1988 39 27 
1989 39 28 
1990 50 22 
1991 53 35 
1992 41 39 
1993 35 29 
1994 42 30 
1995 46 56 
1996 31 33 
Total 451 334 
Sources: J. C. Wheeler, Development Co-operation 1990: Efforts 
and Policies of Members of the Development Assistance Committee, 
OECD, Paris, 1990, pp.224-225; J.H. Michel, Development 
Cooperation 1994: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the 
Development Assistance committee, OECD, Paris, 1994, statistical 
Annex H4-H5; and OECD internet page: 
http//www.oecd.org/dac/htm/table33.htm. 15 July 1998. 
These developing trends do not augur well for the Maldives and 
Vanuatu. As such, they cannot afford to relax their push at the 
multilateral level to increase the ODA budgets of donors and to gain 
a fair and adequate share of whatever is available. Collective 
action through multilateral organisations proved effective in the 
past, like at the UNCED, in exerting pressure on the international 
community. As such, small states need to collectively, through 
416 Ibid. 
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multilateral organisations, present to donors a very strong case for 
special treatment particularly because of the drastic changes needed 
to adjust to the transforming global trading system. 
Moreover, a number of multilateral organisations such as the United 
Nations and its various branches are aid donors themselves. In the 
1995/96 period, for example, Vanuatu received approximately US$ 13.7 
million in assistance from multilateral organisations. 417 In the same 
year the Maldives received approximately US$ 15.87 million from 
mul tilateral sources. 418 These are SUbstantial figures and both the 
Maldives and Vanuatu need to increase their influence within the aid 
donating multilateral organisations in order to ensure the 
continuation of the flow of assistance. 
3.3b - Regionalism - Vanuatu 
Vanuatu's attempts at the multilateral level to further its foreign 
policy goal of economic development were supplemented through 
regionalism. This section will attempt to assess the significance of 
regionalism in contributing towards Vanuatu's economic development 
related foreign policy objectives focused in this chapter. 
Regionalism in the South Pacific enabled Vanuatu to minimise some of 
its vulnerabilities and diseconomies of scale in the area of 
economic development related services and trade. This was 
facilitated by two important factors - a) the existence of a large 
417 Information provided to the author by Mr. Odo Tevi, Assistant 
Macro Economist, National Planning Office, Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Management, Port Vila. 
418 Information provided to author by the Department of External 
Resources of the Maldives, Male'. 
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number of small island states in the region sharing similar 
characteristics and needs as Vanuatu; and b) the support of 
metropolitan powers. While Vanuatu was not solely responsible for 
the benefits derived through regionalism, the country's 
participation and contribution to the process of regional co-
operation were important in realising these benefits. Some examples 
of these benefits in the area of services important for economic 
development are discussed below. 
The membership of the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) continues to be 
very useful for Vanuatu in the protection of the country's marine 
resources. The FFA provides a range of services in the development 
of the fisheries industry such as the collection, analysis, 
evaluation and dissemination to member states of relevant 
statistical and biological information on the living marine 
resources of the region. The organisation is also actively involved 
in monitoring and aerial surveillance of the regional EEZs. 419 
Moni to ring and surveillance are essential in gaining some control 
over illegal fishing. Individual small island states like Vanuatu 
are not in a position to adequately undertake monitoring and 
surveillance of their large EEZs on their own. The South Pacific 
island states receive the assistance of Australia, New Zealand and 
France in the monitoring of their EEZs. 
Australia provided 23 "Pacific class patrol boats" to police the 
EEZs of South Pacific island states. Vanuatu received one of these 
boats. 42o In addition, Australia provides 500 hours and New Zealand 
419 FFA's internet page, online available: 
http://www.ffa.int/frame_index2.html, 19 May 1999; and 
http://www.ffa.int/monitor.htm. 23 November 1998. 
420 E-mail received by author from Mr. Richards, Manager Monitoring, 
Control and Surveillance, of FFA, op. cit. 
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450 hours of aerial surveillance per year in the EEZs of the South 
Pacific island states. France provides approximately 90 hours of 
aerial surveillance each year in the EEZs of Cook Islands, Fiji and 
Vanuatu. Such support is invaluable for Vanuatu which does not have 
the capacity to adequately police its own EEZ. FFA is responsible 
for co-ordinating these flights. 
The relative success in monitoring and surveillance of the South 
Pacific EEZs is demonstrated by the number of offending vessels 
caught. During the past 10 years, over 240 violations have been 
recorded resulting in the collection of over US$ 11.5 million in 
fines and compensation payments from the offending parties. m Since 
1991, a total of 9 fisheries violations within the EEZ of Vanuatu 
have been recorded. Of these 7 cases resulted in court convictions 
and approximately US$ 68 0,000 were collected in fines. 422 
The FFA also provides a forum through which Vanuatu and the rest of 
the regional countries could join forces in dealing with Distant 
Water Fishing Countries, in the protection and maximisation of the 
benefits of the South Pacific's marine resources. The importance of 
this function was demonstrated by FFA's successful campaign against 
tuna poaching by fishing vessels from the United States. Through the 
effort of FFA a multilateral fishing agreement between the United 
States and the organisation was signed in 1987. 423 This five-year 
agreement provided for 50 United States' vessels to be licensed to 
fish in the EEZs of the FFA member states. The licenses issued to 
421 E-mail 
Andrew H. 
of FFA. 
422 Ibid. 
dated 12 December 1998 received by 
Richards, Manager Monitoring, Control 
the author from, 
and Surveillance, 
423 Henningham, The Pacific Island States, op. cit., p. 31 and 74. 
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these vessels generated approximately US$ 10 million a year for the 
South Pacific island states. 424 In 1993, the agreement was renewed 
for an additional 10 years and five more licenses were issued. Under 
this extension the total receipts from the United states increased 
to US$ 18 million a year with Vanuatu receiving approximately US$ 
800,000 in fishing access fees in 1996. 425 
It is only with the united states that a multilateral fisheries 
agreement has yet been signed by FFA. The rest of the fishing 
agreements through which Vanuatu benefits are bilateral. For 
instance, under an agreement with Taiwan some 30 Taiwanese vessels 
operate in Vanuatu's EEZ, paying license fees of US$5000 each. 426 
In protecting the marine resources of Vanuatu, regionalism was very 
effective in the fight against driftnet fishing. As such, the issue 
of driftnet fishing discussed earlier in section 3.3a is touched on 
here to highlight the significance of regionalism in contributing 
towards the protection of the marine environment. It was within the 
SPF that the momentum was built to thrust the issue of driftnet 
fishing onto the global scene. On 11 July 1989 the South Pacific 
island states issued the Tarawa Declaration which called on the 
distant water fishing nations practising driftnet fishing to 
immediately halt their operations in the South Pacific as a first 
step towards a global ban. This Declaration was followed up by 
regional countries in November 1989 by a Convention for the 
Prohibition of Fishing with Long Drift Nets in the South Pacific. 
424 FFA's internet page, online available: 
http://www.ffa.int/ffa nonshock.htm, 19 February 1999. 
425 Calculated from statistics in, W. Sutherland, Review of 
Vanuatu's Membership of International Organisations, a report 
prepared for the government of Vanuatu, 1996, p. 65, (unpublished). 
A copy of this report was obtained from the Department of Foreign 
Affairs of Vanuatu. 
426 ErU, Country Profile, op. cit., p. 86. 
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Article 3 of the Convention required signatories to prohibit the use 
of driftnets and the transhipment, landing, and processing of 
driftnet catches within areas under their jurisdiction. The 
importation of any processed or unprocessed fish or products made 
from fish caught using driftnets, allowing access to port facilities 
for driftnet fishing vessels, and the possession of driftnets on 
board any vessel within the areas of jurisdiction of signatories, 
were also prohibited. Regional countries together with the Dni ted 
states, Canada and Chile signed the Convention. 
Vanuatu is also party to the united Nations Agreement on Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks concluded in December 
1995. Regionalism has been very useful for Vanuatu in the 
implementation of the Agreement that requires states to co-operate 
either directly or through regional or sub-regional fisheries 
management organisations to ensure effective conservation and 
management of such stocks. 427 These organisations are also required 
to perform the function of ensuring compliance and enforcement of 
regional and sub-regional conservation and management measures for 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. FFA is 
instrumental in the South Pacific in the implementation of this 
Agreement. The process of regional co-operation required under the 
Agreement has already begun in the South Pacific as indicated by the 
Multilateral High Level Conference on the Conservation and 
Management of the Highly Migratory Fish stocks of the Western and 
Central Pacific held in Majuro, Marshall Islands in June 1997, and 
427 Agreement for the implementation of the provision of the United 
Nations Convention on Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and High Migratory Fish 
Stocks, United Nations Homepage, 1996, online available: 
gopher://gopher.un.org/00/LOS/CONF164/164_37.TXT, 20 December 1998. 
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the Multilateral High Level Conference now known as the Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Conference, held in Tokyo in June 1998. 
Regionalism has also been effective in affording vanuatu with 
economies of scale in the area of trade. Regional co-operation for 
instance enabled South Pacific island states to establish trade 
commissions in Sydney and Auckland. These Commissions play a variety 
of functions including those such as the dissemination of 
information on the Australian and New Zealand markets, promotion of 
foreign investment in Forum island countries, respond to a couple of 
thousand inquiries about trade and investment opportunities every 
year, maintaining a South Pacific island presence at trade fairs, 
and the like. 428 In October 1996, a Pacific Islands Economic Exchange 
Support Centre was also opened in Tokyo under an agreement between 
the government of Japan and the South Pacific Forum Secretariat. 
This Centre is aimed at promoting trade and investment links between 
Japan and the Forum island countries and to encourage Japanese 
tourism to the region. 429 The establishment of this Centre is as 
Prime Minister Vohor has noted, a "step in the right direction", but 
i ts effectiveness is yet to be seen. 430 
The non-reciprocal arrangement for duty free or concessional access 
for goods from regional developing island countries to the markets 
of Australia and New Zealand was one of the most significant steps 
taken at a regional level in the South Pacific to minimise the 
diseconomies of scale faced by the regional small island states and 
428 SPF Secretariat Homepage, online available: 
http://www.forumsec.org.fj/docs/annual97.htm#SPTCA. 26 December 
1998. 
429 SPF Secretariat Homepage, online available: 
http://www.forumsec.org.fj/docs/annual97.htm#PIC. 26 December 1998. 
430 Statement by Prime Minister Vohor on the occasion of the Japan -
South Pacific Forum Nations Summit, op.cit. 
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to enhance trade. This arrangement was in the form of an agreement 
known as the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Co-operation 
Agreement (SPARTECA) between Australia and New Zealand and the 
developing island states of the South Pacific region. The Agreement 
was signed on 14 July 1980 and came into effect on 1 January 1981. 431 
At the theoretical level SPARTECA is more useful for Vanuatu than 
the Lome Convention due to the geographical proximity of Australia 
and New Zealand to Vanuatu, the larger variety of products covered 
under the agreement, and the leniency of rules of origin. 432 New 
Zealand provides duty free and unrestricted access to all goods 
originating in the Forum island countries. 433 Australia too provides 
duty free access to all except four categories of goods for which 
some conditions apply. Yet, in reality the benefit of SPARTE CAto 
Vanuatu has been limited. Over the last decade the exports of 
Vanuatu to Australia and New Zealand did not climb above US$ 2.2 
million in any given year as evident from Table III. 434 
Sub-regional co-operation through the MSG has been an alternative 
for Vanuatu. In 1992 the leaders of the MSG agreed in principle to 
enter into a limited trade agreement based on three commodities -
tea from Papua New Guinea, canned tuna from the Solomon Islands, and 
beef from Vanuatu. 435 Grynberg and Kabutaulaka noted in 1995 that 
both Solomon Islands and Vanuatu were anxious to broaden the 
agreement but that Papua New Guinea which stood to lose most from 
431 South Pacific Forum Secretariat, SPARTECA: A Reference Handbook 
for Forum Island Exporters, 3 rd edition, Forum Secretariat, Suva, 
1992, p.l. 
432 Ibid. p. 2. 
433 Ibid. f p. I. 
434 Statistics Office, Summary of Overseas Trade, Annual Report 
1997, Statistics Office, Port Vila, 1998, p.11. 
435 R. Grynberg and T.T. Kabutaulaka, 'The Political Economy of 
Melanesian Trade Integration', Pacific Economic Bulletin, Vol. 10, 
no. 2, December 1995, pp. 48-60. 
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expanding the product coverage was very unlikely to agree. 436 
However, the trend in the other parts of the world towards free 
trade areas and the pressure by WTO to reduce tariff barriers, 
prompted Papua New Guinea and the rest of the MSG countries to 
consider expanding trade relations with the regional countries. 
The Joint Communique issued following the Twelfth MSG Summit Meeting 
in Fiji from 23 to 24 July 1998, noted the decision of the Group to 
set-up a sub-committee to study the proposal for a free trade area 
in the region and acknowledged that "free trade was a direction 
which Pacific island countries must ultimately take for increased 
and expanded trading benefits for their peoples". 437 
Table III 
Value of Vanuatu's Exports to Australia and New Zealand, from 1987-
1997 (in U3$) 
Date Australia 
1987 300,000 
1988 591,000 
1989 1,341,666 
1990 2,133,333 
1991 1,758,333 
1992 2,016,666 
1993 1,883,333 
1994 1,525,000 
1995 2,133,333 
1996 800,000 
1997 700,000 
Source: Calculated from, 
Trade, Annual Report 1997, 
11. 
statlstlcs Offlce, 
statistics Office, 
436 Ibid., p. 57. 
New Zealand 
16,666 
25,000 
33,333 
41,666 
16,666 
166,666 
183,333 
141,666 
133,333 
400,000 
325,000 
Summary of 
Port Vila, 
Overseas 
1997, p. 
437 Joint Communique issued at the end of the Twelfth MSG Summit, 
Korolevu, Fiji, 23-24 July 1998, official Fiji government internet 
page, 3 October 1998, online available: 
http://fiji.gov.fj/core/press/98_07_24_2.html, 26 December 1998. 
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Regionalism also continues to provide Vanuatu the opportunity to 
work collectively with the other Pacific regional states in ensuring 
that their special needs at this time of transformation in the 
global trading order, receives due recognition by the international 
community. The 1998 review of the Action Plan produced at the 1998 
Forum Economic Ministers Meeting, noted the decision of the regional 
countries to develop common positions and work collectively on the 
following multilateral trade issues: market access discussions with 
post-Forum dialogue partners; the adoption of a vulnerability index 
through the United Nations with the aim of having such an index 
included among the criteria for determining LDC status, eligibility 
for concessional aid and preferential market access; the formulation 
of alliances with other countries to exert influence over the next 
round of WTO negotiations; seeking observer status for the SPFat 
the WTO General Council and relevant committees; considering the 
establishment of a joint office facility in Geneva for use by 
members engaging in the WTO process; and vigorously pursuing the 
deferral of the graduation of Vanuatu from the united Nations' list 
of LDCs until an acceptable vulnerability index is developed. 438 
In the area of development co-operation too regionalism has been 
very important for Vanuatu. Regionalism in the South Pacific 
continues to be underwritten by contributions from metropolitan 
powers and other external sources making it very attractive to 
regional small states like Vanuatu. For example, only 12 percent of 
FFA's bUdget of US$ 4.8 million is provided by the small island 
developing states of the region. 439 Vanuatu's contribution to the 
438South Pacific Forum, 'Forum Economic Action Plan:1998 Review', 
online available: 
http://chacmool.sdnp.undp.org/pacific/forumsec/docs/femm98.htm, 28 
December 1998. 
439FFA,s internet page: http://www.ffa.int/ffa_nonshock.htm. op. 
cit. 
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organisation stands around US$ 15,000 per annum. m The remaining 88 
percent comes from extra-budgetary sources, the most significant of 
which include Australian Assistance for International Development 
(AusAID), the Australian Department of Defence, European Union, the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, and the New Zealand Overseas Development Assistance 
Program (NZODA). Through FFA Vanuatu has benefited from funding 
assistance for attendance at regional and international fisheries 
meetings; extensive participation in a wide range of training 
programs; attachments and fellowships; consultancy services; and 
technical assistance. This aid received by Vanuatu through regional 
organisations would not have been available if not for regional co-
operation in the South Pacific. 
Australia has been by far the most significant contributor to the 
South Pacific regional programs. During the period 1992-93 to 1997-
98 Australia contributed approximately A$ 202 million to various 
regional programs of the South Pacific. 4H During the above period 
the average annual contribution of Australia to the various regional 
programs of the South Pacific was around A$ 33 million. As the 
figures in table V demonstrate Australian contribution to the 
regional programs peaked in the 1995/96 period and seem to be on the 
decline. Nevertheless, regional organisations in the South Pacific 
still attract a significant amount of foreign aid from which Vanuatu 
benefits. 
440 Calculated from statistics in, Sutherland, Review of Vanuatu's 
Membership, op. cit., p. 65. 
441 AusAID, Australia's Overseas Aid Program 1996-97, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1996, p. 30; and 
Australian Agency for International Development's internet page, 
December 1998, 
http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/general/budget97/b9706.html, 
table 3, 26 April 1999. 
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Recent trends suggest that regionalism has an increasingly important 
role in future development co-operation. Although foreign aid has 
been on the decline globally, the total amount of aid received by 
regional organisations of the South Pacific like SPF, for example, 
have not been affected. This is because donor countries are 
diverting their declining foreign aid dollars from expensive 
bilateral programs to less costly regional projects. 
Table IV 
Extra budgetary assistance received by SPF (in F$ thousands). 
Estimate 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Australia 3008 3544 3190 3272 2975 3498 3962 3602 
New 700 919 890 965 1006 1029 1087 1468 
Zealand 
Japan 599 566 580 809 766 899 898 889 
European 28 212 318 687 574 631 960 1176 
Community 
UNDP/ESCru 295 148 138 607 879 631 854 na 
Canada 280 553 111 122 59 900 189 233 
France na na 86 1035 217 79 338 550 
Taiwan na na na na na 28 37 451 
Rep. na na na na na na 139 100 
Korea 
China na na na na na na 53 70 
USAID na 26 73 66 81 na na na 
Common- na 40 42 30 na na na na 
wealth 
Miscella- 246 223 300 1035 217 910 100 497 
neous 
Total 5156 3621 5728 7790 6728 7974 8617 9036 
Sources: South Paclflc Forum Secretarlat, South Paclflc Forum: 
Annual Reports, 1991/92 to 1995/96, online available: 
http://forumsec.org.fj/docs/annua197.htm, 26 December 1998; 
http://forumsec.org.fj/docs/annua196.htm#CorporateServices, 26 
December 1998; Figures for 1995-1997 are estimates. 
Highlighting the growing significance of regionalism in attracting 
aid, the Pacific Program Manager of Britain's Pacific Aid Management 
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Office, Mr. M. MacDonald, in a letter to this author in 1996, noted 
that in the South Pacific the "case for maintaining significant 
bilateral country programmes is weak" and therefore Britain was 
developing "a smaller programme on a regional basis, with the 
objective of maintaining a positive British presence in the region 
as a whole". 442 The fundamental reasons for this change in the 
Bri tish foreign aid to the South Pacific given by Mr. MacDonald 
were: 1) difficulty in reaching agreement with recipient 
government's on the need for and direction of policy reform; 2) lack 
of commitment shown by Pacific governments to policies necessary to 
achieve sustainable development; 3) problems with absorpti ve 
capacity; 4) the inability of Pacific governments to identify 
sufficient quality proj ects; and 5) growing emphasis on providing 
aid to the poorest of the poor countries. 443 Regionalism has a role 
to play in addressing all these problems except for the last one. At 
a time when foreign aid is declining regionalism provides a useful 
vehicle for Vanuatu and the other small states of the South Pacific 
to further rationalise their foreign aid needs by pooling the 
available resources and avoiding wasteful duplication. 
3.30 - Bilateralism - Vanuatu 
Like regionalism and multilateralism, bilateralism has an invaluable 
function to play in the economic development of Vanuatu. The latter 
country, in fulfilling its developmental needs, heavily depends on 
bilateral support in areas such as preferential market access and 
442 Letter dated 20 September 1996, sent by Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, 
Pacific Programme Manager of Britain's Pacific Aid Management 
Office, in response to a letter from this author requesting 
information on Britain's foreign aid policy in the South Pacific. 
443 Ibid. 
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development assistance. The significance of bilateralism in 
contributing towards the economic development related foreign policy 
objectives of Vanuatu, focused in this chapter, is assessed below. 
In the protection of the marine resources bilateralism has not been 
of much importance to Vanuatu. The threat to marine resources is a 
problem faced by all the countries of the region and a regional 
mechanism for minimising this threat is in place. The bilateral 
partners of Vanuatu contribute to this regional mechanism as 
discussed before. 
Table V 
Australian Aid to Regional/Multi-country Programs in the South 
Pacific (A$ million) 
Expenditure Estimate 
92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 
USP 2.9 2.9 4.4 5.3 4.0 -
SPF 5.3 5.5 5.4 4.5 4.5 -
Forum 3.1 3.3 3.9 4.3 4.5 -
Secretariat 
FFA 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.7 -
SPREP 0.0 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.2 -
pther regional 
~ulticountry 15.7 18.6 19.7 21. 9 18.1 -
Total 28.4 32.9 36.3 38.9 33.9 31.1 
Source: AusAID, Australia's Overseas Aid Program 1996-97, Australlan 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1996, p. 30; and AusAID's 
internet page, 14 December 1998, available online: 
http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/general/budget97/b9706. 
html, table 3, 26 April 1999. 
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Bilateralism has been instrumental in gaining preferential market 
access for Vanuatu under the GSP scheme. The product coverage and 
the level of concessions offered under GSP are decided on a case by 
case basis by the country offering preferential market access. 
Bilateral connections with non-European OECD countries enabled 
Vanuatu to gain preferential access to their markets. Japan is one 
of those non-European OECD countries which provides preferential 
access to products from Vanuatu. As evident from figure 2 below, 
Japan was the second most important export market for Vanuatu during 
the past decade. The most important market for Vanuatu's exports 
continues to be the European Union. 
Vanuatu's exports to Japan as a percentage of the country's total 
value of exports, is presently showing a declining trend. Between 
1993 and 1997 Vanuatu's exports to Japan as a percentage of the 
country's total exports declined from a high of around 29 per cent 
to approximately 10 per cent. 444 This was a decline of around US$ 3 
million from a total of approximately US$ 5 million. The Asian 
crisis and competition from lower priced Australian and New Zealand 
beef is largely blamed for this decline in exports to Japan. m While 
Vanuatu still remains the second largest beef exporter to the 
Japanese market there is a need to find new markets not only for 
beef but for other products as well. 446 
The benefit of exploring for potential new markets is clearly 
demonstrated by the sudden explosion in exports from Vanuatu to 
444 Calculated from figures in, Statistics Office, 'Summary of 
Overseas' op. cit., p. 11. 
445 EIU , Country Profile, op. cit., p. 85; 
446 Fax dated 23 March 1999, received by the author from Mr. Maxwell 
Maltok, Senior Trade Officer, Department of Trade Industries and 
Investment, Port Vila, Vanuatu. 
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Bangladesh from 1992 onwards. until then Vanuatu had virtually no 
exports to Bangladesh. Since 1992 Vanuatu's copra exports to 
Bangladesh skyrocketed from a low of around US$ 241, 000 worth in 
1992 to a high of approximately US$ 7 million in 1996. 447 In 1997 the 
value of exports to Bangladesh stood at around US$ 5.2 million which 
represented 17.5 per cent of the total value of the country's 
exports for that year. 448 
until recently Vanuatu did not use its bilateral connections with 
regional countries for the promotion of trade. Grynberg and 
Kabutaulaka have noted that the island states failed to develop 
bilateral trade among themselves based on the assumption that the 
markets of the South Pacific islands are too small. m Several other 
factors such as transportation difficulties between the regional 
island countries, must have contributed to the failure to develop 
strong trading relations between the regional small island states. 
However, the WTO's provision for preferential market access within 
regional groupings makes it important to explore the potential of 
regional markets. 
Faced with stiff competition in traditional markets like Japan, 
Vanuatu concluded a bilateral trade agreement with Fiji in 1998. The 
agreement allows for reciprocal duty free access for some 43 
products including exports from Vanuatu such as beef, kava, vanilla, 
coffee, copra, ginger and timber. 450 The effectiveness of this 
agreement is yet to be tested. 
447 Statistics Office, SUirunary of Overseas Trade, op. cit., p. 1l. 
448 Ibid. 
449 Grynberg and Kabutaulaka, 'The Political Economy', op. cit., p. 
53. 
450Customs and Excise Dept., 'Customs & Excise Public Notice no. 11 
of 1988: Fiji-Vanuatu Bilateral Trade Agreement (Code 122C)', Suva, 
17 November 1998, the document was made available to the author by 
the Fiji Trade and Investment Board, Suva. 
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Australia and New Zealand are among the most valued bilateral 
partners of Vanuatu in the South Pacific. Expressing how much 
Vanuatu values the relationship with these two countries, Prime 
Minister Vohor in his statement to the Japan-South Pacific Forum 
Nation summit of 1997, noted that "any framework of co-operation 
should be conceived in such a way that it does not jeopardise the 
existing development programmes and the development partnership we 
currently enjoy with our regional neighbours, particularly Australia 
and New Zealand, but it should rather reinforce them in a 
complementary manner". 451 However, Australia and New Zealand have not 
been very significant for Vanuatu as export markets. As mentioned 
before, the value of Vanuatu's exports to Australia did not climb 
over the US$ 2.5 million mark in any given year during the past 
decade. 452 In 1997 the value of Vanuatu's exports to Australia was 
just 2.3 percent of the total value of the country's exports. 453 The 
value of exports to New Zealand from Vanuatu remained very low at 
around a total of US$1.5 million between 1987 and 1997. 454 In 1997 
the value of Vanuatu's exports to New Zealand was around 1 percent 
of the total value of the country's exports, which stood at 
approximately US$ 28 million. 455 
451 statement by Prime Minister Vohor, on the occasion of the 
Japan-South Pacific Forum Nation Summit, op. cit. 
452 See Figure II. 
453 Calculated from figures in, Statistics Office, Summary of 
Overseas Trade, op. cit., p. 11. 
454 Ibid. 
455 Ibid. 
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Figure 2 
Vanuatu's Exports by Main Destinations (US$ millions) 
4 
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Source: Calculated from statistics in, statistics Office, Summary of 
Overseas Trade Statistics, Annual Report 1997, op. cit., p. 11. 
The setting up of a free trade area in the South Pacific, presently 
under consideration, is not likely to improve Vanuatu's trade with 
Australia or New Zealand. Vanuatu already has duty free access to 
the Australian and New Zealand markets under SPARTECA. Therefore, 
unless Vanuatu is able to come up with new or competitive products, 
the country will not be able to take advantage of the Australian and 
New Zealand markets. In developing new products Vanuatu could 
possibly calIon the financial and technical assistance of Australia 
and New Zealand as it has done in the past. For example, the ginger 
and sweet corn exports from Vanuatu to New Zealand, which began in 
1997, were made possible with New Zealand's financial and technical 
assistance. 456 
456 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand 
Development Assistance: Annual Review 1997, Wellington, 
52. 
Official 
1997, p. 
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Bilateralism has also been of some importance to Vanuatu in trying 
to ensure that the country is not prematurely graduated from the 
United Nations' list of LDCs. New Zealand's representative at the 
Economic and Social Council of the united Nations, Michael Powles, 
for example, argued that his delegation was disappointed with the 
1997 decision of the Committee for Development Planning, to graduate 
Vanuatu with immediate effect, when there was growing evidence that 
vulnerability was a crucial limiting factor in the achievement of 
sustainable development. 457 Such support was important in the 
postponement of Vanuatu's graduation to the year 2000. 
One of the most important foreign policy objectives of Vanuatu, like 
all other small island states, is obtaining development assistance 
and bilateralism was invaluable for this purpose. There have been 
times in Vanuatu's history when other foreign policy objectives such 
as decolonisation or assertion of sovereignty were accorded priority 
over aid. Nevertheless these instances were short-lived and foreign 
aid re-assumed its predominant position in the foreign policy of 
Vanuatu. In 1980, for example, Vanuatu wanted to allow the New 
Caledonian Kanak independence movement to set up a 'Provisional 
Government' in Vila, but when France warned that it would cut off 
aid if that step was taken, Lini government changed its mind. 458 In 
another incident in 1987 Vanuatu expelled the French ambassador 
prompting France to reduce aid to the country. Before long the Lini-
government sought to normalise relations with France, most 
importantly because Vanuatu needed French aid. In a press statement 
in 1990 Lini announced that he wanted the French ambassador 
reinstalled in Vila, emphasising the prospective importance of 
457 United Nations, Press Release ECOSOC/5788, 23 July 1988. 
458 Henningham, The Pacific Island states, op. cit., p. 39. 
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French aid. 459 since then relations between France and Vanuatu did 
not deteriorate to such a low level. 
In 1991 the pro-French UMP came to power in Vanuatu. Thus French aid 
to the country was increased drastically. Between 1991 and 1994 
France increased its aid from US$ 6.14 million to US$ 9.36 
million. 460 However this increment was short-lived. France 
discouraged unrealistic expectations of large increases in aid and 
encouraged UMP to look for aid from New Zealand and Australia. 461 
Presently France provides Vanuatu approximately US$ 3.7 million in 
aid. 462 This is a significant amount for a small island state like 
Vanuatu. 
Australia has been one of the most important bilateral partners of 
Vanuatu in the area of development co-operation. As such Vanuatu has 
tried to maintain close relations with Australia. However there have 
been a couple of times when friction developed between the two 
countries, like in 1987 when Vanuatu banned Australian military 
vessels from entering its territory. In this instance relations were 
quickly patched up and it did not affect foreign aid. Similarly in 
1991 Korman ordered the Australian Acting High Commissioner to leave 
the country and relations cooled between the two countries for a 
couple of months. However, relations did not deteriorate to such an 
extent that foreign aid was affected. 
459 Ibid., p. 40. 
460 United Nations Homepage, 1996, online available: 
gopher://gopher.un.org/00/esc/cn17/1996/backgrnd/donor.txt, 13 
December 1998. 
461 Ibid. p. 41. 
462 Interview with Mr. Mundo, op. cit. 
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During the period 1993 to 1996 Australia provided Vanuatu with 
approximately A$ 41 million in assistance. 463 The 1997/98 Australian 
aid program to Vanuatu was A$ 12.5 million. These funds together 
with at least an additional 1 million from the AusAID Policy and 
Management Reform Fund were aimed at contributing towards the needs 
identified in the Comprehensive Reform Program (CRP) of Vanuatu 
geared towards meeting the challenges of the changing global trading 
environment. 
Vanuatu has also had very close relations with New Zealand. The 
assistance from New Zealand to Vanuatu between 1993 and 1996 
totalled approximately NZ$ 17 million. 464 This contribution was quite 
substantial given the fact that the total aid received by Vanuatu 
during the above period amounted to a total of US$ 195 million. 465 .In 
1997 and 1998 New Zealand provided Vanuatu with assistance amounting 
to US$ 2.9 million and US$ 3.1 million respectively. 466 New Zealand 
has also allocated NZ$ 250,000 towards the CRP of Vanuatu, over and 
above its 1997/98 bilateral program. 
Both Japan and the United Kingdom have also been very useful 
bilateral partners for Vanuatu. The united Kingdom, as mentioned 
463 Australia r s Overseas Aid Program 1995-96: Budget 
No.2, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
AusAID internet 
http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/spac/Vanuatu.pdf. 
1998. 
Rela ted Paper 
1995, p. 25; 
page, 
14 December 
464 Calculated from statistics in, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, New Zealand Official Development Assistance, op. cit., p. 
52. 
465 'Table 33. Total Net ODA from DAC Countries, Multilateral 
Organisations and Arab Countries to Developing Countries and 
Territories', Development Assistance Committee's internet page: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/htm/table33.htm. 14 December 1998. 
466 Calculated from statistics provided to author by Mr. Odo Tevi, 
Assistant Macro Economist, Statistics Office, during a meeting in 
Port Vila on 3 February 1999. Mr. Tevi cautioned that there might 
be slight errors in some of the figures he provided and mentioned 
that his office was presently in the process of verifying the 
accuracy of the figures. 
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before, had colonial ties with Vanuatu, and had been providing 
assistance even after independence. However British aid to Vanuatu 
has been on the decline over the past decade. In 1990/91 Britain's 
aid to Vanuatu stood at £ 6 million. 467 This figure declined to £ 1. 3 
million in 1995/96 and further decreased to £862,000 in 1997/98. The 
decline in British ODA, as noted earlier, was because the case for 
maintaining a high level of aid was weak due to factors such as 
problems with absorptive capacity, identifying quality projects and 
the lack of commitment of island governments to policies necessary 
for sustainable development. The increasing hardship facing small 
island states owing to the changing global trading environment is 
likely to strengthen the case for increasing foreign aid to Vanuatu. 
Japan is another very significant aid donor to Vanuatu. Between 1990 
and 1994, for example, Japan provided Vanuatu approximately US$ 
44.07 million in foreign aid. 46B From 1995-1997 an additional US$12.3 
million was provided by Japan as assistance. 469 This is quite a 
significant amount of assistance from a country which did not have 
any colonial or historical ties with Vanuatu. Maintaining good 
bilateral relations with Japan is therefore important in trying to 
ensure that the flow of foreign aid continues. 
China is the other maj or bilateral aid donor to Vanuatu. Chinese 
assistance to Vanuatu over the past decade varied. In 1992 China 
provided approximately US$O. 5 million. 470 In 1994 the aid received 
467 Fax dated 12 September 1996 from the Aid Management Office of 
the British High Commission in Port Vila, to the author; and 
information provided to the author by Mr. Nick Duggin, Programme 
Support Officer of the British High Commission, during a meeting 
on 5 February 1999, in Port Vila. 
468 Economic Cooperation Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Japan (ed.), Japans ODA Annual Report 1995, Association for 
Promotion of International Cooperation, Tokyo, 1996, p. 484. 
469 Calculated from statistics provided by Mr. Odo Tevi, op. cit. 
470 Ibid. 
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from China increased to US$ 6.4 million and dropped back to 
approximately US$ 1.35 million in 1998. More details of Chinese aid 
to Vanuatu was not available to this author. 
Overall, bilateral sources provide much more aid to Vanuatu than 
multilateral sources. Between 1992 and 1995, for example, the aid 
received by Vanuatu from major multilateral sources such as the 
Uni ted Nations Agencies, European Union, World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank totalled approximately US$7.1 million. 471 During the 
same period bilateral sources provided Vanuatu with approximately 
US$ 258 million in assistance. 472 Reliable information on the 
assistance received by Vanuatu from all the bilateral and 
multilateral sources, for the period 1996-1998, was not available to 
this author. 
3.3d - Regionalism - The Maldives 
The significance of regionalism to the economic development of the 
Maldives has been limited compared to Vanuatu's experience. The most 
important reason for this is the difference between the Maldives and 
the rest of the regional countries reflected in their economic 
needs. The effectiveness of regionalism in furthering the economic 
development related foreign policy objectives of the Maldives is 
assessed below. 
A number of issues of importance to small island states such as the 
conservation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, or the 
471 Calculated from figures in a paper entitled 'The Role and Impact 
of Aid in Vanuatu' presented by D.J.E. Smith, Adviser, National 
Planning Office, to Vanuatu Certificate in Financial Management and 
Accountancy course, 6 November 1997, a copy of the document was 
made available to the author by Mr. Tevi, op. cit. 
472 Ibid. 
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protection of EEZs from poaching, have not received attention within 
the SAARC framework. Moreover, SAARC has not had the benefit of 
time, compared to regionalism in the South Pacific, to develop into 
a useful mechanism for the economic development of regional 
countries. Regionalism in South Asia is also constrained by 
financial limitations. 
Consequently, the benefits of SAARC to the Maldives have been very 
limited. In the area of economic development related services only a 
very few are provided to member states through the organisation. 
SAARC for example, maintains and disseminates databases on trade, 
investment, and trade control measures both within and outside the 
region. 473 The SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI) 
organises regional trade fairs which enable South Asian states to 
introduce their products to the regional business community. 
However, as figure 3 below demonstrates these fairs have not been of 
much use to the Maldives. 
The most ambitious step taken by the South Asian countries in the 
area of enhancing regional trade was the South Asia Preferential 
Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) signed in 1993. This agreement provided 
the framework for gradual or step by step elimination of barriers to 
intra-regional trade "in such a manner that the countries of the 
region share the benefits of trade expansion equi tably" . 474 The 
agreement attempted to avoid controversy by allowing each member 
country to decide the trade concessions it wishes to exchange with 
each of the other countries. The agreement provided for safeguard 
measures and balance of payment measures that could be activated by 
473 SAARC Homepage, 3 May 1998, online available: http://www.south-
asia.com/saarc/data.htm, 25 December 1998. 
474 'Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA)', 
preamble. 
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any contracting party to protect itself from the negative impact of 
trade liberalisation. This approach was realistic given the 
persistence of a number of contentious bilateral issues and the 
disparities between the regional economies. 
The framework agreement on SAPTA also contained provisions for the 
special treatment of least developed states in areas such as duty 
free access; deeper tariff preferences for exports; removal of non-
tariff and where appropriate para-tariff barriers; negotiation of 
long-term contracts with a view to assisting the achievement of 
reasonable levels of sustainable exports of their products; special 
consideration in the application of safeguard measures; and greater 
flexibility for LDCs to impose restrictions on imports in critical 
circumstances. 475 Such provisions are very important for the Maldives 
due to its vulnerability. 
The SAPTA entered into force in 1995. The operationalisation of 
SAPTA was a sign of SAARC's potential for more substantial regional 
trade co-operation in the future. Under SAPTA three rounds of trade 
negotiations have already been held. The Ninth SAARC Summit held in 
Male' decided to deepen and widen tariff cuts while simultaneously 
removing non-tariff barriers and structural impediments so as to 
quickly move towards the goal of establishing a South Asia Free 
Trade Area (SAFTA). 476 SAARC leaders at the Summit recognised the 
importance of achieving the goal of SAFTA by the year 2001. This 
recognition was reiterated at the Tenth SAARC Summit held in Colombo 
in 1998. 
475 Ibid., Article 10. 
476 'The Declaration of the Ninth SAARC Summit', 14 May 1997, Male', 
a copy of the document was made available to the author by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Male'. 
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Despite the significance of SAPTA as an important step in regional 
co-operation in South Asia in general, the value of trade 
liberalisation to the Maldives is not clear yet. A detailed study of 
the impact and potential impact of SAPTA and SAFTA respectively, 
have not been undertaken. Available statistics on trade demonstrate 
that the Maldives' imports from the region were rising even prior to 
the SAPTA and that the trend is continuing today. Between 1993 and 
1997 imports from South Asian countries to the Maldives rose from 
approximately US$ 27 million to US $ 72 million. 477 However, the 
value of Maldives' exports to the region remained constant from the 
pre-SAPTA period. Between 1993 and 1997 the exports of the Maldives 
to South Asia fluctuated between approximately US$ 9.5 million and 
11 million. The reason for this lies in the fact that the Maldives 
presently does not have sufficient and appropriate export products 
to take advantage of the SAPTA concessions. Moreover, the major 
export products of the Maldives such as garments and canned tuna 
have not received concessions under SAPTA. 
A number of factors suggest that SAFTA will also not be of much 
benefit to the Maldives presently. One reason is the potential loss 
in government revenue due to trade liberalisation. Presently import 
duties constitute approximately one third of the Maldives' 
government revenue. 478 Approximately one fifth of the value of duties 
received by the government is generated from imports from the 
region. m Thus it is estimated that the Maldives stands to lose 
around US$ 8.5 million per year in the first few years of the next 
century if all tariffs on regional imports are eliminated under 
477 MPHRE, statistical Yearbook of the Maldives 1998, MPHRE, 1998, 
pp. 188, 202. 
478 Ibid., p. 163. 
479 Ibid., pp. 187-190. 
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SAFTA. 480 This loss will be quite a burden for a small island state 
like the Maldives. Thus, the Maldives will be forced to activate the 
safeguard measures which are expected to be a part of the agreement 
unless the country manages to increase its exports to the region to 
compensate for the loss. 
Figure 3 
Regional Imports and Exports of the Maldives from 1993-1997 
(US$ millions) 
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Source: Calculated from statistics in MPHRE, statistical Yearbook of 
Maldives 1995, op. cit., pp. 185-87, 198; MPHRE, statistical 
Yearbook of the Maldives 1998, MPHRE, 1998, pp. 188 & 202. 
The ability of Maldives to take advantage of preferential access to 
regional markets is not very promising at least in the short term as 
480 Information provided to the author by an Official of the 
Ministry of Finance of the Maldives, Male', 26 February 1999. 
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demonstrated by the performance of the country's exports under 
SAPTA. Being a small island state with a narrow resource base, the 
exports of Maldives are few with canned tuna being the main export 
product. Unfortunately there is not much demand in the regional 
countries for this product. Attempts by the Maldives to market 
canned tuna in Sri Lanka for example, has not proved very 
successful. 481 In the long-run however, the Maldives might be able to 
take advantage of some niches within the large potential markets of 
the SAARC region. 
The effectiveness of regionalism for the Maldives in obtaining 
development assistance has also been very limited. The developmental 
needs of the Maldives shaped by its unique geography are different 
from the rest of the regional countries. These differences limit the 
benefits to the Maldives of development assistance received by 
SAARC. For example, a regional study on land transport funded by 
foreign aid will be very useful to all the South Asian countries 
except the Maldives. This is because the land area of the islands of 
the country are so small that motor vehicles are very rare except in 
Male', and related infrastructure like railways, and bridges common 
to other countries of South Asia do not exist in the Maldives. As 
such, the Maldives is keen to ensure that foreign aid provided to 
SAARC does not in any way interfere with the country's bilateral aid 
program. 
Moreover, SAARC's effectiveness in attracting foreign aid has been 
very limited. A SAARC-Japan Special Fund was set-up in 1993 under 
which Japan has provided US$ 500,000 for the activities of the 
organisation. This Fund has been useful in supplementing the 
481 Fax from MIFCO, op. cit. 
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financial commitments of member states in organising SAARC 
activities and programs. 482 A South Asia Development Fund (SADF) has 
also been formally established in 1996 for the purpose of 
"mobilising global surpluses for the development of South Asia". 483 
This fund brought under its umbrella two earlier SAARC funds namely 
SAARC Fund for Regional Projects (SFRP) and the SAARC Regional Fund 
(SRF). SADF aims to contribute to regional development in the 
following areas: a) identification of development projects; b) 
institutional and human resource development projects; and c) social 
and infrastructure development projects. To date the Fund has 
financed feasibility studies for 13 projects. 
SAARC has signed Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with a number 
of international organisations including UNCTAD, Asia Pacific 
Telecommunity (APT), European Community (EC), and ESCAP. These MOUs 
provide for co-operation and assistance in the development of South 
Asia region. Under the MOU with UNCTAD, for example, SAARC receives 
updated copies of its Trade Analysis and Information Systems 
(TRAINS) on a regular basis. The MOU with ESCAP provides for co-
operation on development issues through joint studies, workshops 
seminars and exchange of information and documentation on poverty 
alleviation, human resource development, trade promotion, foreign 
direct investment, and so on. The benefits of these MOUs to the 
Maldives have been very modest. Through the MOU with ESCAP for 
instance the Maldives has received technical assistance for the 
alignment of trade documents, and a trade documentation software for 
the Maldives is being developed. 
482 Y. K. Silwal, Secretary General of SAARC, 'SAARC: the First 
Decade' f 3 May 1998, online available: http://www.south-
asi;.com/saarc/1.htm, 25 December 1998. 
483 SAARC Secretariat, 'SAARC - A Profile', online available: 
http://www.south-asia.com/saarc/c7.htm#1. 5 January 1999. 
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At the Tenth SAARC Summit held in colombo in 1998, member countries 
decided to harness the rich intellectual capacity of South Asia for 
the purpose of collective intervention in international negotiations 
to safeguard South Asian interests and to develop some edge for 
effective leverage in such negotiations. 484 The process of convening 
of a network of researchers comprising of members of the Private 
Sector, Central Banks, Planning Ministries, Research Institutes and 
eminent economists nominated by Governments to identify, analyse and 
help SAARC face up to current global financial and economic 
developments affecting the region, is now underway. 485 As in the 
cases discussed earlier, the relevance of the above exercise to the 
Maldives will probably be limited because of the vast differences 
between its economy and those of the other South Asian states. 
Unless the network of researchers focus specifically on the 
challenges facing small island states, the exercise will not be of 
much use to the Maldives. 
3.3e - Bilateralism - The Maldives 
The Maldives has diplomatic relations with a large number of 
countries as mentioned earlier. Yet, not all of these countries have 
been of much use to the Maldives in the area of promoting its 
economic development related interests. It is the aim of this 
section to assess the significance of bilateralism in contributing 
towards the foreign policy objectives of the country in the area of 
economic development. 
484 'The Declaration of the Tenth SAARC Summit', Colombo, 31 July 
1998, a copy of the document was made available to the author by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Male'. 
485 Ibid. 
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Bilateralism has been of little importance to the Maldives in the 
protection of the country's marine resources. One of the threats to 
the marine resources of the country is the incidence of poaching. 
Qui te a number of foreign fishing vessels which are caught for 
illegal fishing within the Maldives' EEZ are from sri Lanka. Since 
the Maldives is not in a position to adequately police its EEZ and 
given the lack of a multilateral or regional mechanism to deal with 
the issue of poaching, bilateralism continues to be one of the few 
options for the Maldives to deal with the problem. As such, the 
Maldives approached the Sri Lankan authorities in 1994 for a 
solution to the problem of poaching. In response Sri Lanka promised 
to educate its own fisherman about international regulations 
governing such issues and to dissuade them from engaging in 
poaching. Since then the number of Sri Lankan vessels caught dropped 
from 14 in 1994 to 5 in 1997. 486 However, poaching in the EEZs of the 
Maldives still continues today. 
The contribution of bilateralism to the economic development of the 
Maldives has been particularly important in the areas of trade and 
aid. Until the early 1970s Sri Lanka was the single most important 
\ 
country in terms of imports and exports of the Maldives. 487 The 
significance of Sri Lanka to the Maldives was demonstrated by the 
fact that Colombo was the only foreign capital in which Male' had a 
diplomatic mission until the 1980s. 
The dependence on a single bilateral partner for imports and exports 
was however risky. Prior to the 1980s Maldive fish (dried tuna), 
486 This statistic was provided to the author by the Legal and 
Consular Affairs Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Maldives, September 1998. 
487 Phadnis and Lui thui, Winds of Change, op. cit., p. 78. 
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considered a delicacy in Sri Lanka, was the only export of the 
Maldives and the most important source of foreign exchange for the 
country.488 In 1971 sri Lanka began to curb the import of Maldive 
fish due to foreign exchange problems, demonstrating the danger of 
depending on a single country for trade. 
The restrictions imposed on the Maldives' exports to Sri Lanka led 
the former to look for alternative markets and products. In 1981 the 
trade agreement between Sri Lanka and the Maldives was renewed and 
sri Lanka offered to buy dried fish at a higher price. 489 However, by 
then Sri Lanka had lost its dominance in the Maldives' trade, 
although the former still remained among the top three export 
destinations of the Maldives. 
The exports from the Maldives to Sri Lanka reached an all time high 
of US$ 12.24 million in 1994. Since then the value of exports from 
the Maldives to Sri Lanka has remained fairly constant as evident 
from figure 4 below. In 1997 the value of exports from the Maldives 
to Sri Lanka was approximately US$ 11.9 million. 
Presently there is a bilateral arrangement between the Maldives and 
Sri Lanka, facilitated under SAPTA, for concessional export and 
import of a number of goods between the two countries. However, the 
agreement does not seem to have had an impact on the Maldives' 
exports. Most of the local exports such as dried fish or canned fish 
are either not covered within the products for which concessions 
have been offered, or the concessions received were not enough to 
have a major impact on trade. Even importers of products from 
488 Government of the Maldives, Maldives and its Development 
Partners, op. cit., p. 15. 
489r bid. 
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regional countries do not seem be utilising the benefits under SAPTA 
due to the long and arduous procedures involved and the time wasted 
for clearing the goods. 
In 1984, a Sri Lanka-Maldives Joint commission was set up with the 
hope of enhancing economic and technical co-operation between the 
two countries. So far six sessions of the Commission have been held. 
However, the Maldives does not seem to have benefited much from the 
Commission as far as the country's exports to Sri Lanka are 
concerned. 
A Sub-Commission on Fisheries was set up in 1995, under the Joint 
Commission, for the purpose of co-operation between the two 
countries. This Sub-Commission has not made any sUbstantial progress 
because of the differences in interest between the Maldivian and the 
Sri Lankan sides. As such the achievements of the Sub-Commission 
have been limited to those such as study tours. 
India is the other South Asian country that has been of some 
significance, although limited, for Maldives' exports. Although the 
exports from the Maldives to India are increasing the income 
generated is still very low. The trade arrangement under the SAPTA 
has not been very effective in stimulating a significant level of 
exports. From 1987 to 1997, exports from the Maldives to India grew 
from US$ 12,000 to approximately US$ 145,000. 490 The Maldives will 
have to identify a niche in the Indian market to cater to if it is 
to increase exports to India. Such a niche could prove very 
profitable given the size of the Indian market. GATT/WTO rules allow 
490 MPHRE, Statistical Yearbook of the Maldives 1998, op. cit. f p. 
312. 
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for sub-regional preferential arrangements that the Maldives could 
exploit in increasing exports to India. 
Figure 4 
Exports of the Maldives by Major Destinations from 1993-1997 
(U8$ millions) 
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Source: MPHRE, statistical Yearbook of the Maldives, 1995,1997 and 
1998, pp. 198,214 and 202 respectively. 
In 1995 the united Kingdom became the dominant export market for 
products from the Maldives. Exports from the Maldives to the united 
Kingdom has been growing steadily from US$ 8,000 in 1984. 491 Between 
the latter date and 1997 the value of exports from the Maldives to 
the united Kingdom increased by almost 2000 fold to US$15.9 
million. 492 Most of these exports consisted of frozen and canned tuna 
and other marine products. 
491 MPHRE, statistical Yearbook of the Maldives 1993, MPHRE, Male', 
1993, p. 289. 
492 MPHRE, Statistical Yearbook 1998, op. cit., p. 202. 
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The exports of the Maldives to the united Kingdom are facilitated by 
the tax concessions the former receives under the GSP scheme. 
Presently marine products exported from the Maldives to the united 
Kingdom do not have any tariffs imposed on them. As mentioned 
earlier, unless preferential treatment is received, the Maldives' 
will find it very difficult to compete in the European and other 
OECD markets. 
The other main export markets of the Maldives include the united 
states, Japan, Germany, singapore, and Thailand. Of these countries 
the united states is a member of the OECD just like Japan and 
Germany, but does not offer preferential treatment under GSP to 
products from the Maldives. The United States, in 1995, withdrew 
concessions for the Maldives under GSP due to dissatisfaction over 
labour rights in the country. The withdrawal of GSP by the united 
States demonstrates the danger of dependence on bilateral 
arrangements which are left to the whim of individual nations. 
Efforts by the Maldives to convince the united states that the 
labour conditions in the country are much better than most 
countries; the average salary received by unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers are higher than in other countries of the region; and that 
there is no gender discrimination or child labour in the Maldives 
unlike in a large number of other countries; have not yet been 
successful in regaining preferential treatment under GSP. 
Despite the withdrawal of GSP the Maldives managed to continue 
exporting garments to the united states. Garments from the Maldives 
were competitive without GSP because the investors in the garment 
industry were fairly well established companies. Some of these 
companies were engaged in the apparel distribution business within 
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the united states. These companies invested in the Maldives, which 
presently has only six garment factories, to take advantage of the 
country's quota for garments in the united states' market. This 
quota is presently under threat as the United states plans to phase 
out MFA by the end of 2005. Bilateralism has a very significant role 
to play in trying to ensure that the Maldives receives some form of 
preferential treatment or competitive advantage so that the garment 
industry in the country could survive. 
As figure 4 demonstrates, the exports of the Maldives to its major 
markets are growing. This includes markets such as Japan, Germany, 
Singapore and Thailand, discussed above. Of these markets the 
Maldives enjoys preferential treatment under GSP in Japan and 
Germany. In 1998 Maldives' exports to all these countries were 
marine products with the exception of approximately US$ 2.18 million 
worth of garments which went to Germany. 493 Although the Maldives' 
products do not enjoy GSP in Singapore and Thailand, taxes imposed 
on these exports are very low since the Maldives is a LDC. 
Trade liberalisation under GATT/WTO and the erosion of preferences 
offered by developed countries are bound to have a negative effect 
on the exports of the Maldives to the OECD markets at least in the 
short-term. This means that the effectiveness of bilateralism in 
keeping the exports of the Maldives competitive in the international 
market is under threat. WTO rules do not allow for discriminatory 
bilateral arrangements. However, until such time when such bilateral 
arrangements in the area of trade are disallowed, bilateralism has 
an important role to play in enhancing the foreign trade of the 
Maldives. 
493 Ibid. 
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Some of the countries that did not prove too useful as export 
markets have been very important for the Maldives in contributing 
towards the economic development related foreign policy objective of 
enhancing development co-operation or maximising foreign aid. India, 
for example, has not been a major export market for the Maldives, 
yet it has been very important in the area of development co-
operation. India has been assisting the Maldives since the 1970s. 
Between 1989 and 1993 Indian assistance to the Maldives increased 
from US$ 1.5 million to US$12. 8 million. 494 This large increase was 
due to the construction of a Indian sponsored hospital in the 
Maldives. 
Some of the other regional countries such as Pakistan have also 
provided a substantial amount of assistance to the Maldives over the 
years. Between 1994 and 1998 Pakistan provided the Maldives with 
assistance worth approximately US$ 3.7 million. This was a 
substantial amount for a small island state like the Maldives, made 
possible through its bilateral connections. 
Since 1993 Japan overtook India as the number one aid donor to the 
Maldives. Between 1990 and 1998 Japan provided the Maldives 
approximately US$ 94.5 million in grant aid. 495 In 1998 alone Japan 
provided US$ 11.5 million in assistance. 
The other major bilateral aid donors to the Maldives include 
Australia and Germany. In 1998 for example, Australia provided 
around US$ 1.2 million in grant aid. The same year Germany provided 
494 UNDP, Development Cooperation: Maldives, UNDP, Male', 1994, 
p.ll. 
495 Information provided to the author by the Department of External 
Resources of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Male', 1992. 
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US$ 0.67 million and Pakistan US$ 0.7 million. 496 At a time when aid 
flows are declining, bilateralism has a very important role to play 
in ensuring that the Maldives receives enough aid to meet the 
developmental needs of the country. 
Bilateral relations have also been important to the Maldives in 
obtaining assistance from various multilateral sources of the Middle 
East. Since President Gayoom came to power, Maldives established 
very close relations with Arab countries through bilateral channels 
and membership in organisations such as the OIC. These connections 
enabled the Maldives to gain concessional loans and grants from Arab 
financial institutions such as the Kuwait Fund, Saudi Fund and the 
Islamic Development Bank. In 1997 for instance the Maldives received 
US$0.3 million as grant aid and US$0.9 million as concessional loan 
from Kuwait Fund, US$ 3.5 million as loan from the Islamic 
Development Bank and US$ 0.46 million as loan from the Saudi Fund. 497 
Overall, bilateralism has been invaluable to the Maldives in gaining 
development assistance. In 1997 for instance, three fourths of the 
approximately US$ 16 million received by the country as grant aid 
were from bilateral sources. Further, more than one third of all 
assistance received by the country in 1997, which amounted to US$ 
33.24 million, was from bilateral sources. Thus bilateralism 
continues to be the most useful strategy in contributing towards the 
Maldives' foreign policy objective of maximising foreign aid. 
496 Ibid. 
497 Ibid. 
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3.4- Conclusions 
In the area of economic development the foreign policy strategies of 
multilateralism, regionalism and bilateralism had varying degrees of 
importance in contributing towards the different obj ecti ves in the 
two countries. This section will assess the significance of these 
strategies with respect to the objectives of Vanuatu and the 
Maldives. 
In the case of Vanuatu, multilateralism and regionalism were 
important in the protection of resources. On the issue of driftnet 
fishing, the momentum for the fight against this wasteful fishing 
method was built at the regional level. However, it was with the 
support of the international community through multilateral 
organisations that a moratorium was placed on driftnet fishing. 
Regionalism also contributed to the protection of resources as 
demonstrated by the regional mechanism for monitoring and 
surveillance of the EEZ of Vanuatu. As a result of this mechanism to 
which Vanuatu's bilateral partners such as Australia and France 
contribute, bilateralism itself did not prove of much use for the 
protection of marine resources. 
In minimising the effects of vulnerabilities and the promotion of 
trade Vanuatu has been reaping the benefits of preferential access 
to the OECD markets through arrangements at the multilateral level 
such as the Lome Convention. Presently a large proportion of 
Vanuatu's trade is with OEeD countries. However, the preferential 
treatment enjoyed by Vanuatu and other small island states is now 
under threat due to global trade liberalisation. This calls for 
collecti ve action by all concerned states in trying to retain or 
receive some form of preferential treatment in market access. Such 
collective action by a large number of states can only take place 
through multilateral organisations. This highlights the continuing 
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importance of multilateralism for the foreign policy of small 
states. 
The erosion of the profit margins enjoyed by small states due to 
global trade liberalisation also highlights the importance of 
regionalism for Vanuatu. The country has to seek regional or 
bilateral arrangements to minimise the negative impact of global 
trade liberalisation on its economy. SPF is exploring the potential 
benefits of a regional free trade area. However, existing regional 
arrangements such as SPARTECA have not proved very useful for 
Vanuatu. 
Vanuatu is trying to complement its effort at the regional and 
multilateral levels with bilateral trade arrangements. A bilateral 
trade agreement has already been signed with Fiji. Vanuatu still 
needs to explore the potential benefits of strengthening trade 
relations with other regional countries. 
In the fight against premature 
Vanuatu found the support of 
graduation from the LDC category 
small island states and other 
sympathetic states very useful. With the support of these states 
through organisations such as the Commonwealth and the united 
Nations, Vanuatu has now managed to defer graduation until the year 
2000 by which time a vulnerability index is expected to be 
formulated. The SPF has also decided to work to ensure that Vanuatu 
is not prematurely graduated. 
In contributing towards the 
bilateral partners proved to 
objective 
be the 
of maximising 
most useful 
foreign aid 
for Vanuatu. 
Regional countries such as Australia and New Zealand and others such 
as France, Japan and the united Kingdom have been very significant 
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in terms of the aid they provide to Vanuatu. Regionalism has also 
been useful in gaining foreign aid since the activities of regional 
organisations in the South Pacific are underwritten by assistance 
from external sources. Multilateral arrangements such as the Lome 
Convention have also realised aid for the country. However, there is 
a declining trend in the overall aid offered by DAC countries in 
general and the amount received by Vanuatu. Thus, Vanuatu has to 
work at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels in trying to 
retain the present level of foreign aid if not increase it. 
In the case of the Maldives too multilateralism was important in 
minimising vulnerabilities and the promotion of trade. The Maldives 
has found multilateral forums such as the Commonwealth and the 
United Nations useful in drawing international attention to the 
problems faced by small states. Further, multilateralism is very 
important for the Maldives in trying to retain some form of 
preferential treatment despite trade liberalisation. 
Regionalism has not been very useful to the Maldives in contributing 
towards any of the economic development related objectives. Despite 
SAPTA, Maldives' exports to regional countries have not improved. It 
is doubtful whether the proposed SAFTA will be of much use in the 
short term. 
The Maldives receives most of its foreign aid through bilateral 
partners. In this respect regional countries such as India and non-
regional states such as Japan and Germany have been important. The 
connection with Arab countries forged bilaterally and through 
organisations such as the OIC have been helpful in obtaining aid 
from certain Arab countries and financial institutions. 
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In the protection of resources, multilateralism and regionalism have 
not been very important for the Maldives. A multilateral arrangement 
for the monitoring and surveillance of the EEZs of small island 
states is still not in place. Regionalism is also not conducive for 
the Maldives to gain assistance in the protection of resources since 
contentious and bilateral issues are excluded from the ambit of 
SAARC. Bilateralism is the only option for the Maldives to seek 
assistance in protecting its marine resources. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION 
4.1 - Introduction 
Growing international concern over the deteriorating global 
environment led issues related to environmental protection to move 
from low politics to the centre stage of high politics during the 
past couple of decades. 498 The World Commission on Environment and 
Development, popularly known as the Brundtland Commission, for 
instance noted that the present day environmental trends are 
threatening to radically alter our planet, endangering the survival 
of a number of species upon it including the human species. 499 There 
is no other group of countries that face this threat more seriously 
than small island states such as the Maldives and Vanuatu. As 
President Gayoom noted at the Global Conference on Sustainable 
Development of Small Island Developing States in 1994, environmental 
degradation threatens to "expose all Small Island Developing States 
to unimaginable dangers". 500 This process has already begun and has 
placed environment protection among the foreign policy priorities of 
both the Maldives and Vanuatu. 
498 A useful discussion of how environmental issues entered the 
political, economic and security agendas of the international 
community is in, C. Thomas, The Environment in International 
Rela tions, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 
1992, pp. 21-54. 
499 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common 
Future, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, p. 2. 
500 President Gayoom, statement delivered on behalf of the Group of 
Eminent Persons on the Sustainable Development of Small Island 
Developing States, Bridgetown, 21 April 1994, a copy of the 
statement was made available to the author by the Permanent Mission 
of the Maldives to the United Nations. 
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Over the past twelve years or so the Maldives and Vanuatu shared a 
number of foreign policy objectives in contributing towards their 
goal of environment protection. Some of the most significant of 
these objectives have been selected for use in this chapter. It is 
the aim of this chapter to assess the significance or the 
effectiveness of multilateralism, regionalism and bilateralism in 
realising the foreign policy objectives of Vanuatu and the Maldives 
noted in section 4.2. 
This chapter is divided into four parts or sections. The first 
section or section 4.1 is the introduction. The second section or 
section 4.2 discusses the shared foreign policy objectives of 
Vanuatu and the Maldives in their fight against the deteriorating 
global environment. This will be followed by section 4.3 that 
attempts to assess the foreign policy actions of Vanuatu and the 
Maldives at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels in 
contributing towards their foreign policy objectives. Since the 
foreign policy actions of Vanuatu and the Maldives at the 
multilateral level largely overlap, they are discussed jointly in 
section 4.3a. sections 4.3b and 4.3c will attempt to assess the 
foreign policy actions of Vanuatu at the regional and bilateral 
levels respectively. A similar exercise with respect to the Maldives 
will be carried out in the remaining sections 4.3d and 4.3e. section 
4.4 will attempt to conclude the chapter with an intra-country 
comparison of the significance or the effectiveness of 
multilateralism, regionalism and bilateralism in contributing 
towards the foreign policy objectives of Vanuatu and the Maldives. 
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4.2- Foreign Policy Objectives of the Maldives and Vanuatu 
This chapter focuses on three of the most significant environment 
related foreign policy objectives shared by the Maldives and Vanuatu 
during the past twelve years - drawing international attention to 
the plight of the small island states in the face of the 
deteriorating global environment and placing the issue of global 
warming on the international agenda; influencing negotiations 
regarding the convention on climate change; and obtaining assistance 
for environment protection. These objectives are so closely inter-
linked that this section will not attempt to discuss them 
separately. Instead the section will undertake a brief discussion of 
the environmental threats facing both the Maldives and Vanuatu and 
indicate why the objectives noted above entered the foreign policy 
of these two countries. The aim of the section is to provide the 
essential background against which the foreign policy actions of 
Vanuatu and the Maldives at the multilateral, regional and bilateral 
levels could be assessed. 
4.2a The most serious 
Maldives and Vanuatu and 
combating these threats 
environmental threats facing the 
the foreign policy objectives in 
There are a number of inter-linked factors such as deforestation and 
desertification, which contribute to the deterioration of the global 
environment and the plight of the small island states. Yet it is the 
greenhouse gas induced global warming and climate change and marine 
pollution, which are the most immediate and serious environmental 
threats facing small island states like the Maldives and Vanuatu. 
The foreign policy objectives focused in this chapter stem from the 
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need to defend against these formidable environmental threats, which 
are briefly discussed below. 
Scientists have estimated that the Earth's surface temperature has 
risen at a rapid pace of around 0.3° - 0.6° C during the last 100 
years compared to a 1° C fluctuation during the 10,000 years 
preceding this century. 501 This trend is expected to continue in the 
predictable future with temperature increases between 13°C 
relative to 1990 level, by the year 2100. 502 
The increasing global temperature is an extremely serious threat to 
small island states due to its impact on sea level and climate 
patterns. Greenhouse gas induced global warming over the last 100 
years or so caused the Earth's sea level to rise by 10~25 
centimetres through thermal expansion and the melting of the polar 
ice caps. 503 IPCC proj ections of sea level rise based on various 
scenarios range from 15 to 94 centimetres by the year 2100. 504 Of 
these, the best estimate is said to be a rise of 50 centimetres. 505 
A rise in sea level by 50 centimetres will not only cause socio-
economic havoc in small island states but also threaten the very 
existence of low-lying countries like the Maldives. The maximum 
elevation of land in the Maldives that is above sea level is around 
3 metres while the maximum height of 80 percent of the country's 
land area is less than 1 metre above the mean high tide. 506 This 
501 J.T. Houghton, L.G. M. Filho, & B. Callander (eds.), Climate 
Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. xii. 
502 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
503 Ibid., p. 363. 
504 Ibid. p. 6. 
505 Ibid. 
506 MPHRE, State of the Environment: Maldives, country document 
prepared for the Global Conference for the Sustainable Development 
of Small Island Developing States, Barbados, 1994, p. 2. 
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means that a half a metre rise in the global sea level would render 
uninhabitable a large part if not the whole of the Maldives. 
Mountainous small island states like Vanuatu do not face an imminent 
threat of being washed away from the surface of the Earth by the 
rising sea level. However, they too are not immune to the threat of 
global warming and climate change. Rising sea level will subject the 
shorelines of small and large countries alike to increasing erosion. 
Low-lying islands in the Banks and Shepherd groups of Vanuatu will 
be directly affected by a sea level rise of even 20 centimetres. 507 
Furthermore, storm surges or tidal waves that begin at a higher 
level than today present a very serious threat to the population and 
infrastructure of Vanuatu, mostly located on coastal plains. 50S 
Global warming is also expected to increase the frequency and 
severity of tropical cyclones making them a more serious threat to 
Vanuatu that lies in the cyclone prone South Pacific. 
The Maldives has already started experiencing the devastating 
effects of sea level rise. In 1987, unprecedented high waves and 
swells caused widespread damage to the infrastructure and the 
natural environment of a number of islands in the Maldives, 
estimated at around US $ 30 million. 509 A similar amount of damage 
was inflicted on the country again in 1991 by unusually severe 
storms. 510 
507 E . Bani and B. Clarke (draft), Country Report for UNCED: Vanuatu, 
SPREP, 1992, p. 27. 
508 C. Brown, Economic 
Countries, International 
1989, p. 157. 
Development in Seven Pacific 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington, 
Island 
D.C. , 
509 President Gayoom, keynote address entitled, "A Warning from the 
Small Island Nations: Our Fate will be your Fate H , delivered at the 
Second Municipal Leaders Summit on Climate Change, Berlin 1995, a 
copy of the statement was made available to the author by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Male'. 
510 MPHRE, State of the Environment, op. cit., p. 26. 
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Rising sea levels will also worsen the ground water problems facing 
a number of small island states like the Maldives. In Male' the 
ground water is already unusable for human consumption due to 
contamination and saline intrusion. Rising sea level is bound to 
aggravate this problem. 511 
Global Warming and sea level rise also pose a very serious threat to 
the fragile marine environment of small island states like the 
Maldives and Vanuatu. Coral reefs, rich in biological diversity, 
have a very narrow range of temperature tolerance and need to 
maintain themselves at a certain depth from the surface. 512 The 
increasing global temperature could have a lethal effect on several 
of these reefs. Furthermore, a rapid rise in sea level within a very 
short period, as is occurring today, would outpace the growth of a 
number of coral reefs leaving them too deep for survival. 
Destruction of the marine environment will have wide ranging 
implications for small island states. A number of coastal villages 
in Vanuatu and quite a large proportion of the inhabitants of the 
Maldives depend on the marine environment for sustenance and 
commerce. Thus, any damage to the marine environment is a serious 
threat to the inhabitants of these two countries. Furthermore, the 
destruction of coral reefs would mean the loss of the natural 
barrier that cushions the impact of the ocean on Vanuatu and the 
Maldives. Wave action is such a serious threat to the islands of the 
Maldives that tens of millions of dollars are being spent on 
511 J.C. Pernetta, "Impact of climate change and sea-level rise on 
small island states", in Global Environmental Change: Human and 
Policy Dimensions, Vol. 2, no. 1, March 1992, pp.19-31. 
512 B.L. Thorne-Miller and J.G. Catena, The Living Ocean: 
Understanding and Protecting Marine Biodiversity, Island Press, 
Washington, D.C., 1991, p. 53. 
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protecting the coast including the constructing of a sea-wall around 
Male' .513 
Pollution is another serious threat to the marine environment of the 
Maldives and Vanuatu. One of the major sources of pollution is 
accidental and illegal discharge of oil into the ocean. It is 
estimated that some 600,000 tonnes of oil enter the oceans because 
of normal shipping operations, accidents and illegal discharges. 514 A 
sUbstantial oil spill near a small island state like the Maldives or 
Vanuatu could destroy coral reefs, pollute the beaches and seriously 
affect the fisheries and tourism industry. 
The transportation and disposal of hazardous waste is yet another 
danger facing. marine and terrestrial environment of small island 
states. In 1991 for example, around 120,000 tonnes of hazardous 
waste was exported legally from Europe to the developing world. 515 
Every year around 2.2 million tonnes of hazardous waste is moved 
across boundaries. Some of this waste is transported by sea and 
passes through or close to the territories of small island states. 
Such transboundary movement and disposal of hazardous waste is a 
very serious threat given the potential for accidents. The concern 
is even more serious in the case of illegal traffic and disposal of 
hazardous waste. 
In the face of the deteriorating global environment, most 
importantly global warming and climate change, there is very little 
513 Japanese aid provided for the construction of the sea-wall 
around Male' is noted in p. 279. 
514'Agenda 21' Chapter 17, in N.A., Robinson, (ed.), Agenda 21: Earth's 
Action Plan, IUCN Environmental Policy & Law Paper no. 27, Oceana 
Publications, Inc., New York, 1993, pp. 307-356. 
515 A. Crump, Dictionary of Environmental Development, Earthscan 
Publications Ltd., London, 1998, p. 52. 
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small island states like the Maldives and Vanuatu could do on their 
own to protect themselves. They need international assistance to 
tackle the various environment related problems at the local level 
and to find a solution to the larger issue of global warming. To 
gain external assistance and support, first international attention 
needed to be drawn to the plight of small island states and the 
issue of global warming and climate change had to be placed on the 
interna tional agenda as elaborated in section 4. 3a. Thus, drawing 
attention to the plight of small island states in the face of 
environmental degradation and placing global warming and climate 
change on the international agenda became a foreign policy objective 
of the Maldives and Vanuatu during the last few years of the 1980s. 
Once climate change was on the international agenda, negotiations 
began on a convention on climate change, as discussed in more detail 
in section 4. 3a. There were a number of different interest groups 
involved in the negotiations. Small island states like the Maldives 
and Vanuatu needed to influence the negotiations if they were to 
ensure that their needs are adequately addressed. This need also 
became a foreign policy objective of both Vanuatu and the Maldives 
since the beginning of the 1990s. 
The third foreign policy objective focused in this chapter is 
finding ways and means of alleviating the problems related to 
environmental degradation. The financial and other resources of 
Vanuatu and the Maldives are such that these two countries cannot 
expect to tackle on their own, the numerous environment related 
problems they face. External support and assistance from regional 
and non-regional sources are essential in dealing with these 
problems. Finding ways and means of tackling these problems became a 
foreign policy objective of the Maldives and Vanuatu. 
229 
4.3 - Foreign Policy Actions of Vanuatu and the Maldives 
This section will attempt an assessment of the significance or the 
effectiveness of the foreign policy actions of Vanuatu and the 
Maldives at the multilateralism, regional and bilateral levels. In 
doing so, the section will first focus on the significance of 
mul tilateralism for both Vanuatu and the Maldives in contributing 
towards their foreign policy obj ecti ves. These two countries have 
been treated together under the subheading, multilateralism 
Vanuatu and the Maldives, since their actions at the multilateral 
level largely overlap. The section will then go on to assess the 
significance of regionalism and bilateralism in furthering Vanuatu's 
foreign policy objectives, followed by a similar assessment of the 
regionalism and bilateralism with respect to the Maldives. 
4.3a - Multilateralism - Vanuatu and the Maldives 
The most pressing problems of environmental degradation threatening 
Vanuatu and the Maldives are global in nature. Such global problems 
call for inter alia, global solutions. This does not automatically 
make multilateralism a particularly useful foreign policy 
orientation for the Maldives or Vanuatu in combating environmental 
degradation. The significance of multilateralism will depend on the 
strategy's actual or potential contribution to the foreign policies 
of these two countries. 
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The unusually high waves that struck the Haldives thrice in 1987 
inflicting extensive damage propelled enviroIL.Tflental protection onto 
the foreign policy priorities of the Haldives. The disaster rr~de the 
Haldives realise the serious nature of the environmental dangers 
facing the country. It presented the government with the tasks of 
finding both short and long-term solutions to the problem. In the 
short=term the country needed to obtain foreign assistance for 
emergency relief and subsequent rehabilitation \'mrk. The long-term 
solution was more extensive and requiring the resolution of the 
fundamental problems responsible for environrr~ntal degradation such 
as global warming, climate change, deforestation and the like. 
Hultilateralism proved useful in meeting the short-term needs of the 
Haldives following the said envirom1lental disaster. The united 
Nations was instrumental in appealing to the international cOmITillnity 
to generously contribute to the relief and rehabilitation effort 
underway in the Baldi ves .516 The united Nations' resolution 
A/RES/42/202 also called on the various bodies of the united Nations 
system to contribute towards the formulation and implementation of a 
planned prograrrrrne of action to strengthen the coastal defences of 
the Haldives. 
The more complex long-term solution to the environmental threats 
facing the Baldi ves required tact and diligence in foreign policy. 
At the heart of the solution lay the need for far=reaching and 
drastic changes to the socio-economic and industrial practices 
within the international community. International co-operation and 
corrrrni tment were .... ' 1 eSSenL..la.L for any such solution. Before any 
516 United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/42/202, of 11 
Decerober 1987; United Nations Homepage, 1996; online available: 
gopher:!!gopher.un.org!OO!ga/recs/42!202, 19 April 1998. 
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international action could take place, the issue needed to find its 
way onto the international agenda. 
Some issues related to global enviroThuental degradation such as the 
depletion of the ozone layer and transboundary air pollution found 
their way onto the international agenda between the 1950s and early 
1980s. In some of these casesi international co-operation had proved 
successful in affording solutions, although in piecemeal fashion. 
The Vienna Convention of 1985 and Montreal Protocol of 1987 are 
examples of such international co-operation. The issue of climate 
change, which was the most urgent threat facing the Maldives and 
other small island states, was however not significant on the 
international agenda in 1987. 
Although climate change had not received much significance on the 
international agenda in 1987 the scientific cOmITillnity was well aware 
of its impending threat. The increasing concern within the 
scientific community over the rising concentration of carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere had led the International Council of Scientific 
Unions (IeSUl i united Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the 
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) to hold joint meetings on 
the issue starting in 1980. 517 Their 1985 meeting in Villach, 
Austria, concluded that increasing greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere since the beginning of this century will significantly 
change the global climate and raise the sea=level by 20=140 
centimetres in about 40 years. 518 The Conference noted that "climate 
change and sea level rise due to greenhouse gases are closely linked 
517 ICSU, UNEP, IAJMO, World Climate PrograIru"'lle: Report of the 
International Conference on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon 
Dioxide and of Other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and 
Associated Impacts, Vil1ach, Austria, 9-15 October 1985, vn40, 1986, 
foreword. 
5W Ibid., ~~.1-2 & 56-68. 
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with other major environrr~ntal issues, such as acid deposition and 
threats to the Earth's ozone shield mostly due to changes in the 
composi tion of the atmosphere by man! s activities". 519 
The Villach Conference also recowmended various steps that needed to 
be taken by governments, regional and inter=governmental 
organisations in addressing this threat of global \'larming and sea 
level rise. These steps included those such as the need for 
governments to take account of the findings of the Conference in 
their socio-economic and environmental prograrrmes and the control of 
the emission of greenhouse gases; enhancing public awareness; 
greater collaboration between scientists and policy=makers; and if 
necessary the initiation of the consideration of a global 
convention. 
The identification or recognition of a problem at the scientific 
level does not automatically lead to international co-operation. The 
onus ,..;as on those states that ,..;ere most concerned by the problem to 
place the issue on the international agenda. The foreign policy of 
Maldives, folloHing the 1987 disaster, and Vanuatu since 1989 became 
geared towards this end. 
The membership of multilateral organisations such as the 
Commonwealth and the United Nations proved a cost=effective avenue 
for the Maldives in its bid to place the issue on the global agenda. 
THO main factors assisted the Maldives in its effort. These factors 
included - '" \ ~/ the seriousness of the threat of global \"Jarming and 
sea level rise to small island states Hhich made ita palpable 
concern that the international community could not ignore; and b) 
519 Ibid. 
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the existence of an epistemic community on global warming, as 
demonstrated by the 1985 Villach Conference, to underpin any action 
to place the issue on the international agenda. 
The above mentioned factors provided the Maldives in 1987 a window 
of opportunity to draw international attention to the plight of low= 
lying small island states and to push for international co-operation 
in search of a solution. The Maldives was quick to utilise this open 
window of opportunity starting with the Co~uonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting (CHOGM), held in Vancouver, Canada, in October 
1987. 
As an initial step the Maldives submitted to the CHOQ1 in Vancouver 
a memorandum on the threat of global >-larming and sea-level rise 
facing the international co~uunity and especially the low-lying and 
small but numerous members of the organisation. The threat was 
further elaborated by President Gayoom in his address to the summit, 
in which he referred to the environmental disaster his country 
experienced earlier that year and explained to the assembly that 
small island states like the Maldives have already started to 
experience the devastating effects of climate change. This speech 
labelled by the international media covering the summit, as the 
"Death of a Nation Speech", gave the issue the sense of urgency 
needed for early action.~o 
The attempt by the Maldives to draw the attention of the 
Commonwealth leaders to the issue of climate change was successful. 
520 Interview conducted by the author with Mr. Mohamed Khaleel, 
Deputy Director, Environment Section, Ministry of Home Affairs and 
Environment, Male' , 10 March 1999. Also see, Commonwealth 
Secretariat, Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Vancouver, 
13-17 October 1987, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1987, p. 26. 
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Then Prime Minister of Britain, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, for examplej 
noted in her address at the Royal Society annual dinner, that the 
potential impact of global warming and in particular its effect on 
low-lying states was "brought home" to her at the Vancouver 
Commonwealth " • .j... 0umll11 L by President Gayoom. 52l As suggested by the 
1'1aldives the Commonwealth leaders at the Vancouver CHOGH requested 
the Secretary General to convene a group of experts to examine the 
implications to Corrmonwealth member countries of sea=level rise and 
other natural disasters resulting from climatic change. 522 
Shortly after the Vancouver SUITlJ.llit, President Gayoom raised the 
issue of global warming at the Forty-Second Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1987, with the "intention of bringing 
the matter to the attention of the entire international 
corrmunity".523 It was the first time the growing threat of sea-level 
rise due to global warming was raised at the Heads-of-State level at 
the United Nations. 52q In his speech, President Gayoom drew the 
attention of the United Nations community to the environmental 
disaster his "endangered nation" faced earlier that year due to 
global warming and sea level rise. He passionately explained to the 
assembly that "it is now a distressing probability that the 
environmental change caused by industrial progress in the developed 
world may slowly drown this unique paradise [the Maldives] in its 
entirety".525 Gayoom called on the international community to 
521 Prime Minister Thatcher's speech at the Royal Society annual 
dinner, 27 September 1988, quoted in M. Paterson, Global Warming 
and Global Politics, Routledge, London, 1996, p. 34. 
522 Ibid. , pp. 26-27 i Commonwealth Secretariat, Report of the 
Commonwealth Secretary General 1989, Commonwealth Secretariat, 
London, 1989, pp. 17-19. 
523 President Gayoom, keynote address entitled, "A Warning From 
Small Island Nations", op. cit. 
524 J. Leggett (ed.), Global Warming: Green Peace Report, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 431. 
5~5 President Gayoom, statement to the Forty-Second Session of the 
Uni ted Nations General Assembly, New York, 1987, a copy of the 
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ini tiate an "all =encompassing international commitment and effort" 
to battle against the global threat posed by climate change. 526 
other small states were quick to join in the lobby to place the 
issue of global \'larming on the international agenda. The Dni ted 
Nations General Assembly, at its Forty=Third Session in 1988, 
unanimously adopted a resolution submitted by Malta entitled, 
'Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of 
Mankind', which called for timely action vIi thin a global framet·mrk 
1 . h . 527 • 1 to dea Wltr global warmlng. The resolutlon a so requested the 
DNEP and WHO to iIThLlediately initiate action leading to a 
comprehensive review and recommendations on a number of climate 
change related issues. 
While small island states were trying to place global warming and 
sea-level rise on the international agenda, several developments 
favourable to their cause were taking place in the international 
arena. In 1988 the Canadian government sponsored the Toronto 
Conference called, The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global 
security. The Conference was attended by more than 300 scientists 
and delegates from 46 countries. 528 The Toronto Conference 
reconfirmed the threat of global warming and noted that "humanity is 
conducting an uncontrolled globally pervasive experiment whose 
ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear 
war" . 529 
statement was made available to the author by the Permanent Mission 
of the Maldives to the United Nations. 
526 Ibid. 
527 Uni~ea Na~i6ns General Assefimly aocurnen~ A/Res/43/53, 6 December 
1988; a copy of the document was made available to the author by 
the Environment Section of MPHRE, Male'. 
528 D.E. Abt'arlarnson (ea.), The Challenge of GloDal Warming, Islana 
Press, Washington, 1989, p. 46. 
529 Ibid. 
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The effort by small states and developments such as those discussed 
above, heightened international awareness and concern over the 
incessantly deteriorating global environment. Consequently, in 1989 
the united Nations General Assembly decided to convene the UNCED, 
with participation at the highest possible level. 
In 1990, the Second World Climate Conference was held under auspices 
of WMO and UNEP. At this Conference, the Maldives, along with other 
small states, ensured that the gravity of the environmental danger 
facing low-lying and small island states got due recognition. 530 
Consequently, the Ministerial Declaration produced at the end of the 
Conference took note of the "potentially serious consequences of 
climate change, including the threat to the survival of low-lying 
and other small island states". 531 
Furthermore, in 1990 the United Nations General Assembly decided to 
establish an Inter-governmental Negotiating Committee to prepare an 
effective Framework Convention on Climate Change. 532 Resolution 
A/RES/45/212 of the united Nations General Assembly assigned the 
Inter-governmental Negotiating Committee the task of having the 
Framework Convention finalised before the UNCED and have it open for 
signature during the Conference. The issue of Climate Change was now 
well and truly on the international political agenda. 
530 MPHRE, State of the Environment, op. cit., p. 51. 
531 The Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate 
Conference, in J. Jager and H. L. Ferguson (eds.), Clima te Change: 
Science Impact and Policy: Proceedings of the Second World Climate 
Conference, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 535-
539. 
532 United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/45/212 of 21 
December 1990, United Nations Homepag~, 1996, online available: 
gopher://gopher.un.org/00/ga/recs/45/2l2, 13 January 1999. 
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The next step for Maldives, Vanuatu and the rest of the small island 
states was to have a strong say in the negotiating process of the 
Convention on Climate Change. Vanuatu and the Maldives were well 
aware of their limitations in influencing the international 
communi ty. One way of minimising these limitations was to employ 
what R. P. Barston has labelled "associative diplomacy". 533 The main 
purpose of associative diplomacy is for groups of countries to co-
ordinate their policies and jointly try to enhance their influence 
with respect to other groupings. 534 Over the past few decades 
associative diplomacy has been practised, with varying degrees of 
success, by small states at the regional level. 
The initial step for associative diplomacy among small states at the 
global level was taken in 1989, with the hope of jointly dealing 
with the threat of global warming. In 1989 the Maldives in 
association with the Commonwealth Secretariat, convened in Male' a 
ministerial meeting of small island states to consider the 
implication of sea-level rise and to evolve a united stance. This 
conference named, Small States Conference on Sea Level Rise was of a 
global nature. The conference was attended by small states from most 
regions of the world such as the Caribbean, Mediterranean, Indian 
Ocean, and the South Pacific. Vanuatu was among those that attended 
the conference. 
The Small States Conference on Sea Level Rise produced a joint 
declaration known as the 'Male' Declaration on Global Warming and 
Sea Level Rise'. This declaration took note of a moral obligation on 
the part of the industrialised countries which were primarily 
responsible for climate change, to urgently initiate international 
533 R.P. Barston, Modern Diplomacy, Longman, Essex, 1988, p. 108. 
534 Ibid. 
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action to stabilise greenhouse gases and to sponsor a world-wide 
programme of action to combat the effects of global warming and sea-
level rise. The Conference also decided to initiate an Action Group 
to oversee the implementation of the decisions of the Conference; to 
co-ordinate a joint approach on the issues of climate change, global 
warming and sea level rise; and to pursue and follow-up on global 
and regional response strategies. 535 
During the Second World Climate Conference in 1990 the co-operation 
between small island states was further strengthened by the 
formation of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) initially 
with a membership of 32 states. This alliance was an ad hoc 
organisation set up for the purpose of co-operation on the issue of 
climate change. AOSIS presently has a membership of 42 countries 
that jointly yield close to 5 per cent of the global population and 
almost 20 per cent of the united Nations' membership. 536 These are 
significant numbers that increase the influence of small states in 
their fight against global warming and climate change. 
Vanuatu's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Robert Van 
Lierop who was actively involved in promoting the cause of small 
island states, was elected in 1990 as the first Chairperson of the 
AOSIS. The election of Van Lierop demonstrated his ability and 
willingness to make use of an opportunity which presented itself. 537 
535 Small States Conference on Sea Level Rise, Male' Declaration on 
Global Warming and Sea Level Rise, 18 November 1989, Male'. 
536T . N . Slade, Chairman of the AOSIS, address to the Caribbean 
Ministerial Meeting on the Implementation of the Barbados Programme 
of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island States, 
10-14 December 1998, a copy of the document was made available to 
the author by the Permanent Mission of Samoa to the United Nations, 
New York. 
537 Van Lierop's role on the issue of global warming is discussed 
in, E, Shibuya, 'Roaring Mice Against the Tide: The South Pacific 
Islands and Agenda-Building on Global Warming', Pacific Affairs, 
vol. 69, no. 4, 1996-1997, pp. 541-556. 
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His effective leadership of the AOSIS not only gave Vanuatu a 
significant position within the organisation, but also placed the 
country in the world's spotlight. It enabled Vanuatu to playa very 
constructive and important role in the negotiations on climate 
change. 
The work of the Inter-governmental Negotiating Committee (INC) on 
climate change began in Chantilly, near Washington DC, in February 
1991. 538 At the first session of the Committee it was decided to set 
up two working groups to deal with the different aspects of the 
negotiations. Working Group 1 was to deal with the commitments that 
states were to make, and Working Group II was to address the 
question of institutions and mechanisms that were to be set up by 
the Convention. At the second session of the INC in Geneva, in June 
1991, Ambassador Van Lierop was elected to co-chair of Working Group 
II. His election demonstrated the respect AOSIS, under his 
leadership, has acquired within the INC. However, the usefulness of 
AOSIS for the foreign policy of Vanuatu and the Maldives depended on 
the organisation's ability to influence the negotiations on the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
The negotiations on the convention that ensued at the INC meetings 
were tough and complex. 539 Some of the complexity arose from factors 
such as the number of uncertainties still surrounding the phenomenon 
of climate change; the existence of a very large amount and varying 
degrees of producers and consumers of greenhouse gases; the 
different costs involved in emission reduction to different 
538 Five sessions of the INC are discussed in, Paterson, Global 
Warming, op. cit., pp. 51- 64. 
539 Difficulties in negotiating the convention on climate change is 
discussed in P. Hayes and Smith (eds.), The Global Greenhouse 
Regime: Who Pays?, The United Nations University, Tokyo, 1993, pp. 
10-12. 
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societies; and the different levels of threat posed to different 
societies by climate change. Given the complexities of the issue 
under question, conflicts of interests emerged between groups of 
countries involved in the negotiations, resulting in the division of 
the participants into bargaining blocks. The small island states 
under the AOSIS constituted one of these blocs. The differences 
between the negotiating blocks are briefly discussed below to 
provide an idea of the nature of the task that confronted the AOSIS. 
The INC meetings demonstrated that there were differences even 
within the OECD countries, mainly between the united states and the 
European Community. The united states being the biggest emitter of 
greenhouse gases in the world was in favour of the "no regrets 
principle" in its approach to climate change. 540 Under this 
principle, the United states was opposed to any restrictions on 
greenhouse gas emission because there were still uncertainties 
surrounding climate change. curati ve measures such as increasing 
energy efficiency and recycling, which would not adversely affect 
the United states' economy, were suggested as solutions to the 
problem of climate change. 
In contrast to the united states the EC members were in favour of 
the "precautionary principle", or taking action to reduce greenhouse 
gases even if there was some scientific uncertainty as to the rate 
540 The ranking of 50 countries according to the amount of 
greenhouse gases they emitted is in, World Resources 1990-91, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 15. The "No-Regrets 
Principle", "Keep-Options Open Principle" and the "Precautionary 
Principle" are discussed in J. C. I. Dooge, 'Policy Responses to 
Global Environmental Issues: An Overview', in R. E. Munn, J. W.M la 
Riviere, & N. L. Campagne (eds.), Policy Making in an Era of Global 
Environmental Change, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1996, 
pp. 97-112. See also, P.M. Morrisette and A. J. Plantinga, 'The 
Global Warming Issue: Viewpoints of Different Countries' , 
Resources, Spring 1991, pp. 3-6. 
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and degree of global warming. The EC believed in the application of 
preventative measures such as the inclusion of quantified binding 
targets for emission reduction in the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change even if scientific uncertainties on the issue did 
exist. 
There were diverse and conflicting interests even within the 
developing countries or the Group of 77 (G77). Some larger G77 
countries that did not face an imminent threat from global warming 
were more interested in issues of equity between the North and the 
South than an urgent solution to climate change. Oil producing 
countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were mostly interested in 
slowing down the negotiating process and ensuring that the agreement 
did not control the production and emission of carbon dioxide in any 
way.541 The AOSIS favoured the precautionary approach in tackling 
global warming. The member states of the Alliance wanted to include 
stringent targets for carbon dioxide emission reduction in the 
Framework Convention. 
A group within the G77 that called themselves the G24, opposed to 
the point of view of the AOSIS, proposed its own text at the fourth 
session of the INC. This text did not include any emission controls 
by industrialised countries. 542 AOSIS followed with its own proposal 
which emphasised, immediate and significant cuts in carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse gas emissions by industrialised countries; 
equitable funding mechanisms that recognise the need to compensate 
vulnerable island states; transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies; the application of the 'polluter pays' principle in 
compensation for the consequences of climate change; and commitment 
541 Hayes and Smith, The Global Greenhouse, op. cit., p. 345. 
542 Paterson, Global Warming, op. cit., p.58. 
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to binding and meaningful energy conservation and efficiency 
requirements, and the development of al ternati ve energy sources. 543 
Rowland has noted that despite these differences all the Southern 
countries were united on one issue, and that was opposition to any 
restriction on their use of fossil fuel until they reach a higher 
level or stage of development. 544 
After arduous negotiations a framework convention on climate change 
was drawn up before the UNCED or Earth Summit held in 1992. 
According to Van Lierop, the convention was not "the most desirable 
package, but it was the achievable one". 545 Given the divergent 
interests involved on the issue of climate change with some 
countries favouring a "policy of inaction", the convention was an 
essential first step. As Van Lierop further noted, "the convention 
sets in train a process, that can be added to, and evolve later into 
what is absolutely necessary". 546 
The contribution of the AOSIS to the negotiating process was very 
important. The organisation was able to ensure that the voice of 
those countries most affected by climate change was heard at the 
negotiations. Commentators on the negotiating process have noted the 
importance of the role played by AOSIS. The journal Our Planet, 
produced by UNEP, for example identified AOSIS as "a key player" in 
the climate change negotiations. 547 Similarly, Djoghlaf has pointed 
out that the contribution of AOSIS was highly influential in the 
543 R. E. Taplin, 'International Policy on the Greenhouse Effect and 
the Island South Pacific', in The Pacific Review, vol. 7, no. 3, 
1994, pp. 271-281. 
544 I. H. Rowlands, The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change (Issues 
in Environmental Politics), Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1995, p. 198-199. 
545 Van Lierop quoted in, I. Williams, 'Hoping for Stronger 
Commitment', Pacific Islands Monthly, June 1992, p. 33. 
546 Ibid. 
547UNEP , 'Power to the Small', Our Planet, Vol. 6, No.1, p. 5. 
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t · t' . t 548 nego la lons on comml ments. Oran Young has argued that because 
the concerns of the small island states were so real and because 
they had the assistance of sophisticated advisers the AOSIS proved 
effective in the climate negotiations despite the material weakness 
of its members. 549 
The influence of the AOSIS in the negotiating process resulted in 
the inclusion in the convention of several aspects that were very 
important for small states. 550 The convention, for example, included 
a commitment by the developed countries to assist developing 
countries that were particularly vulnerable to climate change, in 
meeting costs of adaptation to the adverse effects of the phenomena. 
The convention also required developed countries to give full 
consideration to actions necessary under the convention including 
those related to funding, insurance and the transfer of technology, 
to meet the needs and concerns of developing countries especially 
small island states. These needs and concerns include those arising 
from the adverse effects of climate change and the impact of the 
implementation of response measures. Although these achievements did 
not fully meet the foreign policy needs of Vanuatu and the Maldives, 
they were definitely important contributions towards the overall 
goal of protecting the environment. 
The negotiating process also demonstrated that there were limits to 
what small states like the Maldives or Vanuatu could expect despite 
548 A. Dj oghlaf, 'The Beginning of an International Climate Law', 
in, I.M. Mintzer and J.A. Leonard (eds.), Negotiating Climate 
Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 106-118. 
549 O.R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment 
in a Stateless Society, Cornell University Press, London, 1994, p. 
39. 
550 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, in, S. P. 
Johnson (ed.), The Earth Summit:The United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), Graham & Trotman, London, 
1993, pp. 59-78. 
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their best effort. During the negotiations the AOSIS made a 
comprehensive proposal for the ,establishment of an insurance pool as 
an integral part of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, to 
provide financial insurance against the consequences of sea level 
rise. 551 The proposal suggested that the financial burden of the 
insurance scheme be distributed among industrialised countries in an 
equitable manner. This scheme was in the draft convention until the 
very last negotiating meeting before the UNCED and then dropped as 
developed countries were unwilling to make the necessary financial 
commitment. Insurance was included in the convention only as an 
issue that needed to be considered by the developed countries. 
The most serious disappointment for the AOSIS and others that 
advocated the precautionary principle during negotiations, was their 
inability to convince the united states to agree to commitments or a 
timetable for reducing carbon dioxide, the main gas responsible for 
global warming. The chairperson of AOSIS, Ambassador Van Lierop, 
noted that the "the commitment to specific commitments was just not 
there in the united States, and without them there is no point 
having a convention". 552 However, the convention was, though 
inadequate, a step in the right direction and in Lierop's words the 
only "achievable one" at that time. 553 The Convention was opened for 
signature at the Rio Summit in 1992. 
The Earth Summit was a welcome development for the Maldives and 
Vanuatu which have been struggling over the years to instigate 
international co-operation in combating environmental degradation 
and to draw attention to the plight of small island states. The 
551The insurance scheme proposed by AOSIS in, Hayes & Smith, The 
Global Greenhouse, op. cit., pp. 184-187. 
552 Williams, "Hoping for Stronger Commitment", op. cit. 
553 Ibid. 
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Summit was one of the largest conferences in history and the first 
global gathering on environment and development at the heads of 
state or government level. The conference was attended by 
representatives from around 180 nations, with over 100 heads of 
state and government, 1500 officially accredited non-governmental 
organisations and 7000 journalists. 554 The extent and level of 
participation in the Earth summit was indicative of the near 
universal awareness of the threats facing the global environment and 
the recognition that international co-operation was necessary for a 
solution. The international exposure and respect gained in the quest 
for environmental protection, among other factors, enabled the 
representatives of the Maldives and Vanuatu to gain two of the nine 
Vice Presidential posts of the Earth Summit allocated to the Asian 
countries. 555 
The usefulness of the Earth Summit to the foreign policy of the 
Maldives and Vanuatu could be judged by the contribution it made 
towards global environmental protection. However, it is not within 
the scope of this thesis to assess the whole range of environment 
related issues such as deforestation, conservation of biodiversity, 
protection of deserts and the like, dealt at the Summit. This 
section will therefore try to focus on the factors directly related 
to global warming and the protection of the environment of small 
island states. 
The Maldives, Vanuatu and other small island states at the summit 
managed to persuade the international community not only to 
recognise their special problems but also managed to include these 
problems in the 27 norms or principles for state and interstate 
554 Johnson (ed.l, The Earth Summit, op. cit., pp. 4 & 509-513. 
555 Ibid. p. 515. 
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behaviour agreed at Rio. These norms were listed in the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development - one of the five most 
important instruments produced at the Summit. 556 Principle 6 of the 
Declaration stated that the "special situation and needs of the 
developing countries, particularly the least developed and those 
most environmentally vulnerable, shall be given special priority" in 
international action in the field of environment and development. 
Agenda 21 produced at Rio was an ambitious blueprint for future 
action in the area of environment and development. The document 
covered a broad range of environment and development related issues 
such as poverty alleviation, human health promotion, combating 
deforestation, desertification and drought, and the protection of 
the quality and supply of fresh water. Small states at the summit 
managed to include in chapter 17 of the document a section on the 
sustainable development of small islands. This section specified a 
number of activities which needed to be undertaken in the area of 
environment and development of small island states. The section, 
among other things, required international and regional 
organisations to give priority to the environment and development 
needs of small states. Furthermore, the section identified the need 
for periodic regional and global meetings on the sustainable 
development of small island states, with the first global conference 
in this respect to be held in 1994. 
The annual financial cost (1993-2000) for implementing the 
activities outlined in the section on small island states was 
estimated at US$130 million with US$ 50 million to be provided by 
556 The text of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
in, ibid., pp. 118-122. The other four important instruments were 
the convention on biodiversity, convention on climate change, 
forest principles, and Agenda 21. 
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the international community on grant or concessional terms. 557 As for 
the activities of Agenda 21 as a whole, the developed countries 
reaffirmed their commitment to increase their ODA to reach the 
united Nations target of 0.7 per cent of GNP. The World Bank agreed 
to look into increasing the funding available through its 
concessional lending arm, the International Development Association 
(IDA). The other important funding mechanism for Agenda 21 was the 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF) , managed jointly by World Bank, 
UNDP and UNEP. The GEF was designated the interim funding mechanism 
for the conventions on climate change and biological diversity. 
Vanuatu continued to play a very active role in environment related 
issues at the multilateral level immediately after the Rio summit. 
The country's "vigorous advocacy of the AOSIS position", among other 
factors, enabled it to win a seat on the 53-member Commission for 
Sustainable Development (CSD). 558 This Commission was set up in 1992 
by the united Nations, as stipulated in Chapter 38 of Agenda 21. The 
purpose of the Commission was to oversee the implementation of the 
activities of Agenda 21. 
The Pacific Islands Monthly has reported that according to 
diplomats, Vanuatu certainly had the opportunity to become one of 
the vice-presidents of CSD in 1994, which would have placed it in a 
"very good position to influence the agenda and to progress items of 
interest to the Pacific islands and the other Small Island 
States".559 When this opportunity presented itself in 1994 Ambassador 
Van Lierop had been dismissed and his successor, Jean Ravou-Akii, 
557 Johnson, The Earth Summit, op. cit., p. 330. 
558 I. Williams, 'Can Small Islands Rely on Anyone', Pacific Islands 
Monthly, July 1994, p. 38. 
559 Ibid. 
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did not have the willingness to take advantage of it. 560 Ambassador 
Ravou-Akii did not attend a single meeting of the two-week-long 
session of the CSD held in early 1994. 561 As such, while there was 
little enthusiasm for electing a newcomer as vice-president, "there 
was no support at all for nominating an empty chair". 562 
The effectiveness of multilateralism in contributing towards the 
foreign policy objectives of Vanuatu and the Maldives has been more 
limited in the post-Rio environment, though still important. The 
Global Conference on the sustainable Development of Small Island 
Developing States convened in Barbados, from 25 April to 6 May 1994, 
for instance, had limited success in mobilising fresh resources. 
However the conference provided an opportunity for the small island 
states to strengthen their relationship and "reach consensus on 
their special needs and concerns, and to impress upon the 
industrialised world the seriousness of the plight that awaits those 
hapless countries if effective and urgent measures are not taken to 
avert the impending global environmental crises lf • 563 Mrs. Annette des 
Isles, the Chairperson of AOSIS in 1994 and ambassador of Trinidad 
and Tobago to the united Nations, confirmed that the most tangible 
benefit of the conference was in fact the sense of unity it created 
among small island developing states. 564 The record of AOSIS shows 
that unity provides some advantage in international relations. 
The other most important achievement of the conference was the 
formulation of a comprehensive programme of action for the 
560 Ambassador Lierop was dismissed in early December 1993. Pressure 
from France is believed to have been responsible for the dismissal 
of Van Lierop who played an active role within the United Nations 
in trying to halt French nuclear testing. See I. Williams, 'Van 
Lierop Dismissed', Pacific Islands Monthly, January 1994, p. 33. 
561 Ibid. 
562 Williams, 'Can Small Islands Rely on Anyone', op. cit. 
563 President Gayoom, statement on behalf of the Group of Eminent 
Persons on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing 
States, op. cit. 
564 I. Williams, 'North Tells Small Islands to Drown', Pacific 
Islands Monthly, June 1994, pp. 6-8. 
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sustainable development of small island developing states. 565 This 
programme of action was significant, as it was more detailed than 
the section on small island states in Chapter 17 of Agenda 21. The 
programme covered a wide range of issues and specified various 
measures that needed to be taken at the national, regional and 
international levels to promote sustainable development of small 
island developing states. 
The response of the industrialised countries to the Conference was 
not as enthusiastic as the Maldives or Vanuatu would have liked. The 
level at which industrialised countries were represented at the 
conference was low and not a single head of state from these 
countries attended. Only a few countries like Australia, New 
Zealand, Germany and Canada sent ministers. 566 Britain, the former 
colonial overlord of a large number of small island states, sent 
only an Under Secretary of the Department of Environment. France was 
represented by the local ambassador to Barbados. 
The attitude of the industrialised countries at the conference 
towards new and additional assistance to small island developing 
states was grudging. Just two years after the Earth summit which 
acknowledged the need for new and additional financial resources to 
be provided to small island states, the industrial countries at the 
Global Conference on the sustainable Development of Small Island 
Developing States refused to increase their assistance. Their 
justification was that most small island developing states already 
receive more financial aid per head of population than land based 
565 The programme of action for the sustainable development of small 
island states, in, 'Report of the Global Conference on the 
Sustainable Development of Small Island States', United Nations 
document, A/CONF.167/9 of October 1994, Annex II, pp. 6-55, United 
Nations Homepage, 1996, online available: 
gopher://gopher.un.org/OO/conf/sids/conference/official/eng/poa.txt 
, 6 March 1999. 
566 I. Williams, 'North Tells Small Islands', op. cit. 
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developing countries. 567 The special needs of small island states 
with respect to environment and development that were responsible 
for the convening of the conference were ignored. However, the need 
to provide adequate, predictable, new and additional financial 
resources in accordance with Chapter 33 of Agenda 21 was included in 
the final report of the Conference on the insistence of small island 
states. 568 In other words, the developed countries refused to fulfil 
their Rio pledges to small island states and were willing to go no 
further than merely reiterate them. The repetition of the pledges 
was important for small island states as it gave them some 
ammuni tion to keep their pressure on the developed countries for 
assistance. 
The reluctance of the developed countries to implement their Rio 
pledges to small island developing states and the continuing 
deterioration of the global environment, meant that small states 
cannot afford to slacken their campaign in seeking international 
commitment to environment protection. As such, the Maldives and 
Vanuatu are continuing to be active through multilateral 
organisations such as the AOSIS, Commonwealth and the united Nations 
in pushing for international action in protecting the environment. 
In 1994, Vanuatu's Ambassador Ravou-Akii became a lead negotiator in 
the discussions on the composition of the GEF. Vanuatu sought 
jointly with the rest of the small island states of the South 
Pacific, to gain a seat in the GEF Council. This was important for 
the South Pacific island states so as to have a say in the decision 
making process of this mechanism through which a large portion of 
567 Ibid. 
568 Document A/CONF.167/9, Annex II, op. cit., Section on Finance. 
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environmental projects were to be funded. 569 However, the attempt was 
not too successful. Only 6 seats were allocated to the Asia and the 
Pacific and when it came to having a say in the nitty-gritty of aid 
allocation there was very little sympathy for South Pacific island 
states from the other countries. 570 As such, the South Pacific island 
states had to settle for a constituency that included Indonesia and 
Philippines. 571 
The assistance received by Vanuatu and the Maldives from the GEF has 
been very limited to-date. At the end of 1998, only US$ 358 thousand 
has been allocated by GEF for global warming and biodiversity 
related projects in Vanuatu, and US$10 million for South Pacific 
region-wide projects. 572 A total of US$ 864 thousand was allocated by 
GEF for projects in the Maldives. According to Mohamed Khaleel, 
Deputy Director, of the Environment Section of Ministry of Home 
Affairs and Environment of the Maldives, funding from GEF to his 
country is likely to increase in the future. 573 Mr. M. Khaleel noted 
that the main reasons for the low level of assistance from GEF is 
firstly because the organisation ran only a pilot project until 
1998, and secondly, appropriate projects for funding have not been 
identified. Mr. Khaleel also mentioned that his ministry is now in 
the process of developing such appropriate projects. 
569 I. Williams, 'Can Small Islands Rely on Anyone', op. cit., p. 
38. 
570 D. Fairman, 'The Global Environment Facility: Haunted by the 
Shadow of the Future', in R.O. Keohane and M.A. Levy (eds.), 
Institutions for Environmental Aid, The Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, Massachusetts, 1996, pp. 55-88. 
571 I. Williams, 'Can Small Islands Rely on Anyone', op. cit., p. 
39. 
572 GEF 
online: 
1999. 
home page, 'Project Review', 12 January 1999, 
http://www.gefweb.org/OPERPORT/PROGLIST.PDF, 13 
573 Interview with Mr. M. Khaleel, op. cit. 
available 
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The fact that a funding mechanism for environment related projects 
was set-up and a Framework Convention on Climate Change was signed, 
did not mean that small island states could relax their fight 
against the deteriorating global environment. The Maldives and 
Vanuatu are still using almost every opportunity to address 
international forums to ensure that the plight of small island 
states is not forgotten. simultaneously, these countries are also 
continuing along with other small states, to play an active role in 
climate change negotiations through the AOSIS, which is still one of 
the leading players in the process. 
At the first meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP) to the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, held in Berlin in 1995, for 
example, an AOSIS submission was among the two protocol proposals 
that were considered. The AOSIS protocol proposal that called for 
emission reduction by at least 20 per cent off 1990 levels by the 
year 2005 was in fact the focus of COPi. 574 The proposal had the 
support of many states but was rejected as some industrialised 
countries such as Japan, Canada and especially the united states and 
Australia were opposed to any targets or timetables. 575 
The failure of COPi to adopt specific targets and timetables for 
emission reduction did not mean that the AOSIS protocol proposal was 
futile. In the negotiation of complex issues such as climate change, 
one cannot expect all the countries to cave in easily to the demands 
of anyone group of states. The essential task for small states was 
perseverance and persistence. Success could only be gradual but 
cumulative. The Berlin Mandate adopted at the COPi for example, was 
574 G. Akumu, 'G77 In-Flight Reflections', in ECO Newsletter, Issue 
10, 7 April, 1995. 
575 Paterson, Global Warming r op. cit., pp. 67-71. 
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an advancement on the original Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, as it decided that the commitments of parties under Article 
4, paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of the said convention were inadequate. 576 
The Mandate also established an open ended ad hoc group of parties 
to start negotiations for strengthening the said commitments with 
the aim of setting quantified emission reduction targets within a 
specified time-frame. 
COP2 held in Geneva in 1996 built on the achievements of COP1. COP2 
called for the conclusion of a protocol or another legally binding 
instrument to reduce greenhouse gases, which also includes feasible 
and achievable time-frames and timetables to reverse the 
concentration of gases to acceptable levels before the turn of the 
century. Based on this call COP3 held in Kyoto in 1997 adopted the 
Kyoto Protocol under which developed countries accepted a 
"differentiated" target, which allowed them to negotiate individual 
targets yielding overall at least a 5 per cent reduction in emission 
off the 1990 level by 2005-2008. 577 The European Union accepted an 8 
per cent reduction, the united states agreed to a 7 per cent 
reduction, and Japan, a 6 per cent cut. The Russian Federation 
agreed to merely stabilise its emission while Australia and Iceland 
were allowed to increase their emissions. Although this target fell 
short of the AOSIS' demand for a 20 per cent reduction in greenhouse 
gas emission, it was still an improvement on the measures that 
existed then. 
COP4 held in Buenos Aires in 1998 discussed modalities for 
implementing the emission reduction mechanisms agreed under the 
576 The Berlin Mandate, in, T. 0' Riordan and J. Jager, Poli tics of 
Climate Change, Routledge, London, 1996, Appendix II. 
577 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Article 3, paragraph 1. 
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Kyoto Protocol. The latter Protocol is yet to come into force once 
it receives the signature and ratification of 55 countries, which 
includes developed country parties accounting for at least 55% of 
1990 global carbon dioxide emissions. 578 The Maldives had the honour 
of being the first country to sign the Kyoto Protocol. 579 
Despite the effort of the Maldives, Vanuatu and the rest of the 
small island states the global environment continued to deteriorate 
over the past decade. 580 The sense of urgency, funds and the 
political will necessary to halt the degradation of the global 
environment is still insufficient within the international 
communi ty, to have a substantial impact on the global environment. 581 
Expressing dismay over the state of the global environment, 
President Gayoom, in 1997, noted that even the Barbados conference 
was "characteristic of the many false hopes that we have encountered 
since Rio" as nothing has been achieved in additional resource 
mobilisation and very little in technology transfer and capacity-
building to promote sustainable development. 582 
Nevertheless, the effort made by Vanuatu and the Maldives to halt 
the deterioration of the global environment has not been in vain 
altogether. The steps taken at the international level for the 
578 United Nations Department of Public Information, 'Setting the 
Record Straight: Global Climate Change', 1 October 1998, online 
available: http://www.un.org/plweb-
cgi/idoc.pl?36+unix+_free_user_+www.un.org .. 80+un+un+webnews+webnew 
s++convention%26adj%26on%26adj%26climate%26adj%26change, 10 
December 1998. 
579 Interview with Mr. M. Khaleel, op. cit. 
580 UNEP, Global Environment Outlook, 1997, Executive Summary. 
581 Interview conducted by author with Mr. Ernst Bani, the Head of 
the Environment Unit of Vanuatu, Port Vila, 4 February 1999. 
582 President Gayoom, address to the Nineteenth Special Session of 
United Nations General Assembly held for the overall review and 
appraisal of the implementation of Agenda 21, 21-24 July 1997, a 
copy of the address was made available to the author by the 
Permanent Mission of the Maldives to the United Nations. 
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protection of the global environment discussed above, and as noted 
in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the whole of the Nineteenth 
Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, some 
progress has been made in the area of environment protection during 
the past decade. 583 Mul tilateralism proved extremely important for 
the Maldives and Vanuatu for their contribution towards this 
progress. 
4.3b - Regionalism - Vanuatu 
Vanuatu is located in a region consisting of a number of small 
island states that face numerous common environment related 
problems. Most of these problems are linked to the location and 
physical make-up of the island states. For example, all of these 
states are made up of one or more islands and are situated in the 
cyclone-prone South Pacific. Consequently, they all face the threat 
of devastation due to cyclones. Climate change that has the 
potential to increase the frequency and severity of cyclones is a 
very serious threat and concern for all of these states. Sea level 
rise is another very serious threat facing the low lying islands of 
Vanuatu and the rest of the region. The similarity of the threats 
facing Vanuatu and most of the other states of the region meant that 
there was scope for co-operation or a joint effort at the regional 
level to overcome or minimise their environmental problems. 
Moreover, Vanuatu and the rest of the South Pacific island states 
are resource poor, making regional co-operation an important means 
to maximise the benefits of the limited available resources by 
583 United Nations document A/S-19/29, of 27 June 1997, paragraphs 
13-21. 
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avoiding wasteful duplication. Regionalism also offered Vanuatu and 
the rest of the small island states of the South Pacific the 
opportunity to realise economies of scale in the protection of their 
environment. Regionalism is also a vehicle that could potentially be 
used by these island states to join forces in influencing 
international developments in the area of environment protection. It 
is the aim of this section to assess the significance of regional 
co-operation in contributing towards the foreign policy objectives 
of Vanuatu in the area of environment protection. 
Environment protection has been among the areas of regional co-
operation in the South Pacific since the 1960s. The SPC, now Pacific 
Communi ty was the main regional organisation involved in regional 
environment protection until the 1980s. Among the initiatives of the 
SPC in the 1970s was the convening of a Regional Symposium on 
Conservation of Nature Reefs and Lagoons in 1971, and the 
launching of a special nature conservation project in 1974 with the 
appointment of a regional ecological adviser to advice territorial 
administrations on environment related issues. 584 
In 1976 the SPC and the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature convened a regional conference in the capital of Western 
Samoa, at which the Convention on the Conservation of Nature in the 
South Pacific, also known as the Apia Convention, was adopted on 12 
June 1976. 585 This Convention primarily encouraged states to 
establish protected areas to preserve the natural ecosystems and to 
protect and preserve the flora and fauna of the South Pacific. 
584 J . Carew-Reid, Environment, Aid and Regionalism in the Pacific, 
Pacific Research Monograph no. 22, National Centre for Development 
Studies of the Australian National University, Canberra, 1989, 
p.69. 
585 A comprehensive discussion of the importance and implications of 
Apia Convention is in, Ibid., pp. 93-110. 
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Presently there are over ninety protected areas in the South 
Pacific. These initiatives discussed above are benefits in the area 
of environment protection that would not have been possible for 
Vanuatu and the small island states of the South Pacific if not for 
regionalism. 
The increasing importance given to environment protection in the 
South Pacific and the need for cost effective and comprehensive 
environmental programmes led to the establishment of the SPREP. The 
organisation enabled the small island states of the South Pacific to 
co-ordinate their activities .in protecting the region's environment. 
Another important benefit of SPREP to Vanuatu is the fact that the 
activities of the organisation have been largely underwritten by 
assistance from regional and non-regional developed countries and 
organisations. Between 1993-1997 for example, Australia provided 
SPREP with A$ 5.1 million in assistance. 586 Vanuatu's contribution to 
the organisation stood at around US$ 11,445 in 1996. 587 At the 
present time when bilateral aid flows are declining world-wide a 
regional body which attracts foreign aid is very important for 
Vanuatu and the other South Pacific island states for the protection 
of the region's environment. 
Between June 1995 to May 1996, SPREP carried out some 223 projects 
and activities in the South Pacific island countries. 588 Vanuatu was 
the recipient of 23 of these projects and activities. The Head of 
the Environment unit of Vanuatu, Mr. Bani, noted that the assistance 
586 AusAID, Australia's Overseas Aid Program 1996-97, Australia 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1996, p. 30. 
587 W. Sutherland, Review of Vanuatu's Membership of International 
Organisations, a report prepared for the government of Vanuatu, 
(unpublished), 1996, p. 55. 
588 Ibid., pp. 29-34. 
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received from SPREP to the country focused mainly on areas such as 
climate change monitoring; conservation of biological diversity; 
education of the general public (through newsletters, workshops and 
assistance to libraries); training; technical advice; and financial 
assistance to participate in international meetings. 589 Sutherland 
has noted that SPREP has been a maj or financial contributor to 
Vanuatu's environmental programme activities including a significant 
amount of funding for the following large projects: Vanuatu 
Government Environment Unit; Vanuatu National Conservation Strategy; 
Vatthe (Big Bay) Conservation Areas Proj ect. 590 
Among the other benefits of SPREP to Vanuatu is the useful role 
played by the organisation in preparing regional countries for major 
international conferences on environment. Through SPREP, the 
regional governments are able to develop common positions that they 
present at major international conferences. Advocating common 
positions at international conferences are important for small 
island states since they have very little or no influence within the 
global community unless they stand united. 
SPREP also provides expert advice and help to regional countries in 
the preparation of country reports for major international 
conferences. In preparation for UNCED, for example, SPREP helped 
prepare reports such as, The Pacific Way: Pacific Island Developing 
Countries Report to the UNCED, and the Country Report for UNCED: 
Vanuatu. 591 This function of SPREP in assisting the regional 
countries prepare for international conferences is very useful for 
589 Interview with Mr. Bani, op. cit. 
590 Sutherland, Review, op. cit., p. 56. 
591 SPREP, The Pacific Way: Pacific Island Developing countries 
Report to the UNCED, SPREP, Apia, 1992; SPREP, Country Report for 
UNCED: Vanuatu, SPREP, Apia, 1992. 
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small countries such as Vanuatu that have very little financial or 
human resources at their disposal. 592 
Regional co-operation in the South Pacific has also focused on 
protecting the marine environment of the region from toxic 
pollution. As discussed in section 4.1, the protection of the marine 
environment is among the foreign policy priorities of Vanuatu. The 
Japanese plan at the beginning of the 1980s, to dump radioactive 
waste in the Pacific Ocean, about halfway between Japan and the 
Northern Mariana Islands, was contrary to Vanuatu's interests. 
Ogashiwa has noted that Japan was planning to dump around 100,000 
curies of radioactive waste per year and that there was no guarantee 
that the waste would not escape into the marine environment. 593 A 
consultant hired by the Northern Marianas to review the dumping plan 
argued that, "the lesson of the past oceanic radioactive waste 
disposal operations is clear: what we put into the sea eventually 
returns to us in our food". 594 The Eleventh SPF held in Tarawa in 
July 1980 provided the forum for the emergence of firm and 
collective opposition to the Japanese plan from the South Pacific 
island states. 595 The issue was also discussed at the Twentieth SPC 
meeting held in Port Moresby in October 1980, and a resolution 
expressing grave concern over plans to dump radioactive waste in the 
Pacific, was adopted. 596 The strong opposition from the South Pacific 
island states led Japan, in 1981, to dump the plan. 
592 Interview with Mr. Bani, op. cit. 
593 Ogashiwa, Microstates and Nuclear Issues, op. cit., p. 19. 
594 G. Johnson, 'Japanese Aid with Nuclear Strings?', in Pacific 
News Bulletin, Vol. 3, No.7, October 1988, pp.6-7. 
595 Ogashiwa, Microstates and Nuclear Issues, op. cit., p. 19. 
596 SPC, Report of the Twentieth South Pacific Conference, Port 
Moresby, 18-24 October 1980, SPC, Noumea, 1980, pp. 21-22. 
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The desire to place environmental protection on a legal footing led 
governments of South Pacific island states in 1986, to adopt the 
Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and 
Environment of the South Pacific Region, commonly known as the SPREP 
Convention. 597 Vanuatu, being one of the most hard-line against 
nuclear-related activities in the South Pacific, strongly supported 
the adoption of the Convention. 598 The SPREP Convention that entered 
into force on 18 August 1990 had a protocol prohibiting the dumping 
of hazardous waste, and another one on co-operation in combating 
pollution in the region. The Convention required signatories to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution in the region, specifically 
that from vessels, land-based sources, sea bed exploitation and 
exploration, airborne pollution, and toxic and hazardous waste 
dumping. It was a comprehensive convention for the protection of the 
coastal and maritime environment of the region. The significance of 
the agreement also lay in the fact that non-regional members of SPC 
which were involved in nuclear activities in the region, such as 
United States and France, signed the SPREP Convention. 
Another convention known as the Waigani Convention, that 
strengthened the legal framework for the protection of the region's 
marine environment was concluded through the SPREP in 1995. The 
Waigani Convention was initiated by Papua New Guinea. However, 
before approaching the SPF, the idea of drawing up such a convention 
was first discussed by Papua New Guinea with the MSG countries. 
Vanuatu was quick to support the idea and was instrumental in 
sensitising the other South Pacific island states regarding the need 
for the convention. 599 
597 The SPREP Convention is discussed in detail in Carew-Reid, 
Environment, op. cit., pp. 80-92. 
598 Interview with Mr. Bani, op. cit. 
599 Interview with Mr. Sami, op. cit. 
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The Waigani Convention was adopted at Waigani, Papua New Guinea, on 
16 September 1995. The convention aimed at banning the importation 
into the Forum island countries of hazardous and radioactive wastes 
and to control the transboundary movement and management of such 
waste within the South Pacific region. 600 The Convention will enter 
into force once two thirds of the regional countries ratify it. 
Given the slow rate of ratification of this convention it is not 
sure when it will enter into force. 
Regionalism also proved useful for Vanuatu in its battle against 
climate change. A regional stand against climate change would 
undoubtedly carry more weight than that of an individual nation in 
the international arena. Regionalism enabled Vanuatu and the rest of 
the SPREP member states to work collectively in the search for 
solutions to the threat of climate change and sea level rise due to 
global warming. 
The first major step by Vanuatu and the other South Pacific island 
states against the threats posed by global warming was the 
Intergovernmental Meeting on Climate Change and Sea Level Rise, held 
in Majuro, the Marshall Islands, in 1989. At this meeting the SPREP 
member states took a collective stand in denouncing climate change 
as potentially catastrophic and threatening in the long term the 
very existence of low lying countries of the region.~l They called 
on the developed industrialised countries responsible for global 
warming to provide the South Pacific island states with financial, 
600 Forum Secretariat, 'Waigani Convention', available online: 
http://chacmool.sdnp.undp.org/pacific/forumsec/docs/wc.htm, 15 
March 1999. 
601 Majuro Declaration quoted in Taplin, 'International Policy on 
the Greenhouse Effect', op. cit., p. 237. 
scientific and technological resources 
comprehensively with this problem. 602 
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to monitor and deal 
since the Majuro Meeting the South Pacific island states have been 
united on the issue of climate change and sea level rise. This unity 
created through the framework of SPREP and other regional forums 
resulted in South Pacific island states presenting a united front in 
international forums dealing with climate change and sea level rise. 
These forums included the COP to the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. 
The only drawback of regionalism to Vanuatu lay in the conflict of 
interests between some regional states in the area of environment 
protection. On the issue of climate change, the differences in 
interests are most obvious between Australia and the small island 
states of the region. For example, prior to COP3 the small island 
states of the South Pacific strongly advocated a uniform reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions by 20 per cent off the 1990 level in 
developed countries, while Australia was of the view that each 
country should have the right to set its own emission target. 
Presently, the South Pacific island states believe that a 60 - 80 
per cent reduction in emissions is needed to halt climate change, 
while Australia has fought hard and acquired the right under the 
I , .' 603 Kyoto Protoco , to lncrease effilSSlons. 
Given the fact that almost all of the South Pacific island states 
are heavily dependent on Australia for development assistance and 
602 Ibid. 
603 SPREP, Press Release, 'Pacific island countries argue for bigger 
emission cuts', 8 June 1999, available online, 
http://www.sidsnet.org/pacific/sprep/PressRelease/1999/pr9910_.htm. 
10 June 1999. 
263 
other supportl at times they have to compromise their own interests 
and accommodate those of Australia. At the SPF meeting held in Cook 
Islands in 1997, for example, the small island states of the South 
Pacific endorsed the "Australian climate treaty negotiating position 
of differentiation" in emission reduction l although it was not in 
line with their own. 604 This dilemma of having to sacrifice Vanuatu's 
own interests to accommodate those of the others l is a reality that 
the country will have to live with l or is inevitable l within the 
framework of regional co-operation. 
4.3c - Bilateralism - Vanuatu 
A number of countries share similar environmental concerns and 
interests as Vanuatu. However shared interests and concerns do not 
necessarily make bilateral relations with them particularly 
important in furthering Vanuatu/s objectives in the area of 
protecting the environment. Some bilateral partners are very useful 
in terms of the aid they provide but their policies on environment 
are damaging to those of Vanuatu. The significance of bilateralism 
in the area of environment protection will be judged in this section 
based on the usefulness of these partners in contributing towards 
the foreign policy objectives of Vanuatu focused in this chapter. 
Vanuatu's bilateral connections with the regional small island 
states have been strong over the years and most of them share 
similar environment-related interests as Vanuatu. Yet, regional 
small island states have not been very significant at the bilateral 
604 M. Pitcher, 'South Pacific Forum Communique Endorses Australia 
Climate Position', 16 April 1999, available online: 
www.weathervane.rff.org/negtable/statcomm.html, 14 May 1999. 
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level in contributing towards Vanuatu's foreign policy objectives. 
Firstly, the small island states of the South Pacific are very poor 
in terms of financial and human resources, and are dependent on 
foreign aid for the protection of their environment. Thus, these 
small island states of the South Pacific have not been of much help 
to Vanuatu in the area of environment protection as far as resources 
are concerned. Secondly, the existence of an effective regional 
framework for co-operation in the area of environment protection 
minimised the importance of bilateralism for co-ordination and co-
operation between regional small states. 
As mentioned previously, the environment-related interests of 
Vanuatu, the other Pacific island states and numerous other states 
within the international community are quite similar. Thus, in 
promoting environment related interests at the international level 
Vanuatu has been able to join forces not only with the small states 
of the South Pacific but other states within the global community 
which share similar interests. Through the AOSIS, the united 
Nations, and other organisations like the Commonwealth, small island 
states and others facing similar environmental problems, have been 
able to co-operate and co-ordinate their activities at the 
international level so as to best promote their interests. The 
significance of multilateral organisations such as those mentioned 
above diminished for Vanuatu the relevance and importance of 
bilateral relations with the small island states of the South 
Pacific in influencing events at the international level. It is only 
for purposes such as gaining candidature support in international 
elections that bilateral relations with these countries have been of 
significance. 
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In the case of larger regional partners, their policies have on 
certain instances been contrary and damaging to the interests of 
Vanuatu in the area of environment protection. For example, French 
nuclear testing in the South Pacific totally conflicted with 
Vanuatu's interest in protecting the marine environment of the 
region. Similarly the Australian position on the issue of climate 
change has been damaging to the interests of Vanuatu. At COPl for 
example, Australia turned its back on Vanuatu and other small island 
states and was among those responsible for obstructing agreement on 
stringent emission reduction targets. 605 At COP2, Australia used 
stalling tactics with respect to emission reduction, drawing harsh 
cri ticism even from quarters such as the European Union. 606 Other 
major bilateral partners of Vanuatu in the developed world such as 
Uni ted Kingdom, France and Japan also did not share Vanuatu's 
viewpoint on the issue of climate change, as discussed in section 
4. 3b. In other words these countries were unwilling to sacrifice 
their own national interests for the sake of bilateral partners such 
as Vanuatu. 
On issues such as those discussed above, there is virtually nothing 
Vanuatu can do through its bilateral links to change the policies of 
its partners. As a typical small island state, Vanuatu does not have 
economic, military, or any other power to wield in influencing the 
policies of these larger countries. Moreover, Vanuatu, like other 
small island states, has a dependent relationship with its bilateral 
partners, which provide the badly needed development assistance for 
the country. Thus, bilateralism has been of little use in instances 
605 K. Hamilton, 'Aussie NZ SellOut?', ECO Newsletter, 7 April 
1995, Issue 10. 
606 'Aussie Bashed', ECO Newsletter, 18 July 1996, Issue 7. 
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where the environmental interests of Vanuatu clashed with the 
political or economic interests of the bilateral partners. 
Despite conflicts of interests from time to time with some bilateral 
partners in the developed world, on issues such as climate change, 
bilateralism has not been totally useless for Vanuatu. Relations 
with the developed countries of the South Pacific namely, Australia 
and New Zealand have been very useful because of the assistance they 
provide. Between 1990 and 1995 Australia provided Vanuatu 
approximately A$ 2.79 million in aid for areas such as disaster 
relief, environmental sanitation, and sea-level and climate 
monitoring. 607 Presently there are four environment related ongoing 
projects in Vanuatu sponsored by Australia. 608 These projects 
include: 1) sustainable Forest utilisation Project (1993-1999); 2) 
Land Use Planning Project for the sustainable Development of Natural 
Resources (1995-2000); 3) Sea Level and Climate Monitoring (1996-
2000); and 4) Pacificland Phase II for the Management of Sloping 
Land (1997-2000).609 Australia has committed a combined total of A$ 
19.1 million in grant aid for the full duration of the proj ects. 
Australia has also been committed to providing disaster relief to 
Vanuatu as the need arises. 610 These are important benefits reaped by 
Vanuatu through bilateral relations with Australia. 
New Zealand has also been providing grant aid to Vanuatu for 
environmental projects. Since 1992 New Zealand's assistance to 
Vanuatu for environment protection focused on three projects. These 
607 AusAID, Australian Overseas Aid Program Official Expenditure: 
1990/91 to 1994/95, AusAID, Canberra, 1995, pp. 42-43. 
608 'Australia Aid Program to Vanuatu: Work Program 1999'. A copy of 
the document was made available to author by the AusAID Office in 
Port Vila. 
609 Ibid. 
610 Ibid. 
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projects include: 1) Forestry/Environment (1997-1998); 2) 
Agricultural Security (1992-1993); and 3) Conservation-Big Bay 
(1994-1995) .611 By the end of the 1998/99 period, New Zealand is 
estimated to spend a combined total of approximately NZ$ 2.3 million 
for the projects. In relation to Vanuatu's needs the assistance 
received from New Zealand is not much, but extremely valuable given 
the scarcity of resources available to the improvement of the 
country's environment. 
The other major aid donors of Vanuatu have not been contributing to 
environment related proj ects of the country. France for instance 
does not provide any environment related assistance to Vanuatu. 
According to Mr. Mundo, Cultural Attache of the French Embassy in 
Port Vila, the French do not provide assistance for environmental 
proj ects to avoid duplication, since certain other countries and 
organisations assist Vanuatu in that area. 612 Mr Mundo also noted 
that France and the other main aid donors to Vanuatu co-ordinate 
among themselves to avoid duplication in the assistance provided. 
The other main bilateral aid donors to Vanuatu such as the united 
Kingdom and China also do not assist the country in the area of 
environmental protection. 613 Thus, bilateral assistance received by 
Vanuatu in the area of environment protection is very limited but 
useful. This situation is unlikely to improve in any substantial 
manner in the foreseeable future since aid donors are likely to 
611 Information provided to the author by Mrs. J. Caine, Deputy High 
Commissioner, New Zealand High Commission, Port Vila, 5 February 
1999. 
612 Interview conducted by the author with Mr. Mundo, Cultural 
Attache of the French Embassy, Port Vila, 5 February 1999. 
613 Interview conducted by author with Mr. N. Duggin, Programme 
Support Officer of the British High Commission, Port Vila, 3 
February 1999; Telephone conversation between the author and the 
First Secretary, Economic Division, of the Chinese Embassy, Port 
Vila, on 4 February 1999. 
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favour multilateral funding institutions in the area of environment 
protection to bilateral arrangements. However, as Mr. M. Khaleel 
noted in the interview with the author, if small states like the 
Maldives and Vanuatu can come up with good projects there are donors 
out there that will be willing to finance them. 
4.3d - Regionalism - Maldives 
Over the past decade the Maldives has been trying to employ 
regionalism to further its foreign policy objectives in the area of 
environment protection. However, the effort has not been very 
successful due to the differences between the Maldives and the rest 
of the regional countries. It is the aim of this section to assess 
the effectiveness of regionalism for the Maldives in furthering the 
country's environment related objectives. 
The differences in the physical make-up and social conditions of the 
Maldives and the rest of the South Asian countries are inevitably 
reflected in their environmental interests. However, two main 
factors made SAARe sympathetic and responsive, to some extent, to 
the sea-level rise related environmental concerns of the Maldives. 
Firstly, a long history of close relations with the regional 
countries placed the Maldives in a favourable position to obtain the 
support of SAARe member states on issues of concern to the country. 
Secondly, the SAARe region has been plagued by numerous 
environmental disasters such as floods, deforestation, soil erosion, 
droughts, and storms. 614 Moreover, while sea-level rise was also a 
serious and imminent threat to parts of Bangladesh, climate change 
614 The environmental problems faced by South Asian states are 
discussed in, Shaukat Hassan, Adelphi Papers 262: Environmental 
Issues and Security in South Asia, Autumn, 1991, The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, London, pp. 7-23. 
269 
was a threat to all countries of South Asia alike. Given the fact 
that the region is poor, thickly populated and heavily dependent on 
agriculture, natural disasters due to climate change could seriously 
affect very large segments of the region's populace. These factors 
made it conducive for the Maldives to instigate regional co-
operation on environment in South Asia. 
Relying on the above factors, the Maldives in 1987 initiated 
discussion, at the Third SAARC Summit held in Kathmandu, on the 
inclusion of environment protection in the areas for South Asian co-
operation. 615 The initiative was met with interest by the leaders of 
the SAARC member states, all of which face numerous environmental 
problems and are occasionally victimised by natural disasters that 
stem from them. Consequently, the declaration issued at the 
Kathmandu Summit, expressed concern over the vulnerability of the 
region to natural disasters such as floods, droughts, land slides, 
cyclones, tidal waves and the danger posed to regional countries by 
global sea level rise. 616 The Declaration also noted the decision of 
the South Asian leaders to engage in regional co-operation with a 
view to strengthening the disaster management capabilities of the 
region. On the ini tiati ve of President Gayoom, SAARC leaders also 
decided in 1987 to commission a study on the causes and consequences 
of natural disasters and the protection and preservation of the 
environment. 617 The Maldives also followed up its initial drive to 
615 SAARC Secretariat, SAARC Summits, SAARC Secretariat, Kathmandu, 
1990, p. 150. 
616 'Declaration of the Third SAARC Summit', Kathmandu, 4 November 
1987, paragraph 13. A copy of the Declaration was made available to 
the author by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Male'. 
617 The singular commitment and contribution by President Gayoom to 
SAARC and especially the organisation's environment related 
activities are highlighted in the statement by Mr. Naeem U. Hassan, 
Secretary-General of SAARC, at the inaugural ceremony of SAARC 
Environment Ministers' Conference, 15-16 October 1997, Male'. This 
statement is in, SAARC Secretariat, SAARC Environment Ministers' 
Conference, 15-16 October 1997, Male', annex, IV. 
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initiate regional co-operation with a proposal in 1988 for the 
conduct of a study on greenhouse effect and its impact on South 
Asia. The proposal received the support of SAARC member states at 
their Fourth Summit Meeting in Islamabad. 618 The Maldives was also 
instrumental in designating 1992 as the 'SAARC Year of 
Environment' .619 
Two regional studies on environment have been undertaken by SAARC to 
date. They included, SAARC Regional study on the Causes and 
Consequences of Natural Disasters and the Protection and 
Preservation of the Environment, and the, SAARC Regional study on 
Greenhouse Effect and its Impact on the Region, were completed in 
1992. 620 A committee was also set up under SAARC to examine these 
studies, identify measures for action, and decide on modalities for 
implementing them. 621 The committee was later designated as the 
Technical Committee on Environment. 
studies are an essential first step in the protection of the 
environment. However, studies can make little difference to the 
physical environment unless the recommendations contained in them 
are implemented. SAARC has not yet been effective in implementing 
the recommendations contained in the two studies on environment 
mentioned above. Some of these recommendations included the 
618 'Declaration of the Fourth SAARC Summit', Islamabad, 31 December 
1988, paragraph 10. A copy of the Declaration was made available to 
the author by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Male'. 
619 President Gayoom, statement to the UNCED, 12 June 1992. A copy 
of the statement was made available to the author by the Permanent 
Mission of the Maldives to the United Nations. 
620 SAARC Regional Study on the Causes and Consequences of Natural 
Disasters and the Protection and Preservation of the Environment, 
SAARC Secretariat, Kathmandu, 1992; SAARC Regional Study on 
Greenhouse Effect and its Impact on the Region, SAARC Secretariat, 
Kathmandu, 1992. 
621 'Declaration of the Sixth SAARC Summit', Colombo, 21 December 
1991, paragraph 27. A copy of the Declaration was made available to 
the author by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Male'. 
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dissemination of information, transfer and exchange of technologies, 
establishment of gauging stations to monitor sea level rise and 
increasing energy efficiency and conservation. 622 Regional leaders at 
the Eighth SAARC Summit held in Delhi in 1995, expressed the need 
for speedy action in the implementation of the recommendations. 623 
However, SAARC did not make any substantial progress in the field of 
environment protection during the subsequent two years. Consequently 
the Ninth and Tenth SAARC Summits held in the Maldives and Sri Lanka 
respectively, again reiterated the need for urgent action.~4 
The lack of political will seems to be the main reason for the 
ongoing delay in SAARC action in the area of environment protection. 
The relatively low priority afforded to environment protection could 
perhaps be explained as a product of more pressing socio-economic 
problems existing within the region. Furthermore, as far as the 
issue of sea level rise is concerned it is only the Maldives and 
Bangladesh which face an imminent serious threat. According to Mr. 
M. Khaleel, given the poverty, starvation, the enormity of socio-
economic problems in South Asia and the limited resources available, 
it is unlikely that environment protection will move higher in the 
list of priorities of the regional countries. 625 
SAARC's lethargy in implementing concrete measures to protect the 
environment does not render regionalism meaningless in furthering 
the foreign policy objectives of the Maldives. Any progress, even if 
622 SAARC Regional Study on Greenhouse Effect, op. cit. f pp. 164 -
166. 
623 'Declaration of the Eighth SAARC Summit', Delhi, issued on 4 May 
1995, paragraph 33. A copy of the Declaration was made available to 
the author by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Male'. 
624 'Declaration of the Ninth SAARC Summit', Male' f issued on 14 May 
1997, paragraph 3; Declaration of the Tenth SAARC Summit, Colombo, 
31 July 1998, paragraph 53. Copies of the Declarations were made 
available to the author by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Male'. 
625 Interview with Mr. Khaleel, op. cit. 
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it is slow, is important for the Maldives. Furthermore, SAARC 
provides the Maldives a channel through which to impress on regional 
countries the need for action. Keeping this channel open is 
important since it is one of the few avenues through which the 
Maldives could exert some pressure on the regional countries to 
contribute to environmental protection. Unless a framework for co-
operation exists there is no hope for any action at the regional 
level in the protection of the environment. 
During the past decade SAARC has presented collective positions at 
international conferences on environment such as the Fourth World 
Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction held in Japan in 1997, 
Rio+5 (the Nineteenth Special Session of the united Nations General 
Assembly held for the purpose of review and appraisal of Agenda 21), 
COP3 and COP4. These positions have not been very useful for the 
Maldives since their scope is narrow and excludes those aspects of 
environment protection over which there exist differences among 
regional countries. Moreover, the differences in interests between 
the Maldives and the rest of the regional countries are such that 
the emphases of these collective positions were not the most 
desirable from the point of view of the Maldives. The common 
position of SAARC drawn up on the eve of COP4, for example, 
emphasised the need to ensure that any precept that has the 
potential of requiring developing countries to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions is not allowed. The common position argued, 
"that any attempt by some Annex I Parties to link their ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol to the introduction of new commitments for 
non-Annex I Parties will only delay the Protocol coming into force" 
and that "such an attempt is totally unwarranted within the 
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framework of the Climate Change Convention". 626 The need for deeper 
cuts in greenhouse gas emission to save small island states like the 
Maldives from submergence does not feature in the common position. 
This means that the most fundamental environment related interests 
of the Maldives such as a drastic reduction in greenhouse gas 
emission are not adequately stressed in the common positions of 
SAARC. 
The inability to adequately address the environmental needs through 
SAARC forced the Maldives to join with other small states, to 
collectively work at the international level in furthering their 
environmental interests. In 1992, in the 'bloc politics' climate of 
the Earth Summit, the Maldives sought refuge within the AOSIS camp, 
of which no other South Asian country had membership. 
The membership of multilateral organisations such as the United 
Nations, Commonwealth and most importantly the AOSIS diminishes the 
importance of regionalism to the Maldives in furthering environment 
related foreign policy obj ecti ves. Through multilateral 
organisations the Maldives has the opportunity to co-ordinate its 
actions at the international level with other countries which have 
similar interests. Since almost all the member states of the AOSIS, 
for example, have fairly similar needs and concerns as the Maldives 
they are able to pursue their environment related interests at the 
multilateral level collectively through their organisation. Thus, as 
mentioned in the case of Vanuatu, the Maldives' membership of 
multilateral organisations which are more conducive to diplomacy at 
the global level, makes regionalism less important in pursuing the 
country's foreign policy interests in the international arena. 
626 SAARC Secretariat, Fourth SAARe Environment Ministers Meeting, 
30 October to 1 November 1998, Colombo, Appendix A: Annex XIII. 
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Despite the fact that SAARC has not been very effective in 
contributing towards the foreign policy objectives of the Maldives, 
the latter has not given up on regionalism as a tool in contributing 
towards environment protection. In 1997, for example, the Maldives 
offered at the SAARC Summit in Male', to prepare a feasibility study 
on the establishment of a Coastal Zone Management Centre. Work on 
this study is presently being undertaken by the Environment Section 
of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Environment of the Maldives. 627 
The benefit of the Centre to the Maldives will however be limited. 
The Coastal Zone Management Centre is likely to focus largely on 
issues which are of importance to the majority of South Asian 
countries such as the management of river banks and marshland none 
of which are present in the Maldives. 
Following a decision by the SAARC leaders the Maldives is also 
presently engaged in the preparation of a National Environment 
Action Plan, and a state of the Environment Report. 628 It is true 
that studies and action plans are important if South Asia is to 
contribute towards the protection of the environment. It is also 
true that such reports and action plans will be of little use unless 
the regional states are committed to implement the various measures 
called for in the documents prepared. Given the numerous pressing 
socio-economic problems in South Asia, a strong commitment is 
unlikely unless SAARC receives substantial external funding for 
environment protection. However, aid donors are unlikely to provide 
funding unless South Asian countries show a strong commitment to 
environment protection. Overall, the future of regionalism in 
627 Interview with Mr. Khaleel, op. cit. 
628 Ibid. 
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contributing towards the environment related foreign policy 
objectives of the Maldives in a substantial manner is bleak. 
4.3e - Bilateralism - Maldives 
There are major differences between the environment-related 
interests of the Maldives and its major bilateral partners. These 
differences are particularly pronounced on the issue of climate 
change. Thus, 
furthering only 
bilateralism has been useful for the Maldives in 
the objectives. 
some 
It 
foreign policy obj ecti ves or some aspects of 
is the aim of this section to assess the 
significance of bilateralism in contributing towards the foreign 
policy objectives of the Maldives in the area of environment 
protection, focused in this chapter. 
Bilateral relations with South Asian countries have not been of much 
significance to the Maldives in furthering the country's foreign 
policy objectives of drawing international attention to the plight 
of small island states in the face of the deteriorating global 
environment and placing global warming on the international agenda; 
influencing negotiations on the convention on climate change; and 
finding ways and means of protecting the environment at the local 
and regional levels. As discussed in section 4.3d bilateral partners 
of the Maldives in South Asia such as India and Pakistan do not 
share the same interests as the Maldives on issues related to global 
warming. Thus, they have not been of much use to the Maldives in 
promoting its environment related interests at the global level. 
Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar are another 
group of bilateral partners that have not been very useful in 
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contributing towards global warming or climate change related 
objectives of the Maldives. As discussed earlier in the section on 
globalism, petroleum exporting states such as those mentioned above 
have been among the most outspoken against the position of the 
Maldives and other small island states on the issue of global 
warming and sea level rise. As Rowlands has noted the member states 
of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and 
those of the AOSIS are the most polarised on the issue of emission 
abatement. 629 Thus, bilateral relations of the Maldives with these 
Arab states have been of no use in placing the issue of global 
warming on the international agenda or influencing negotiations on 
climate change. 
The sympathy of the bilateral partners in the developed world, that 
are influential in the international arena was useful for the 
Maldives in placing the issue of global warming and sea level rise 
on the international agenda. As discussed earlier, states such as 
the united Kingdom were sympathetic to the concerns of the Maldives 
first expressed in the "Death of a Nation" speech delivered at the 
Vancouver CHOGM of 1997, by the President Gayoom. Such sympathy from 
developed countries was important in thrusting the issue of climate 
change onto the international agenda. 
Small island states are the only countries that share similar 
environmental concerns as the Maldives. Yet bilateral relations with 
these countries have not been of much use in furthering the 
environment related objectives of the Maldives. Most individual 
small island states have neither influence within the global 
community nor resources that the Maldives could benefit from. 
629 Rowlands, The Politics of Global, op.cit., p.212. 
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Moreover, small island states could co-ordinate their acti vi ties 
through the AOSIS making bilateral relations among them not very 
insignificant in furthering environment related objectives. 
Bilateral relations with developed countries have been of use to the 
Maldives only in certain areas of environment protection. In 
influencing negotiations on the convention on climate change, 
bilateral relations with developed countries were of not much value 
to the Maldives. The interests of the Maldives and developed 
countries with respect to the issue of global warming were very 
different in the negotiations. 
As discussed earlier in sections 4. 2a and 4. 2b, the problem of 
global warming was largely a product of industrialisation. The 
developed countries have been the major emitters of greenhouse gases 
responsible for climate change. Maj or changes in the industrial 
practices in the developed world are essential in slowing global 
warming. Developed countries have been reluctant to implement such 
change at a pace that would affect their economic progress. As such 
the concessions the developed countries have been willing to make in 
COP meetings are too little to satisfy the interests of the 
Maldives. 
One area in which bilateralism is potentially significant for the 
Maldives is in gaining positions of influence in environment related 
international meetings and organisations. Such positions are 
important in exerting some influence on the developments through 
these meetings and organisations. The united Nations practice of 
allocating seats based on regional groupings means that the Maldives 
needs to maintain close bilateral links with regional countries if 
it wants to win regional seats. Bilateral links with influential 
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countries wi thin the global community are also important in this 
respect. However, given the limitation of human resources the 
Maldives has not been able to stand for office in major 
international organisations, although the country has chaired 
numerous environment related meetings. 630 
In 1992, the Maldives and Vanuatu were successful in being among 
those elected to the vice-presidential seats allocated to the Asia-
Pacific at the UNCED. They succeeded because much larger and 
influential countries such as Japan and Bangladesh stood down in 
their favour. 631 However, it should not be forgotten that the 
environment related interests of the Maldives are very different to 
those of a number of its larger bilateral partners. Thus, although 
bilateralism is essential in gaining positions of influence on 
international meetings and organisations, the Maldives cannot always 
count on the support of bilateral partners in elections. In other 
words, bilateralism is important but not always reliable when it 
comes to elections in environment related organisations or meetings. 
The significance of bilateralism to the Maldives in the protection 
of the environment lies mainly in the area of development 
assistance. The Maldives lacks the resources to adequately address 
the country's environmental problems at the local level. 
Consequently, the country is largely dependent on foreign aid. Most 
of the foreign aid the country receives for the protection of the 
environment comes from bilateral sources. 
South Asian countries such as India and Pakistan, though poor, have 
been very generous in assisting the Maldives. In 1991 following the 
630 Interview with Mr. Khaleel, op. cit. 
631 Taplin, 'International Policy', op.cit., p. 227. 
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environmental disaster caused by monsoon winds and high tide, India 
provided the Maldives with assistance worth US$1.25 million, topping 
the list of international donors that came to the assistance of the 
Maldives in that particular incident. 632 Pakistan was second on the 
list, providing US$ 840,000 worth of assistance. The highest amount 
of assistance from developed countries came from the united states 
which provided US$ 300,000 followed by Britain which contributed US$ 
83,000 and Norway which donated US$ 30,000. The total amount of 
bilateral aid received was US$ US$2,690,633.74. In comparison with 
bilateral assistance, the total aid received from multilateral 
sources such as UNDP, UNICEF and UNDRO was just US$ 95,000. OPEC 
provided an additional US$ 50,000. In addition to the above 
financial aid small amounts of assistance in kind were received from 
bilateral and multilateral sources. 
Maldives has also found bilateralism to be extremely important in 
obtaining the funds needed for environment related projects. In this 
respect, Japan has been the biggest donor to the Maldives. From 1996 
to 1998 for instance, Japan provided approximately US$ 21.2 million 
worth of" assistance to protect against erosion and the threat of 
high waves that could inflict serious damage on the low lying 
islands. 633 The bulk of Japanese assistance was directed towards 
constructing a sea-wall around Male' to protect against wave action. 
The other bilateral partner that provided environment related 
assistance to the Maldives during the above period was Canada that 
donated US$9,500 for the million tree planting project. 
632 Disaster relief statistics was provided to the author by the 
Department of External Resources of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Male, December 1998. 
633 Statistics on aid were provided to the author by the Department 
of External Resources, Male', December 1999. 
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In comparison with bilateral partners, multilateral institutions 
realised for the Maldives only US$ 1.16 million worth of assistance 
during the above period. The GEF and the UNDP contributed this 
assistance. Funding from multilateral organisations is not likely to 
surpass in the foreseeable future the assistance received from 
bilateral sources. Overall, bilateralism far outweighs 
multilateralism or regionalism in contributing towards the foreign 
policy objective of finding ways and means of alleviating problems 
related to environmental degradation. 
4.4 - Conclusions 
No single foreign policy strategy discussed in this chapter was able 
to successfully realise all the objectives of Vanuatu and the 
Maldives in the area of environment protection. These objectives 
included drawing international attention to the plight of small 
island states in the face of the deteriorating global environment 
and placing the issue of global warming on the international agenda; 
influencing negotiations on climate change; and finding ways and 
means of alleviating environmental problems at the local and 
regional levels. This section will attempt to assess the relative 
significance of multilateralism, regionalism and bilateralism in 
contributing towards the objectives of the two countries. 
Multilateralism was by far the most useful for Vanuatu in drawing 
the attention of the international community to the plight of the 
small island states. Starting in the late 1980s Vanuatu joined 
forces with other sympathetic states through multilateral forums in 
drawing the attention of the international community to the 
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environmental vulnerability of small island states. In comparison 
with multilateralism the usefulness of regionalism in contributing 
towards the objective was relatively less effective. A statement 
made at a regional meeting for example is not as effective in 
drawing international attention to the cause as a statement made in 
a multilateral forum like the united Nations or the Commonwealth. 
Bilateralism was also not useful for Vanuatu with respect to drawing 
international attention to the plight of small island states. 
Multilateralism also proved very effective for Vanuatu on the issue 
of influencing negotiations on climate change. The election of Van 
Lierop to the chair of the AOSIS gave Vanuatu an effective position 
to influence negotiations. Through the AOSIS Vanuatu and other small 
island states were able to collectively influence the negotiations 
on the Framework Convention on Climate Change to an extent that 
would not have been possible through any other means. 
The success of AOSIS has however been limited as demonstrated by the 
organisation's inability to gain the support of the developed 
countries for the proposal to establish an insurance scheme. 
Similarly, the position of the AOSIS on the issue of climate change 
has not received the support of larger countries. Furthermore, 
although the AOSIS led by Vanuatu managed to include a section in 
Agenda 21 on the needs of small states and committed the 
international community to assist them, the results have not been 
satisfactory. The developed countries have not honoured their UNCED 
pledge to increase ODA levels to 0.7 per cent of their GNP. 
Furthermore, the Developed countries at the United Nations 
Conference on the sustainable Development of Small Island Developing 
States refused in 1994 to commit additional finance to small island 
states. 
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Nevertheless, the AOSIS continues to be a useful avenue through 
which small islands states can have some influence on environment 
related issues at the global level. Even after Vanuatu lost the 
chair of the AOSIS, the country has been working collectively with 
other regional states through the AOSIS in trying to ensure that the 
interests of small states receive due importance in the COPs on the 
Convention on Climate Change. 
Regionalism has been useful for Vanuatu in protecting the 
environment of the country at the regional and local levels. The 
SPREP Convention and the Waigani Convention owe their existence to 
regionalism. Vanuatu has also benefited from a number of activities 
organised by SPREP to protect the regional environment and received 
assistance in preparing for major international conferences and 
meetings. Moreover, the activities of SPREP have been underwritten 
by external assistance. At a time when ODA to the South Pacific 
island states are declining, SPREP proves to be an important asset 
in the area of foreign aid. However, compared to regional and 
multilateral sources, bilateral partners such as Australia and New 
Zealand provided Vanuatu with more environment related aid. 
In the case of the Maldives too multilateralism was invaluable in 
sensitising the 
island states. 
international community on the plight of small 
Through the Vancouver CHOGM and the United Nations 
General Assembly of 1987 the Maldives drew international attention 
to the threat faced by small island states due to global warming. 
Other small states quickly joined in the effort to place global 
warming on the international agenda. 
Through the AOSIS the Maldives was .able to join forces with other 
small island states in the fight against climate change and sea 
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level rise. AOSIS apparently, turned out to be one of the leading 
forces in the negotiations on the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. 
Regionalism was not of any use to the Maldives in placing the issue 
of global warming on the international agenda or influencing 
negotiations on climate change, due to differences in the interests 
of the Maldives and the rest of the regional countries. Although the 
Maldives received the sympathy of bilateral partners such as the 
United Kingdom for the environmental concerns of the country the 
significance of bilateralism in placing the issue of global warming 
on the international agenda or influencing negotiations on climate 
change was far less than multilateralism. 
In the area of environment related aid the record of multilateralism 
has not been too good. Nevertheless, the general trend shows that an 
increasing amount of aid will in the future be diverted from 
bilateral programmes to multilateral or regional programmes. 
Moreover, multilateralism remains the most cost-effective avenue 
through which the Maldives could singularly and in association with 
other states, push the international community to increase aid 
allocation to small islands states. Thus, multilateralism is 
important in the area of environment-related aid but so far it has 
not been as effective as bilateralism. 
Bilateralism proved the most effective for the Maldives in obtaining 
foreign aid for environment protection at the local level. Countries 
such as Japan have been invaluable for the Maldives in this respect. 
The assistance received from bilateral partners has been far greater 
in comparison with that received from multilateral and regional 
sources. 
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The contribution of regionalism to the Maldives' effort to protect 
its environment is likely to remain very limited in the foreseeable 
future. The Maldives was able to introduce environmental protection 
into the SAARC process and initiate two studies on the regional 
environment. However, the recommendations contained in the studies 
have not been implemented. Other more pressing problems in the 
regional countries have accorded very low priority to environment 
protection within SAARC. Nevertheless, the Maldives is continuing to 
work for greater regional co-operation in environmental protection. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis was undertaken with the aim of contributing to the 
relatively neglected study of the foreign policy of small island 
states. The thesis attempted to evaluate the foreign policies of 
Vanuatu and the Maldives to determine whether it is justified to 
argue in favour of mul tilateralism, regionalism or bilateralism as 
the most effective foreign policy strategy for small states. 
This study was undertaken due to two main reasons. Firstly, the 
literature on the foreign policy of small states is riddled with 
diverse views on the most effective foreign policy strategy for this 
group of countries creating the need for additional research in the 
area. Secondly, the resources available to small states are very 
limited making it extremely important for them to ensure that their 
foreign policy orientation is the most effective. 
Vanuatu and the Maldives were employed as case studies in this thesis 
because they were small island states and their foreign policies were 
of the same class or universe rendering them suitable for comparison. 
This similarity in foreign policies largely stemmed from their common 
physical characteristics intrinsic to small island states and certain 
similarities in the historical experience of these two countries. For 
example, both these countries are environmentally and economically 
very fragile; they are LDCs on the verge of premature graduation from 
the category; they both faced secessionist movements just before 
independence; and on independence both these countries advocated the 
policy of non-alignment and joined international organisations such 
as the, united Nations, the Commonwealth and the NAM. 
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The evaluation in this thesis was based on the framework for foreign 
policy evaluation suggested by G.A. Raymond. Under the framework, the 
foreign policies of Vanuatu and the Maldives were divided into their 
three elementary components goals, objectives and actions. In 
identifying the goals for use in the thesis, the following three 
strategies suggested by Hermann were employed: 1) taking at face 
value the professed goals; 2) infer goals from behaviour; and 3) 
infer goals from the demands imposed by the environment. The goals so 
identified for evaluation include Preserving and Enhancing Security 
and Sovereignty; Economic Development; and Environment Protection. 
The above goals were linked to several objectives. This thesis 
selected for evaluation some of the most significant of these 
obj ecti ves based on: 1) foreign policy actions of both countries 
under study; 2) statements made by officials of Vanuatu and the 
Maldives; and 3) academic literature on small states in general and 
Vanuatu and the Maldives in particular. Most of the objectives 
identified for evaluation were shared by both Vanuatu and the 
Maldives. The environment protection related objectives used in the 
study included: drawing international attention to the plight of the 
small island states and placing the issue of global warming on the 
international agenda; influencing negotiations on climate change; and 
obtaining resources for environment protection. The economic 
development related objectives employed for evaluation included the 
protection of resources; reducing vulnerabilities and the promotion 
of trade; and maximising development assistance. Of the security and 
sovereignty related objectives used in the thesis assertion of 
sovereignty was common to Vanuatu and the Maldives. Protecting 
against transnational crime was an objective of the Maldives and a 
professed objective of Vanuatu. The country specific objectives 
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employed in the thesis were tied to the goal of preserving and 
enhancing security and sovereignty and included the support for 
decolonisation and the establishment of a SPNFZ which were very 
significant in the foreign policy of Vanuatu, and the establishment 
of an IOZOP and a SANWFZ which was prominent in the foreign policy of 
the Maldives. 
Each objective identified were linked to multilateralism, regionalism 
and bilateralism. Each linked goal, objective and strategy made up a 
program. This thesis attempted to assess each program to determine 
whether the strategy employed was indeed effective in contributing 
towards the desired goal, measured by the extent to which the 
obj ecti ve was reached. Based on the compara ti ve method this thesis 
assessed the relative effectiveness of the strategies by comparing 
the extent to which the different programs with the same goal 
realised their objectives. The results of this assessment for Vanuatu 
and the Maldives is then being used below for an inter-country 
comparison to determine whether it is possible to generalise in 
favour of anyone strategy as more effective for the foreign policy 
of small island states. 
In the area of preserving and enhancing security and sovereignty the 
evaluation revealed that multilateralism was important for Vanuatu 
and the Maldives at a symbolic level in asserting their sovereignty. 
By gaining membership of the United Nations quickly after 
independence these states sent a signal to the international 
community that they were determined to assert their sovereignty and 
freedom. Similarly the membership of NAM obtained by the two 
countries were at a symbolic level, expressions of their resolve to 
maintain independent foreign policies. 
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The one stop exposure to the international community offered through 
multilateral forums afforded Vanuatu and the Maldives the most cost-
effective channel to have their interests, grievances and problems 
heard and to sensitise the international community on various issues. 
Based on the principles of non-alignment and assuming the moral high 
ground on international issues the Maldives and Vanuatu used 
multilateral forums in calling for disarmament, denuclearisation, 
decolonisation and the like. In doing so they were able to assert 
their sovereignty and independence in foreign policy. Regionalism was 
less useful for this purpose for both countries since regional forums 
were relatively smaller than their multilateral counterparts. 
Vanuatu also used various bilateral policies to assert its 
sovereignty. Among these policies were the establishment of relations 
with radical states such as Vietnam, Cuba and Libya. However radical 
initiatives at the bilateral level sometimes created unnecessary 
friction with useful partners such as Australia, or backfired and the 
country had to change its policies. As for the Maldives, establishing 
relations with states such as Cuba did not create much controversy in 
the region since they were not perceived a threat by South Asian 
countries, most of which were members of the NAM. 
Multilateralism and regionalism also proved equally useful for 
Vanuatu in contributing towards its objectives of supporting 
decolonisation and denuclearisation. In 1983, Vanuatu was 
instrumental in getting the Commonwealth to stress the need for the 
early independence of New Caledonia. The same year Vanuatu used the 
NAM forum to condemn Indonesian policies in East Timor. Such 
condemnation 
colonialism. 
contributed to the international lobby against 
Through the SPF Vanuatu was able to gain regional support to re-
inscribe New Caledonia in the united Nations' list of colonies. 
Vanuatu's links with NAM member states are believed to have been very 
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important in the re-inscription. The overwhelming support for the 
decolonisation of New Caledonia demonstrated by the united Nations 
member states is believed to have contributed to a softening of the 
French position on the independence of the colony. Vanuatu had no 
success through SPF or multilateral organisations in enlisting East 
Timor and West Papua in the UN' list of colonies. Bilateralism was 
also not very useful for the latter purpose. 
Vanuatu also used multilateral forums such as the Commonwealth and 
the UN to pursue its objective of denuclearisation of the Pacific. 
These efforts contributed to the lobby against nuclear proliferation 
and testing. Scholars have noted that international pressure was 
instrumental in France calling off her tests early. 
Regionalism also enabied Vanuatu to fight for the establishment of a 
nuclear free zone in the region. However given the conflicting 
interests between Vanuatu and influential regional countries such as 
Australia, the former only succeeded partially in contributing 
towards its objective of establishing a nuclear free zone. Australia 
pre-empted the comprehensive SPNFZ agreement that Vanuatu was 
seeking, that would have jeopardised Western interests in the South 
Pacific. The resulting Rarotonga Treaty was what has been called a 
"half loaf", which was better than none. Bilateralism was not at all 
useful in the pursuance of the objective of denuclearisation. 
As for the Maldives multilateralism was the only avenue through which 
it could pursue the establishment of an IOZOP and a SANWFZ. Unlike in 
the case of Vanuatu regionalism was not useful for the Maldives in 
pursuing the latter objective since there was no support for the 
cause from regional powers, and SAARC limited discussion to non-
290 
controversial issues. Bilateralism was not an option for the 
pursuance of an IOZOP or a SANWFZ. 
In the fight against transnational crime the effectiveness of 
multilateral organisations have been very limited for the Maldives. 
During the mercenary attack in 1988 the Commonwealth tried to obtain 
military support for the country. However the assistance that did 
arrive was not due to the effort of the Commonwealth Secretary 
General but because of bilateral relations with India. Furthermore, 
the effort by the Maldives following the attack to mobilise support 
of the united Nations community for the protection and security of 
small states did not prove too successful. The larger states within 
the organisation were unwilling to go any further than provide lip 
service to the special security needs of small states. 
In combating transnational crime the Maldives found regionalism to be 
promising but not in the short-term. A regional convention on 
terrorism has been adopted although the necessary enabling 
legislation is yet to be enacted in all the regional countries. A 
terrorist offences monitoring desk has also been established under 
SAARC but it too is not yet functioning effectively. 
In the case of the South Pacific, regional cooperation is growing in 
the area of combating transnational crime but Vanuatu has not shown a 
great deal of enthusiasm for the cause. corruption in the top ranks 
of the country's bureaucracy is perhaps the reason for the lack of 
enthusiasm. 
Overall, multilateralism has been more effective than regionalism or 
globalism in contributing towards the security and sovereignty 
related objectives of Vanuatu and the Maldives. Regionalism was 
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useful to some extent for Vanuatu with respect to two objectives. As 
for the Maldives regionalism was not useful in making any substantial 
contribution towards any objective, although SAARC promises to be of 
some use in the future in the area of combating crime. Bilateralism 
was useful for the Maldives in defending against the terrorist attack 
in 1988 and for Vanuatu in suppressing the Santo rebellion and in 
tackling the unrest in the country in 1988. 
In furthering the goal of economic development both Vanuatu and the 
Maldives found multilateralism to be effective in contributing 
towards the objective of minimising vulnerabilities and promoting 
trade. Lome Convention gave preferential access for Vanuatu's 
products to the EU, which proved to be the former's biggest export 
market. Furthermore the membership of multilateral forums such as the 
united Nations and the Commonwealth in which there are a large number 
of small states have been very useful for the Maldives and Vanuatu in 
their effort to avert premature graduation from the UN list of LDCs. 
In this effort the support of a number of larger states within these 
organisations, which were sympathetic to the cause of the small 
states was also significant. Moreover in today's world of declining 
aDA and eroding trade preferences multilateral forums have a very 
important role to play for small states in trying to obtain some sort 
of preferential treatment in trade. 
Regionalism has not proved very effective for Vanuatu in the 
promotion of trade despite SPARTECA. Over the last decade the 
exports of Vanuatu to Australia and New Zealand did not climb above 
US$ 2.2 million in any given year. Regional organisations do provide 
some services in the area of trade promotion but the effectiveness 
of such assistance has been very limited. The benefits of trade 
through the agreement between the MSG countries have also not been 
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as effective as trade through multilateral arrangements or 
institutions. 
The effectiveness of regionalism to the Maldives in the area of 
trade has also been very limited. SAPTA has not been effective in 
increasing the exports of the Maldives to regional countries. 
Imports from the regional countries to the Maldives continue to rise 
constantly from the pre-SAPTA period. The usefulness of the proposed 
SAFTA is also questionable given the fact that the Maldives will 
loose a large chunk of its government revenue from taxes and the 
country does not at the moment have appropriate export products to 
take advantage of the regional markets. 
Bilateralism has been as useful as multilateralism for both Vanuatu 
and the Maldives in contributing towards the objective of minimising 
vulnerabili ties and promoting trade. Under bilateral arrangements 
such as the GSP the Maldives and Vanuatu have preferential access to 
the markets of bilateral partners. As a result of GSP Japan is the 
second largest export market for Vanuatu. As for the Maldives UK and 
Germany are among the most valued markets. Although the US does not 
extend preferential treatment to the Maldives under the GSP the 
quota for garments provided to the country under MFA lis very 
valuable for trade. 
Multilateralism and regionalism complemented each other for Vanuatu 
in protecting its marine resources. The large number of small island 
states within the South Pacific enabled cooperation in protecting the 
marine resources of the region. It was within the SPF that the 
momentum was built to thrust the issue of driftnet fishing onto the 
global scene eventually culminating in the UN decision to ban the 
practice. The FFA supported by Australia, New Zealand and France is 
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playing a very effective role in monitoring and surveillance of the 
regional EEZs. The organisation is also doing an effective job in 
managing the region's fishery resources by instituting various rules 
and regulations to be followed by distant water fishing nations. The 
regional states were also able to use the organisation to 
collectively bargain with the united states over fishing rights 
within the South Pacific. The organisation also provides a range of 
services to member states such as the collection and dissemination of 
scientific data on the region's marine resources. 
As for the Maldives regionalism has not been useful at all in the 
protection of the country's marine resources. Given the high degree 
of political tension within the region the monitoring of EEZs is too 
sensitive an issue to be made an area for cooperation under SAARC. 
In pursuing the objective of obtaining foreign aid too regionalism 
has been important to Vanuatu but not for Maldives. Regional 
organisations in the South Pacific receive a substantial amount of 
funding from external sources. Thus regionalism proved to be a useful 
source to supplement the declining aDA to the country. Unlike the 
regional organisations in the South Pacific, SAARC does not receive 
much assistance from external sources. Moreover a large chunk of 
whatever funding received by the organisation goes to projects which 
have very little relevance to the Maldives given the differences 
between the latter and the rest of the regional states. 
Bilateralism is the most effective strategy for the Maldives as far 
as foreign aid is concerned. This is the case with Vanuatu too. Aid 
received from bilateral sources far outweigh assistance from regional 
or multilateral sources in the case of both of these countries. 
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Overall, bilateralism was more effective for both Vanuatu and the 
Maldives in contributing towards the foreign policy goal of economic 
development. Multilateralism was equally important for both Vanuatu 
and the Maldives although to a lesser degree than bilateralism. 
Regionalism proved useful only to Vanuatu in contributing towards its 
economic development related objectives considered in this thesis. 
In contributing towards the foreign policy goal of environment 
protection both Vanuatu and the Maldives found multilateralism to be 
very effective in furthering two of their objectives - (a) enhancing 
international awareness of the threat of environmental degradation to 
small island states and placing climate change on the international 
agenda; and (b) influencing climate change negotiations. The 
membership of multilateral organisations enabled the Maldives to 
raise the issue of global warming and the threat it posed to small 
island states at the Commonwealth and the United Nations in 1987 
thereby bringing the issue into the international spotlight. Other 
small states wi thin these organisations were quick join in placing 
the issue on the international agenda. The AOSIS led by Vanuatu was 
able to play a significant role in the negotiations on climate 
change. At the UNCED the joint effort of small states through the 
AOSIS enabled them to include several issues favourable to their 
cause in the Agenda 21. 
Nevertheless there were limits to the success of small states through 
multilateral institutions. For example, developed countries did not 
take any action no the insurance scheme proposed by the AOSIS. 
Similarly the Convention on Climate Change is still not what the 
small island states would like it to be. As such Vanuatu and the 
Maldives are still working through the AOSIS to halt global warming 
and climate change. 
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Regionalism was not useful for the Maldives in contributing towards 
the above objectives due to the differences in the interests and 
commi tment of the Maldives and the rest of the regional countries. 
Even for Vanuatu regionalism was of not much use in furthering the 
above two objectives. The main reason being the fact that all the 
regional states were members of the AOSIS which was a more effective 
body to act at the international level. Bilateralism was also of not 
much use to Vanuatu or the Maldives in contributing towards the above 
two objectives. 
In obtaining 
bilateralism 
foreign 
to be 
aid both the Maldives 
more effective than 
and Vanuatu found 
multilateralism or 
regionalism. The level of aid received by both these countries from 
bilateral partners were much higher than that from multilateral or 
regional sources. 
Vanuatu found regionalism also to be of significant importance, 
although not as much as bilateralism, since SPREP received a 
sUbstantial amount of assistance from external sources. Moreover the 
co-ordinating role played by SPREP and the various activities of the 
organisations such as awareness raising and training was useful for 
Vanuatu. As for the Maldives, regionalism was not at all useful in 
obtaining assistance to protect the environment. 
Overall, multilateralism was the most effective in contributing 
towards two objectives of the Maldives and Vanuatu which included 
raising international awareness and placing global warming on the 
international agenda, and influencing negotiations on the Convention 
on Climate Change. Regionalism was only effective for Vanuatu in 
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obtaining foreign aid. Bilateralism was the most effective for both 
the countries in contributing towards the latter objective. 
The above evaluation demonstrated a slight bias in favour of 
mul tilateralism as more useful overall compared to regionalism and 
bilateralism, in contributing towards the foreign policy objectives 
of Vanuatu and the Maldives. This was because all of the objectives 
were given equal weight in the analysis. If the objectives were 
prioritised then the results would have been different. For instance 
if foreign aid and physical security were considered the priority of 
small island states then bilateralism would have been considered the 
most effective strategy. Thus there is no justification to argue in 
favour of anyone foreign policy strategy as the most effective for 
small states. 
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